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John Rawls intends his doctrine of political liberalism to be free of metaphysical 
commitments.  For this reason, Rawls’ conception of autonomy is not supposed to be 
dependent on the truth of any one metaphysical theory of human nature.  Instead, Rawls 
states that people are rationally autonomous – able to develop their moral powers – and 
fully autonomous – able to act from a sense of justice – positing that we can accept these 
conceptions of autonomy whatever our other philosophical commitments.   
 
Though autonomy is not Rawls’ central concern, I argue that, nevertheless, full autonomy 
is integral to Rawls’ theory of justice.  Without fully autonomous citizens, there is no one 
to realise justice as fairness.  Through his way of thinking about human nature, Rawls 
assumes that people will be motivated to become fully autonomous.  Through the 
possession of the moral powers, and the witnessing of the just workings of society’s 
institutions, a person will wish to act as a fully autonomous citizen should.  I argue against 
making this assumption.  Instead, I evaluate Rawls’ conception of the person against data 
in neuroscience and psychology, and thereby articulate two central concerns.  First, a 
person’s moral psychology is largely dependent on her upbringing.  If a person’s 
upbringing has not instilled in her a sense of the importance of fairness, there is little hope 
of her becoming fully autonomous in the way Rawls imagines.  Second, in the 
neuroscience of free will, evidence suggests that we are much less in control of our thought 
processes than is traditionally imagined.  If we are not in full control of our thought 
processes, there may be little we can do to prevent our being influenced by ideas that 
undermine justice as fairness.   
 
This is why I argue that, to realise political liberalism in the way Rawls formulates it, a 
system of moral education is necessary; a system that is much more demanding than that 
imagined by Rawls.  It cannot be assumed that people are inherently predisposed to the 
value of justice as fairness, nor can it be imagined that the majority of people would reject 
alternative doctrines through their capacity to regulate their thoughts.  A strong prior 
commitment to justice as fairness is therefore necessary.  If political liberalism is to be 
realised in the way Rawls imagines, people must be educated in the importance of justice 
as fairness, with the aim of such a system of education being the development of fully 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
1.1 Political Liberalism: Autonomy and Free Will  
 
In his 1993 work Political Liberalism, John Rawls attempts to show how his theory of 
justice is not dependent on the truth of a particular doctrine within religion or philosophy.  
A reasonable person could accept this theory of justice whatever her other religious or 
philosophical commitments.  In this thesis, I argue that Rawls’ position cannot hold.  
Rawls considers people to be autonomous, and I show that his conception of autonomy 
contains metaphysical assumptions.  These metaphysical assumptions reveal a flaw in 
Rawls’ supposed neutrality between reasonable philosophical doctrines, and also a 
weakness in how he imagines a just liberal order can be established and sustained.  Rawls 
considers people come to commit to his theory of justice through their own free will and 
intellectual resources.  Data drawn from neuroscience and psychology, however, suggests 
that this approach is overly optimistic.  This data challenges how we think about free will 
and our intellectual capacities.  If we are to enable citizens to become autonomous – and 
for justice as fairness to be realised, citizens must be autonomous – a radically different 
approach must be taken from that proposed by Rawls.      
 
Though Rawls argued that metaphysics had no place within politics, he does allow for the 
implications of scientific knowledge to be considered.  Within what Rawls calls public 
reason – the method of deliberation by which conclusions regarding constitutional 
essentials are drawn – citizens can draw on science to support their reasoning.  This gives 
us grounds, I argue, on which to support our political reasoning with the conclusions of 
neuroscience.  There is work within neuroscience looking at whether we have free will.  
Considering such scientific knowledge leads us to revise how we think about autonomy.   
 
A society without those Rawls describes as fully autonomous citizens – citizens motivated 
to act in accord with what is just – is an unstable one.  Considering neuroscience may lead 
us to think that we cannot expect people to become fully autonomous if left to their own 
devices.  Society should therefore be devised as to encourage the development of full 
autonomy.  In this thesis, I argue that this requires us to adopt certain measures which are 
perfectionist, as they recognise a prior standard of the good against which to judge.  Full 
autonomy provides such a standard; a person who is fully autonomous is living a better life 
than someone who is not.  If the empirical data taken from neuroscience is true, then we 
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should consider how important, yet vulnerable, autonomy is for the stability of a society.  
We would prioritise the development of autonomy over other political values.   
       
1.2 Why Care About Autonomy in Political Liberalism?  
 
There is a sense in which Rawls imagines that moral and intellectual powers underpinning 
autonomy are innate within the human condition.  The basis of what he calls rational 
autonomy is in the two moral powers: the capacity for a sense of justice and the ability to 
formulate a conception of the good (Rawls 2005, pp.72-77).  Because we have these two 
powers, we can be considered rationally autonomous when we develop them.  The way in 
which we are autonomous politically, or fully autonomous as Rawls puts it, rests on how 
we develop the first moral power in relation to the society we inhabit (Rawls 2005, pp.77-
81).  Rawls recognises that we cannot be considered fully autonomous unless we live in a 
society in which the principles of justice are widely recognised and understood.  The basis 
on which we come to realise the conditions necessary for full autonomy rests on our 
capacity for rational autonomy.  That is, it is because we recognise our self-interests as 
rationally autonomous agents that we desire to live in a society in which we can become 
fully autonomous.  Thus, the way in which we are supposed to become autonomous rests 
on certain assumptions regarding our innate sense of morality.   
 
Due to these assumed characteristics, Rawls assumes that we will desire to become 
autonomous.  Autonomous citizens are committed to upholding just institutions, in which 
liberal ideals are embedded.  However, empirical evidence suggests that people are less 
committed to liberal ideals than liberals such as Rawls imagine.  A study by the Hansard 
Society in 2019 found that 54% of the British public thought that a “strong leader who was 
willing to break the rules” was necessary.  In the same survey, 42% thought that 
government would be more effective if it did not have to worry about votes in parliament.  
The Pew Research Center assessed attitudes towards democracy across 34 countries 
between 2018 and 2019, finding that 52% of people were dissatisfied with the way their 
democracy was functioning, while commitment to certain democratic ideals was found to 
be low (Wike & Schumacher 2020).  Nationalist leaders have been gaining support across 
democracies in Europe, with some in positions of power satisfying the desire for a strong 
leader willing to break the rules.  Responding to the Covid-19 crisis, Hungary’s Victor 




Though a rigorous assessment of attitudes towards democracy is not the focus of this 
thesis, these are signs that many people living in democracies are dissatisfied with the 
workings of democracy.  What is of significance here is not the reasons why people are 
dissatisfied with democracy.  There could be many legitimate reasons why a person 
became dissatisfied with the workings of democracy: corruption; politicians failing to 
listen to the people; a feeling that the political class is removed from the experiences of the 
rest of the population.  Instead, the concern here is why people express dissatisfaction with 
democracy itself, rather than demanding the need for reform.  This suggests a low level of 
commitment to the value of democracy on the part of many citizens.  If many citizens 
possess a weak motivation to uphold just institutions, a problem is posed for the 
implementation of liberal political theory. 
 
I argue that this problem is fundamental for Rawls.  A Rawlsian might argue that if what 
Rawls refers to as “the basic structure of society” had functioned more effectively (Rawls 
1971, pp.7-11), realising the sense of justice that Rawls argued should be embedded in this 
structure, then none of this would have been a problem.  People would have continued to 
value liberal democratic institutions providing they functioned effectively, even without a 
deeper commitment to their importance on the part of many citizens.  It is my contention in 
this thesis that this is mistaken.  Whether or not the basic structure of society is functioning 
effectively, a citizenry that cares about the value of democracy and acting so as to realise 
just societies and communities is important.  Without such a citizenry, the task of realising 
a just society will remain perpetually unstable.  
 
This is part of the reason why I argue we should reassess the place of autonomy within 
political liberalism.  Whereas the development of full autonomy is prescribed – a citizen 
should recognise the principles of justice and develop her sense of justice accordingly – the 
citizen is free to develop her rational autonomy within the bounds of what is reasonable.  
She must ensure that her conception of the good is compatible with a society which 
functions according to fair terms of cooperation.  If this is the case, then her conception of 
the good is reasonable.  As she formulates and acts to realise such a conception of the 
good, Rawls considers her rationally autonomous.  The citizen is, then, left to her own 
devices to determine how she conceives of the good life, living life in accord with this 
conception.  A person becomes fully autonomous when she comes to act from the 
principles of justice.  Full autonomy, unlike rational autonomy, is not a matter of 
individual choice, but one of what would be collectively agreed in a hypothetical situation.  
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While the fully autonomous citizen is a citizen who acts from the principles of justice 
accepted by all other reasonable citizens, the rationally autonomous citizen is free to 
choose her good for herself. 
 
Drawing on evidence from neuroscience and its philosophical implications, I argue that the 
conditions under which a person develops her rational autonomy can potentially undermine 
the development of full autonomy.  Evidence within neuroscience suggests that our 
capacity for free choice is limited.  Benjamin Libet precipitated much debate between 
philosophy and neuroscience on the question of free will (Libet et al 1983).  As his 
experiments appeared to reveal that our conscious awareness of our intentions followed 
behind our brain’s formulations of these intentions, Libet posited that our ability to 
consciously initiate our own intentions and desires to act was severely restricted.  While 
philosophers have responded to Libet’s work with a variety of convincing rebuttals, there 
are implications drawn from contemporary neuroscience that I argue remain problematic. 
We should, therefore, take the implications of neuroscience seriously.  The determinism of 
neural processes and the lack of a centre of consciousness from where these processes are 
controlled should lead us to reassess the way in which we come to hold the thoughts we do.  
Whatever philosophical conception of free will one endorses, we should consider this 
problematic.  If there is no centre of consciousness from where we can control our thought 
processes, then we also have little ability to control the way in which our thoughts are 
influenced.  There is no centre of control from where we can regulate our thoughts.  What 
we end up thinking and valuing is, then, largely outside of our control.     
 
Without a prior commitment to the value of justice as fairness, we could not suppose 
citizens would continue acting as fully autonomous citizens.  In a society in which ideas 
that threaten the stability of democratic institutions are prevalent, we could not expect a 
person to remain uninfluenced by these ideas.  A person could be exposed to ideas on 
social media that were at odds with the values of political liberalism, deciding to reject 
political liberalism in favour of these ideas.  In such a case, with no centre of conscious 
control from where thought processes are regulated, we could not expect this person to 
bring her ideals back into alignment with the values of political liberalism.  She has little 
ability to determine how her surroundings influence how she conceives of the good.  
Without any prior commitment to political liberalism, she may well find alternative 




Though Rawls downplays the role autonomy plays in political liberalism, claiming that it is 
not a regulative principle guiding other aspects of the theory (Rawls 2005, p.78), without 
fully autonomous citizens, none of the aims of political liberalism could be achieved.  In a 
society in which the majority of citizens are not fully autonomous, there are few people left 
to uphold the principles of justice.  The stability of the well-ordered society imagined by 
Rawls is lost.  If we cannot assume that citizens will become fully autonomous through 
their own intellectual capacities, society should be structured so as to encourage the 
development of fully autonomy.  While full autonomy, Rawls argues, is only applicable in 
the political domain – it is in realising the principles of justice politically that one becomes 
fully autonomous – I posit that we need to think about the value of full autonomy 
throughout our lives.  This brings us close to what G.A. Cohen calls the “egalitarian ethos” 
(1992; 2008).  In a society in which the egalitarian ethos is central, people refer to their 
concern for equality when justifying their actions.  Likewise, the fully autonomous citizen 
recognises the importance of realising a sense of justice, but also recognises the way in 
which certain acts can impede the development of autonomy for others, in turn, eroding the 
sense of justice existing within society.  Leaving a citizen to determine her own good may 
lead her to develop a moral psychology at odds with justice as fairness.  Instead, the 
development of an appropriate moral psychology should be the focus of education.  This is 
not to say that the state need determine all aspects of a citizens’ good, but that the state 
should ensure its citizens are committed to upholding justice.   
 
In Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), Hannah Arendt focuses on the problem of people who 
have forgotten how to think and judge in totalitarian regimes.  This problem should be 
taken seriously.  It is not only a problem within totalitarian regimes.  People fail to think 
and judge in liberal democracies, too.  Arguably, this is part of the reason for the existence 
of what Rawls might have deemed “unreasonable” ideas in liberal democracies: the belief 
that an authoritarian leader who would break the rules would be preferable to democratic 
norms; the idea that we should judge people based on their race, gender, or sexuality; the 
belief that basic rights are not inalienable.  Such ideas are unreasonable as they break the 
terms of fair cooperation.  Parties in Rawls’ original position – his thought experiment in 
which a position of impartiality is constructed in order to determine what is just – would 
not accept that such conclusions were just.  However, these ideas persist within liberal 
democracies.  Arendt argued that the failure to think and judge is most problematic in those 
who unquestioningly follow orders.  Considering the problems revealed by neuroscience, 
we may conclude that there is no independent space from where we can question our 
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ability to think and judge.  Most of us unquestioningly accept many beliefs and practices as 
acceptable as we never have the opportunity to question their acceptability.  It is not only 
the following of orders without question that leads to the problem of unreasonableness, but 
the lack of an ability to consciously control our thought processes independently of our 
environment.  In an environment in which unreasonable ideas predominate, it could be 
expected that many people would become unreasonable.  An individual under the sway of 
unreasonable ideas has little ability to control how these ideas influence her conception of 
the good.  Therefore, rather than leaving individuals to determine their own good, the 
development of full autonomy should take precedence.  Through a system of moral 
education, citizens should become committed to the value of fairness in the Rawlsian 
sense.  The aim of this is to uphold the stability of the sense of justice within a society, but 
also to allow individuals to better realise their own autonomy.   
 
1.3 Autonomy and The Principles of Justice  
  
A question remains regarding how this argument relates to the central component of 
Rawls’ theory: the principles of justice.  Rawls presupposes that in a just society – one in 
which the principles of justice have been applied to the central institutions – citizens will 
become fully autonomous providing they are made aware of the duties placed on them 
(Rawls 2005, p.78).  Knowing the content of the principles of justice due to its being 
embedded in society’s institutions, citizens will come to act in accordance with the 
principles.  I argue against this presumption.  With nothing to motivate citizens to endorse 
the principles of justice other than knowledge of their content and effectiveness in practice, 
in a society in which freedom of conscience is protected, citizens may choose to endorse 
doctrines entirely at odds with justice as fairness.  Knowledge in itself is not enough to 
commit a person to a doctrine.   
 
If there is to be wide acceptance of the principles of justice, a prior commitment needs to 
be ensured to full autonomy.  It cannot be assumed that citizens will act as fully 
autonomous citizens ought to.  Thus, the relationship between the principles of justice and 
the autonomy of citizens needs to be reconsidered.  In his formulation of the principles of 
justice, Rawls does not speak about autonomy.  The only instance in which autonomy and 
the principles of justice are considered together is when Rawls states that a fully 
autonomous citizen acts from the principles of justice (Rawls 2005, p.77).  However, here 
Rawls assumes that people will act as fully autonomous citizens should.  The principles of 
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justice are not devised so as to encourage the development of full autonomy, nor does 
Rawls assume the prior existence of citizens committed to full autonomy.  The assumption 
that citizens will become fully autonomous is, then, based only on the notion that citizens 
will develop full autonomy through knowledge of the principles of justice.  This is, I argue, 
a weak claim on which to ground the stability of justice as fairness.   
 
In a society in which there were no fully autonomous citizens, no one would act in 
accordance with the principles of justice.  Thus, in such a society, the realisation of justice 
as fairness would be impossible.  While Rawls states that full autonomy develops through 
citizens coming to understand justice as they come to recognise the basic structure as just, 
without fully autonomous citizens to uphold a just basic structure, we are left with no one 
to ensure the basic structure is just.  Within the principles of justice is, then, an implicit 
assumption that citizens are fully autonomous.  As the existence of fully autonomous 
citizens is essential for political liberalism as Rawls formulates it, I argue against making 
this assumption.  Instead, a commitment to the development of full autonomy is needed if 
citizens are to act from the principles of justice; this commitment needs to be fostered.       
 
The application of the principles of justice must, then, be rather different from how Rawls 
imagines.  If the priority of liberty is granted to the institutions constituting the basic 
structure of society, with little regard given to how individuals will behave within this 
structure, individuals may use the liberty granted to the detriment of the principles.  This is 
why, following Cohen (1992; 2008), I argue that the behaviour of individuals must be 
considered.  Without a citizenry committed to upholding the principles of justice, the 
stability of the well-ordered society for which Rawls argues is lost.  Therefore, the 
principles of justice must not only be applied across society, but also in regard to the 
behaviour of individuals.  It is this line of reasoning that undergirds my argument for the 
need of moral education.  If the ideals Rawls formulates are to be attained, citizens must 
become fully autonomous; I argue this can only occur through moral education.   
 
1.4 Autonomy in Political Liberalism: An Overview  
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I explain the basic argument of political liberalism and how autonomy 
is formulated within this theory.  Chapter 2 begins with an assessment of the main concepts 
developed by Rawls in A Theory of Justice.  Rawls’ central task here is to define justice.  
He does this through what he calls the original position and the veil of ignorance (Rawls 
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1971, pp.136-142).  Parties, as he calls those within the original position representing 
citizens, are to imagine they are behind a veil of ignorance; they are ignorant of citizens’ 
place in history, their position within society, and many other aspects of their lives which 
could be considered controversial.  The aim here is to construct a position of impartiality.  
The parties will be impartial as they do not know where in society citizens will come to 
exist; without knowing this, during deliberations they cannot knowingly favour certain 
principles which will favour those citizens over others.  From this position of impartiality, 
Rawls explains the reasoning that leads towards the acceptance of the two principles of 
justice.  These principles are representative of the theory of justice as fairness.     
 
Political liberalism is then considered, and the ways in which Rawls developed the 
concepts and methods within A Theory of Justice, in order to show that they do not 
presuppose the truth of one philosophical or religious doctrine.  He does this by explaining 
the appropriate ways of reaching political consensus.  When deliberating over 
constitutional essentials, we should respect public reason (Rawls 2005, pp.213-216).  
Public reasons are reasons acceptable to people regardless of their other philosophical or 
religious commitments.  Justice as fairness is one such concept.  People can accept justice 
as fairness whatever their beliefs.  This then forms the basis for the overlapping consensus 
of reasonable doctrines (Rawls 2005, pp.144-150).  Society, for Rawls, is based on 
reasonable people united in a sense of justice, but who differ in their beliefs otherwise.  
People’s beliefs overlap where the sense of justice is shared.   
 
Rawls identifies two forms of autonomy in political liberalism: rational and full.  The 
rationally autonomous citizen is able to determine her own good, living in accord with this 
determination, and taking responsibility for the consequences arising.  The fully 
autonomous citizen acts from the principles of justice chosen in the original position.  
Whereas rational autonomy relates more to the form of autonomy important to Raz (1986) 
and Mill (1859) – for whom autonomy is the capacity for self-realisation – full autonomy 
is akin to Kantian autonomy; a form of moral autonomy on which an individual determines 
how to act by reflecting on the principles of practical reason.  For Kant, this means 
identifying the categorical imperative: acting as though the act would become a universal 
law (Kant 1797).  Likewise, Rawls’ fully autonomous citizen reflects on what would be 
determined as just from the perspective of the original position.  Whereas rational 
autonomy – or autonomy as self-realisation – provides the central concern of political 
theory for Raz and Mill, and moral autonomy regulates all aspects of political and moral 
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philosophy for Kant, autonomy is not Rawls’ central concern.  Instead, autonomy is a by-
product of other political considerations.  With the right conditions in place, Rawls 
assumes that citizens will act as rationally and fully autonomous agents.  In a just society, 
individuals will be able to determine their own good and act from just principles, fulfilling 
the demands of rational and full autonomy. 
 
Though Rawls did not place autonomy at the centre of his political theory, as Mill and 
Kant did, autonomy is more important for his theory than Rawls imagines.  This is 
particularly the case with full autonomy.  Without fully autonomous citizens, the 
realisation of justice as fairness would be impossible.  Any political doctrine requires 
people who are convinced of its value, and motivated to act in accord with it.  If the 
majority of citizens in a society are not concerned with the requirements of justice, and fail 
to act accordingly, justice will be unrealisable.  The form of justice devised by Rawls 
requires citizens act in certain ways.  In order to realise the principles of justice, citizens 
need to agree on a certain constitutional form.  They need to vote for certain policies, and 
ensure that society is structured as to promote justice.  This requires a citizenry possessing 
a certain form of moral psychology.  As Rawls deems citizens rationally autonomous, he 
requires them to choose their own good.  Determining their own good, citizens will not 
necessarily develop the kind of moral psychology necessary to uphold political liberalism.   
 
In Chapter 4, I explain the methodology to be used in subsequent chapters, and my 
approach to the relationship between theory and empirical problems.  Rawls’ own method 
of reflective equilibrium is adopted.  In reflective equilibrium, judgements and principles 
are assessed against one another; where there is dissonance between the two, adjustments 
are made to bring both into agreement (Rawls 1971, pp.48-51).  Rawls later distinguished 
“wide” from “narrow” reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1974).  While in narrow reflective 
equilibrium an agent only needs to make judgements in “conviction and confidence”, in 
wide reflective equilibrium, “certain conditions of rationality” are satisfied.  To satisfy 
these conditions, an agent needs to have considered all plausible alternatives to reach a 
state where she is confident in the judgement.  Norman Daniels argues that within wide 
reflective equilibrium, not only judgements and principles need to be considered, but also 
what he calls “background theories” (Daniels 1979).  Though Daniels does not explicitly 
state what theories can be categorised as background theories, it can be surmised that 
various scientific and philosophical theories can be included within reflective equilibrium, 
which are then assessed against the principles and judgements.  I argue that the conditions 
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of wide reflective equilibrium should hold across the framework of political liberalism, and 
neuroscience should be considered at all stages.  To do so would, I argue, alter the 
conclusions reached.  I establish the grounds on which we should consider science and its 
relationship with politics in this chapter.    
 
Thus, rather than assume the nature of a person’s moral psychology, we should, I argue, 
test any theory of moral psychology against the empirics.  I argue that Rawls’ allowance 
for the use of scientific theories to support public reasons should enable us to consider 
psychology and neuroscience.  However, the close relationship between science and 
metaphysics should, I argue, lead us to consider the metaphysical implications of science, 
where these implications bear on matters within political theory.   
 
In Chapter 5, I explain the main metaphysical theories of free will, before arguing that 
Rawls requires the truth of free will – whether that of the compatibilist or the libertarian – 
for the purposes of political liberalism.  Rawls requires citizens who possess the moral and 
intellectual capacities to regulate their own thought processes, ensuring they cohere with 
the ideals of political liberalism.  If citizens lack these capacities, then political liberalism 
is undermined.  However, that they are left to their own devices to develop these capacities 
suggests that Rawls considers them to possess some form of free will.  If it were argued 
that hard determinism was true, and thus we could not be considered morally responsible, 
Rawls would have to reject this view.  Such a view undermines the basis on which Rawls 
thinks about people, their lives, and their abilities to make agreements with one another in 
order to live sociably.  Rejecting the basis on which people come to make these agreements 
would require a different way of thinking about human nature and moral psychology.    
 
Arguments concerning free will in neuroscience are assessed in Chapter 6, before the 
philosophical implications of these arguments are more fully explained in Chapter 7.  
Considering the implications of neuroscience should lead us to revise the way we think 
about people, their thoughts and actions.  Though the compatibilist perspective on free will 
is somewhat immune to the implications of empirical evidence, the data within 
neuroscience should lead us to revise how we think about thought processes.  If we have 
little conscious control over our thought processes, then there may be little we can do to 
prevent the influence of unreasonable ideas.  While compatibilist arguments hold in 
securing responsibility for our acts – nothing taken from the neuroscience undermines the 
arguments of Harry Frankfurt (1971), for instance – there remain problems unresolved in 
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relation to our thoughts.  There are two problematic implications here.  First, the conscious 
will is not a prime mover (Haggard 2008).  Instead, neural processes occur in deterministic 
cycles.  While this in itself is not fatal to the compatibilist position – a compatibilist would 
expect the will to be determined by prior causes – the second implication proves more 
troubling.  This is that there is no centre of consciousness from where these processes are 
controlled (Roth 2003).  Whether consistency holds between two thoughts is, then, 
essentially a matter of luck; that is, thought processes are subject to little human control.  
Without a centre of conscious control from where thoughts can be regulated, we could not 
expect someone to necessarily develop the necessary moral psychology for political 
liberalism if her thoughts were the result of unreasonable external influences.   
 
Assessing Rawls’ formulation of autonomy against ways of thinking about free will within 
neuroscience, in Chapter 8, I argue that we should revise how we think about autonomy.  
However, neither rational nor full autonomy are entirely irreconcilable with the data in 
neuroscience.  Whether or not we have free will, we may be capable of forming a 
reasonable conception of the good and acting justly.  However, rather than assume there is 
an innate sense of morality within the person – as Rawls does when he claims we have two 
moral powers – we should recognise that any sense of morality we come to hold is 
dependent on neural processes over which we hold little influence.  Rather than assign 
individuals the responsibility of developing their sense of morality, we should think of a 
societal responsibility to shape the ideas which influence our moral development.  
Considering this from the perspective of rationally autonomous parties in the original 
position – for whom, as this is a hypothetical space, the data on neural determinism does 
not apply – it will be recognised that without fully autonomous citizens, justice as fairness 
will be unrealisable.  Full autonomy cannot be considered a by-product of the social 
structure; it may be the case that even with a broadly just social structure in place, people 
are still persuaded by unreasonable ideas.  The development of full autonomy should 
therefore be prioritised.  Assuming that citizens are rationally autonomous in the 
appropriate way may undermine full autonomy.  Citizens may develop their rational 
autonomy in ways that are at odds with the values of justice as fairness.  If we take the 
implications of neural determinism seriously, then we cannot expect citizens to ensure the 
thoughts they come to think are reasonable, and that they come to value the appropriate 
sense of justice.  Instead, society should be structured as to encourage people to develop 




Therefore, I argue in Chapter 9 that if justice as fairness is to be realisable, aspects of 
perfectionism are necessary; citizens should be expected to be fully autonomous.  The fully 
autonomous citizen is a necessary component of justice as fairness, and the person living a 
fully autonomous life is living a better life than one who is not, according to the standards 
of political liberalism.  Following from this are several practical implications.  A system of 
moral education is required.  The purpose of education should be to inspire children to 
recognise the importance of fairness.  As adults, people should be motivated to act as to 
realise justice as fairness.  We cannot assume that they will do so of their own free will.  
The effect of this is likely to reduce the diversity of beliefs within a society.  For instance, 
a person raised to value fairness in the Rawlsian sense is unlikely to endorse political 
libertarianism.  Stability, on the other hand, will be enhanced through a common 
understanding of fairness and its value.      
 
As referenced earlier, evidence suggests that citizens are currently detached from the value 
of liberal democracy.  This problem could perhaps be resolved through the perfectionist 
approach suggested here.  On this revision of political liberalism, rather than leave citizens 
to determine their own good, citizens should be motivated to become fully autonomous, 
viewing this as part of their good.  Acting in accord with full autonomy across their lives, 
they act justly towards each other, and recognise the value of the institutions that promote 
this sense of justice.  Such citizens would be motivated to uphold the ideals of a liberal 





Chapter 2 – The Basic Argument of Political Liberalism 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
In Political Liberalism, John Rawls attempted to formulate a theory of justice that would 
be compatible with the plurality of philosophical, religious, and moral beliefs existing in 
modern societies.  This chapter explains the basic argument of Political Liberalism, 
expanding on Rawls’ key ideas and how they fit into the scheme of political liberalism.  
Ideas that specifically relate to Rawls’ conception of the person and autonomy will be 
explained fully in the following chapters.  Thus, they will only be briefly discussed here.  
The purpose of this chapter is to detail the overall structure of political liberalism, so that 
the role of autonomy can be explained at a later stage.  When Rawls’ theory of autonomy is 
critiqued in subsequent chapters, it will then be clearer how the aspects of autonomy being 
critiqued relate to Rawls’ overarching argument.  Finally, some of the main critiques of 
political liberalism are discussed at the end of this chapter.  These will be returned to 
throughout the following chapters, as I assess whether they are supported or undermined 
by the implications arising from this critique.    
 
In 2.2, the theoretical content of A Theory of Justice is examined, and I explain its central 
ideas, which are integral to Rawls’ general thought.  This is followed by an explanation of 
the two principles of justice in 2.3.  Across these two sections, justice as fairness – the 
central idea within Rawls’ political thought – is defined.  A discussion of Rawls’ 
understanding of publicity and public reason is undertaken in 2.4.  These ideas show how 
Rawls imagines citizens come to endorse justice as fairness, and are key to its stability. 
Public reason also establishes the limits of political deliberation; if citizens are to accept 
the legitimacy of state power, then the arguments undergirding this legitimacy must be 
acceptable to them.  Political Liberalism is then analysed in 2.5.   Justice as fairness in 
Rawls’ later work becomes a political conception of justice, supposedly detached from 
wider philosophical considerations.  The way in which Rawls formulates this idea is 
explained in 2.6, through the idea of the overlapping consensus.  Finally, critiques of 
Political Liberalism are assessed in 2.7.  In later chapters, I return to these critiques, 





2.2 A Theory of Justice – The Theory 
 
This section explains the key ideas of Rawls’ theoretical constructs, such as the basic 
structure, the original position, the veil of ignorance, primary goods, and goodness as 
rationality. These ideas show how Rawls draws out his argument, and provide support, for 
his conception of justice.  For Rawls, justice is synonymous with fairness.  While there are 
changes to the formulations of this argument throughout Rawls’ work, the overall 
argument for justice as fairness remains the same.   
 
In formulating a theory of justice, Rawls rejected utilitarianism and intuitionism, and 
instead returned to the idea of the social contract (Rawls 1971, VIII).  Kantian ideas were 
restructured into a framework that Rawls intended to strengthen the idea of justice.  
According to Rawls, justice is the “first virtue of social institutions” (Rawls 1971, p.3).  
For a well-ordered society to function, its institutions must be just.  Furthermore, the idea 
of justice undergirding these institutions must be one that is generally agreed upon, 
otherwise the lack of consensus will cause ruptures within society.  A society with a 
generally agreed upon conception of justice at its heart would allow for the plans of 
individuals to cohere, enabling all to pursue their own aims within the framework of a 
well-ordered society (Rawls 1971, p.6).   
 
According to Rawls, “the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society” 
(Rawls 1971, p.7).  The basic structure consists of all the major institutions across society, 
and legal protections such as freedom of thought, free markets, private property, and the 
family.  These institutions have a major effect on the lives of a society’s inhabitants.  They 
decide the rights and duties people have, they determine peoples’ aspirations, and they 
shape the types of lives people lead. For a society to be just, its basic structure must be just.     
 
The task for Rawls was to identify this conception of justice.  Rawls did this by appealing 
to the idea of the original position (Rawls 1971, pp.17-22), an initial situation in which all 
are equal, assumed to be rational, and able to agree upon principles of justice through a 
process of deliberation.  It is a purely hypothetical situation; Rawls did not assume such a 
place exists.  Furthermore, when Rawls refers to parties in the original position, he is 
referring to representatives of citizens in the well-ordered society, not the citizens 
themselves (Rawls 1971, p.64).  Along with attempting to establish the conditions 
necessary for impartiality, this is to avoid committing to any particular philosophical 
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conception of the self that not all would necessarily agree was true.  Parties in the original 
position are placed behind a veil of ignorance (Rawls 1971, pp.136-142).  This veil ensures 
that the parties have no access to certain forms of knowledge: their place in society, their 
share of society’s resources, their conception of the good, their way of life, particular 
psychological features, or their own natural talents and abilities.  Moreover, they are 
unaware of the general level of development of the society in which they exist.  From this 
position, they must determine principles of justice, and accept that they will live their lives 
according to the implications of those principles.  Rawls argues that the securing of 
primary goods will be at the centre of deliberations (Rawls 1971, pp.91-95).  Whatever 
needs and desires people may have that are personal to them, there are certain primary 
goods “that every rational man is presumed to want” (Rawls 1971, p.62).  There are goods 
that it is in everyone’s self-interest to want, to satisfy their biological needs and meet the 
demands of their basic moral psychology.   Primary goods are divided into social and 
natural goods.  Primary social goods are, for example, “rights and liberties, powers and 
opportunities, income and wealth” (Rawls 1971, p.62).  Primary natural goods are goods 
such as “health and vigor, intelligence and imagination” (Rawls 1971, p.62).   
 
According to Rawls, self-respect is the most important primary good (Rawls 1971, p.440), 
as it is through having self-respect that individuals are motivated to pursue their own ends; 
other primary goods enable a person’s self-respect to be fulfilled.  At the basis of Rawls’ 
understanding of self-respect is the assumption of what he calls the Aristotelian Principle.  
This is the idea that individuals enjoy exercising their “realised capacities” (Rawls 1971, 
p.426).  All of us have certain natural talents.  As we develop, we come to master these 
talents, finding satisfaction in more complex exercises of these talents the further our 
talents grow.  Self-respect, then, is witnessed in those who are successful in realising these 
capacities (Rawls 1971, p.440).  When we feel satisfied that we are reasonably successful 
in life due to the realisation of these capacities, we come to respect ourselves.  For Rawls, 
self-respect grounds the basic motivation of individuals.  It is because of their self-respect 
that they pursue their own ends, finding fulfilment in achieving their aims in life.  This 
virtuous circle also supports the stability of a society, as the continuous reinforcement of 
social cooperation over time motivates individuals to act in accordance with the principles 
of justice.  Self-respect is of vital importance for Rawls. it also forms the basis of Rawls’ 
conception of moral psychology in Political Liberalism, (Rawls 2005, pp.81-82) on which 
citizens are viewed as desiring to be fully functioning members of a cooperative society.  




Where Rawls speaks of ‘the good’ in relation to primary goods, he has in mind the “thin 
theory of the good” (Rawls 1971, pp.395-399).  This is not inclusive of deeper aspects of 
the good belonging to any one philosophical or religious tradition.  For instance, primary 
goods are not goods because God deems them necessary for a satisfactory life, or because 
they are requirements for a life lived according to Aristotelian virtue.  Instead, the thin 
theory of the good defines what will be central to all rational persons’ wants and needs, 
regardless of their philosophical and religious convictions.  This leads Rawls to say that 
goodness is rationality.  Goodness is what is desirable by rational persons.  However, for 
Rawls, the right is prior to the good.  We must determine our conceptions of the good 
within the confines with what is agreed to be right.  This means that any theory of the good 
must be compatible with the principles of justice.          
 
When seeking to define the principles of justice from the original position, the primary 
goods define the nature of what will be sought.  Being rational agents, Rawls thought that 
each person would seek to maximise their own holdings (Rawls 1971, pp.118-119).  
However, other individuals would not accept conditions whereby they were disadvantaged 
by another’s gains, meaning compromise would be necessary.  This compromise is 
reflected in the two principles of justice.  According to these principles, we are afforded 
the opportunity to maximise our gains as is compatible with the same opportunity for 
others.  The principles are further explained in what follows.   
 
To conclude, the aim of the theory here is to identify a conception of justice that can act as 
a regulative principle for a society.  Rawls achieves this by imagining what would be 
sought by parties in the original position, placed behind a veil of ignorance.  Such parties 
seek the best conditions possible for those they represent.  Compromise is sought between 
the parties, as to maximise gains insofar as maximisation is possible with the same level of 
maximisation for others.  It is primary goods that parties are concerned with maximising.  
These goods are what Rawls deems necessary for a satisfactory life, the most important of 
which is self-respect.  A person who has self-respect wishes to develop her moral 
sensibilities and the way of life she desires to live as a result, feeling satisfaction when she 
is successful in this task.  To secure these goods, Rawls argues that a certain arrangement 




2.3 A Theory of Justice – The Principles  
 
Though they are revised throughout A Theory of Justice, and in later work, the original 
formulation of Rawls’ principles of justice read as follows: 
 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to all (Rawls 1971, p.60). 
 
The two principles of justice represent terms that would be acceptable to everyone.  
Securing liberties such as political liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom 
of assembly, the right to personal property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest, the first 
principle ensures that all individuals are able to advance their own aims in life without 
restriction (Rawls 1971, p.61).  The second principle ensures that economic inequalities do 
not impede their ability to pursue their own aims, as any inequalities that do exist are to 
their advantage, as specified by the difference principle.  By accepting the two principles, 
justice comes to be recognised as fairness. 
 
Rawls thought that these principles would be agreeable to all rational agents in the original 
position.  However, Rawls found two problems with the principles of justice: a problem of 
ordering, and a problem of interpretation.  I explain the problem of ordering, before 
moving on to the problem of interpretation. 
 
While determining the principles of justice, Rawls saw that there would be the problem of 
which principles took priority (Rawls 1971, pp.40-41).  Rawls introduced the idea of 
lexical priority, the idea that principles need to be arranged in order of their importance 
(Rawls 1971, pp.42-43).  Before a principle can be satisfied, the principles prior to it must 
be satisfied.  Because self-respect is the most important primary good, the liberty to secure 
self-respect must take priority over all other rights and liberties (Rawls 1971, pp.543-545).  
Therefore, in Rawls’ sequence of lexical priority, the first principle – equal liberties – 
comes before the second principle – social and economic inequalities.  Social and 
economic distributions must be arranged as to be compatible with a system of equal 
liberties for all. While social and economic equality are important, there would be little 
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point in attempting to secure equality in a society that lacked self-respect, and the stability 
of society that self-respect creates.  People who lacked self-respect would not be motivated 
to secure either of the principles.  Thus, the conditions for establishing self-respect must be 
secured before other conditions can be considered.  This arrangement would be agreed on 
in the original position, as it would be recognised that certain rights and liberties were 
necessary for securing other rights and liberties (Rawls 1971, p.45).  Lexical priority is of 
importance, as it is used throughout Rawls’ work in order to determine issues of 
comparative importance.  
 
I now turn to the problem of interpretation of the second principle.  Noting that the terms 
“everyone’s advantage” and “equally open to all” were ambiguous, Rawls suggested four 
possible interpretations: a system of natural liberty, natural aristocracy, liberal equality, 
and democratic equality (Rawls, 1971, p.65).  Of these four interpretations, Rawls thought 
democratic equality was preferable.  
 
The following table is used to explain the four interpretations: 
 
 “Everyone’s Advantage” 
“Equally Open” Principle of 
Efficiency  
Difference Principle  
Equality of Careers 
Open to Talents 
System of Natural 
Liberty 
Natural Aristocracy 
Equality as Equality 
of Fair Opportunity  
Liberal Equality Democratic 
Equality  
(Rawls 1971, p.65) 
 
As can be seen from the table, Rawls finds two ways of interpreting each phrase – 
“everyone’s advantage” and “equally open” – leading to the four possible interpretations.  I 
explain the principle of efficiency to begin.  I then explain equality of careers open to 
talents (formal equality), and equality as equality of fair opportunity (fair equality), 
assessing how these principles lead to the system of natural liberty and liberal equality 
interpretations respectively.  Following this, I explain the difference principle, and discuss 
how formal equality and fair equality lead to the natural aristocracy and democratic 
equality interpretations.  Each interpretation will be defined in order to determine why 




Rawls draws the principle of efficiency from what economists term Pareto optimality 
(Rawls 1971, p.66).  The principle of efficiency means that if a distribution cannot be 
altered in one person’s favour without disadvantaging another individual, it is an efficient 
distribution (Rawls 1971, p.67).  A system of natural liberty ensures that positions are 
formally open to all who are willing to work to attain them (Rawls 1971, p.66).  Under a 
system of natural liberty, if the given distribution is efficient, and there is formal equality 
of opportunity, then the distribution can be considered fair.  Formal equality of opportunity 
means that a position is open to all, and that individuals are not discriminated against.  
However, if an individual cannot afford the education necessary to attain the position, 
nothing need be done to rectify this situation if the aim is to achieve formal equality.  With 
formal equality, a position need only be nominally open to all.  Liberal equality is instead 
based on the premise of fair equality.  This requires that positions are not only formally 
open to all, but that each person has a fair chance of attaining a position.  If two people 
have equal talents and abilities, then they should have an equal opportunity of attaining the 
same position, regardless of economic and social factors.  Rawls notes that according to the 
interpretation of liberal equality (Rawls 1971, pp.72-73), formal equality under a system of 
natural liberty would lead toward inequalities created by natural and social factors that 
have developed historically.  Thus, some will be unjustly favoured or disfavoured, due 
only to whether their natural and social circumstances offered them the chance to develop 
their talents.  Through liberal equality, an attempt to adjust this situation is introduced 
through the principle of fair equality of opportunity.  Yet, with the principle of efficiency 
combined with fair equality of opportunity, there will remain the possibility of large social 
and economic inequalities that are influenced by arbitrary factors.  These inequalities may 
prohibit some individuals from fully realising their talents and abilities (Rawls 1971, 
pp.74-75).   
 
This leads Rawls to the alternative of the difference principle.  The difference principle 
holds that inequalities are not to exist unless they are to the advantage of those with least 
(Rawls 1971, p.75).  With formal equality of opportunity, this leads to the interpretation of 
natural aristocracy.  In a system of natural aristocracy, the talents that people hold can 
only be used if their use is to the advantage of the less talented (Rawls 1971, p.74).  As 
there is only formal equality of opportunity, however, all individuals do not have a fair 
chance of attaining positions or developing their talents.  As Rawls held that unequal 
distributions influenced by arbitrary factors were unjust, Rawls claimed natural aristocracy 
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was unjust.  Although unequal talents are being used to benefit the disadvantaged in a 
natural aristocracy, there remains only formal equality of opportunity.  All citizens do not 
necessarily have a fair chance of attaining positions.  Rawls argued that the interpretation 
of democratic equality achieved the conditions necessary for these fair chances.  With 
democratic equality, the difference principle is combined with fair equality of opportunity.  
Inequalities can only exist when they are to the advantage of those with less, and positions 
are attainable by all.  Economic factors are not prohibitive as efforts are made to ensure 
that the disadvantaged have an equal chance of obtaining a position.  Natural inequalities 
that exist only through historical chance are thus accounted for, and inequalities may only 
exist when they are to the advantage of all (Rawls 1971, p.75).  
 
Through the two principles of justice, with the basic liberties being prioritised lexically, 
and the second principle being interpreted through democratic equality, with fair equality 
of opportunity taking priority over the difference principle, Rawls establishes what he calls 
justice as fairness.  Free and equal persons choosing the principles of justice to undergird 
their constitution would choose principles that allowed fair terms of cooperation.  These 
principles benefit all, allowing each person to realise her conception of the good (Rawls 
1971, pp.11-17).  This defines the idea of justice as fairness.         
 
2.4 Public Reason and Publicity  
 
Rawls imagines that in a society in which justice as fairness is realised, the publicity 
condition will be satisfied.  That is, citizens will be aware of the requirements of justice, 
and will be motivated to act in accord.  In Political Liberalism, Rawls then develops the 
concept of public reason; reasons that all citizens can endorse, regardless of their beliefs.  
In this section, I explain each concept, beginning with publicity.   
 
When the basic structure of society is publicly known to satisfy its principles 
for an extended period of time, those subject to these arrangements tend to 
develop a desire to act in accordance with these principles and to do their part 
in institutions which exemplify them (Rawls 1971, p.177). 
 
Publicity is the idea that the general principles agreed on in a society are publicly known 
and accepted.  Through the idea of publicity, Rawls argued that stability would be 
achieved.  People recognise that they benefit from social cooperation (Rawls 1971, pp.176-
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177).  Due to this, they are motivated to cooperate with one another.  The principles of 
justice lead naturally toward such a cooperative society.  When people act according to the 
principles of justice, society becomes a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (Rawls 
1971, p.4).  Rawls views the relationship between cooperation and self-respect as a sort of 
virtuous circle: due to their self-respect, people are motivated to pursue their own ends; 
social cooperation assists people in pursuing their ends; their self-respect is then enhanced 
through social cooperation.  When the principles of justice become publicly recognised, the 
self-respect of a society’s members is increased, because it is recognised that the principles 
of justice assist individuals to advance their own ends through a system of social 
cooperation (Rawls 1971, p.178).  This reinforces peoples’ desire to act in accordance with 
the principles of justice, and, therefore, the principles of justice “generate their own 
support” (Rawls 1971, p.177).  Rawls’ argument here is based on a certain understanding 
of moral psychology.  It is assumed that when people make agreements, they keep to them.  
They “love, cherish, and support whatever affirms their own good” (Rawls 1971, p.177.).  
As their own self-interest is both in accord with, and advanced by, the principles of justice, 
Rawls argued that there would be a strong motivation for individuals to accept and act 
according to the principles.       
 
Publicity enhances the self-respect of individuals (Rawls 1971, p.178), which, as 
previously mentioned, Rawls thought was the most important primary good (Rawls 1971, 
p.62).  When people act on their conceptions of the good within the limits of justice, 
subsequently realising a level of success, others come to respect them (Rawls 1971, 
pp.178-179).  The respect of others enhances a person’s own sense of self-respect.  Thus, 
when the principles of justice are publicly known, and recognised as effective, the 
opportunities for all to enhance their self-respect are increased.  People being able to 
realise their own aims in life due to the cooperative nature of the society in which they live 
become more self-respecting.  This further increases their willingness to act cooperatively.  
Self-respect and cooperation are, then, mutually reinforcing.       
 
Though the publicity condition still applies within political liberalism, the concept of 
public reason is developed in addition.  Before explaining public reason, it will be helpful 
to understand what Rawls means by ‘reason’ and ‘reasonable’.  Rawls states that reason is 
“an intellectual and moral power, rooted in the capacities of (a society’s) members” (Rawls 
2005, p.213).  Reason allows the members of a society to guide the decisions of that 
society, to make plans, and to prioritise their ends (Rawls 2005, pp.212-213).  A 
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reasonable person is distinguished from a rational person.  Whereas rational people pursue 
their own self-interest, reasonable persons ensure that their self-interest is compatible with 
the interests of others, and of society as a whole (Rawls 2005, pp.48-51).  Reasonable 
persons desire a “social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others” 
(Rawls 2005, p.50).  There are two aspects of the reasonable: willingness to propose fair 
terms of cooperation and recognition of the burdens of judgement (Rawls 2005, pp.54-66).  
First, a willingness to propose fair terms of cooperation means that a person desires to 
enter into any social relations with others on terms other people will be willing to accept.  
This is key to understanding the difference between the reasonable and the rational for 
Rawls.  A rational person knows her self-interests and is able to pursue them in social 
relations, but without being reasonable, a rational person would not necessarily propose 
fair terms of cooperation.  Second, the burdens of judgement are the sources of reasonable 
disagreement (Rawls 2005, pp.55-58).  Though a doctrine may be reasonable, it may 
nevertheless exist in tension with other reasonable doctrines due to fundamental 
disagreements, whether these disagreements be due to religious, metaphysical, empirical, 
moral, or social factors.  In public reason, the burdens of judgement must be borne in mind, 
as there are certain issues that reasonable persons may never agree upon.  Consideration of 
the burdens of judgement is the basis of toleration for Rawls.  Reasonable citizens come to 
hold reasonable comprehensive doctrines, systematic modes of thought containing 
religious, philosophical, or moral ideas informing human life (Rawls, 2005, pp.58-66).  A 
comprehensive doctrine is reasonable if, when taking into consideration the burdens of 
judgement, it is compatible with a socially cooperative world, and can be justified to other 
reasonable persons as being congruent with such a world.  The burdens of judgement place 
a limit on the kinds of comprehensive doctrines that are permissible within a society.  They 
also impose duties on individuals to ensure that their doctrines are reasonable, and 
furthermore, that their doctrines do not mandate the use of state power to suppress other 
doctrines (Rawls 2005, pp.59-61). These two aspects of the reasonable inform the idea of 
public reason.         
 
There are two circumstances in which citizens exercise public reason: when matters of 
justice are being decided and in deliberation on the good of society (Rawls 2005, p.213).  
This occurs primarily in forums in which what Rawls calls “constitutional essentials” are 
being decided, or in matters of basic justice (Rawls 2005, p.214).  Constitutional essentials 
are of two kinds: the structure of government, and the powers of each branch; basic rights 
and liberties and who they apply to (Rawls 2005, p.227).  Either of these matters must be 
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determined within the limits of public reason.  Public reasons are reasons that all people 
can accept.  Thus, whatever my own beliefs in religious or philosophical matters, I can 
accept the content of public reason.  When settling constitutional essentials, we should not, 
then, appeal to the wider aspects of our religious or philosophical beliefs, as all people 
might not accept such reasons (Rawls 2005, pp.224-225).  If I was to appeal to my 
religious faith in order to argue that all branches of government should be subordinate to 
the church, many people would not accept my reasons.  This is because my reasons are not 
public reasons.  To devise a constitution that is acceptable to all citizens as moral equals, 
the reasons we use to support constitutional essentials must remain strictly within the 
political domain.  This is what makes a reason a public reason.      
 
Though forums in which constitutional essentials are decided are the primary subject of 
public reason – Rawls writes that the supreme court is the “exemplar of public reason” 
(2005, p.231) - it is preferable, Rawls claims, if we stay within the limits of public reason 
throughout political deliberations (Rawls 2005, pp.215-216).  These forums are considered 
to have a primary duty to respect the limits of public reason because if they are not 
respected there, they will be respected nowhere.  Politicians should keep their campaigns 
within the limits of public reason, and citizens should respect public reason when deciding 
how to vote if constitutional essentials are being considered.  Reasonable citizens – citizens 
whose conceptions of the good cohere with those of others in a cooperative society – 
realise the importance of reasons used to support political principles being agreeable to all 
other reasonable citizens.  If state power can be used to prevent certain activities from 
being performed, then it is necessary that there is common agreement on what is the 
legitimate use of this power.  To reach this agreement, the bounds of public reason must be 
respected.       
 
To sum up, if citizens are to recognise the value of justice as fairness, the publicity 
condition must be reached.  The political principles undergirding the constitutions must be 
recognisable in the institutions forming the basic structure of society.  Citizens are then 
aware of their equal basic rights and liberties, and the way in which the arrangement of 
society is conducive to their own self-interests.  From this, a citizen’s sense of self-respect 
is increased.  She realises that her aims in life are supported through the arrangement of the 
society in which she lives.  She is afforded the opportunity to realise her own plan of life, 
derived from the conception of the good she has conceived.  When she is successful in 
realising these plans, she is respected by others, and increases her own self-respect in turn.  
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She is then motivated to act cooperatively; the benefits of cooperation and self-respect 
exist in a virtuous circle.  Rawls then develops the concept of public reason in Political 
Liberalism.  An understanding of public reason helps to explain the solution Rawls finds to 
the central problem of political liberalism: how a conception of justice can be endorsed by 
people regardless of their philosophical and religious commitments.  A public reason is a 
reason acceptable to all other citizens.  Public reasons are void of commitments to religious 
and philosophical positions.  Whatever a person’s beliefs, if she is reasonable, she should 
accept the public reasons used to support the adoption of political principles.  In part, this 
answers the problem of political liberalism.   
     
2.5 Political Liberalism: Revising Goodness as Rationality   
 
I now turn to how Rawls revised his theory of justice in Political Liberalism.  To begin, I 
explain how Rawls clarifies the line of reasoning from the original position to the 
acceptance of the principles of justice.  I then turn to how Rawls revises the thin theory of 
the good to show how it is not a comprehensive theory of the good.  These ideas identify 
what is being sought through formulating a theory of justice.  To address the way in which 
a society could support this theory of justice, Rawls further develops the idea of the basic 
structure in Political Liberalism, which is supported by the basic liberties.  After 
examining these ideas, I discuss how Rawls further refines the idea of justice as fairness.  
With the content of justice and its implementation explained, I explain the specific problem 
Rawls was responding to in Political Liberalism: the issue of how a conception of justice 
could be endorsed in a society divided by a range of comprehensive doctrines.   
 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls further refined and developed ideas originating in A Theory 
of Justice, responding to its critics.  The main problem Rawls sought to address was 
whether justice as fairness was a comprehensive conception of justice (Rawls 2005, 
pp.XVI-XVII).  If it were comprehensive, citizens endorsing such a conception would be 
committing to the various metaphysical and moral doctrines to which it was tied.  The 
problem here is that a modern democratic society that allowed for freedom of thought 
would, over time, develop a range of comprehensive doctrines.  Its citizens would be 
divided by various religious and philosophical beliefs.  These comprehensive doctrines 
would potentially be in discord with the comprehensive doctrine of justice as fairness.  The 
legitimacy of the democratic regime would, then, be lost amidst the range of 
comprehensive philosophical doctrines.  Rawls attempted to refine the conception of 
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justice toward a specifically political conception of justice, one that avoided moral or 
metaphysical commitments.  Citizens would be able to endorse the political conception of 
justice without rejecting their own comprehensive doctrines.   
 
In the line of reasoning that leads to the acceptance of the principles of justice, Rawls 
stresses that no metaphysical positions are presupposed.  Rawls aims here to counter those 
such as Michael Sandel who argue that the original position assumes an artificial account 
of human nature (Sandel 1984).  No such perspective on human nature is assumed in the 
original position, according to Rawls (2005, p.27).  The original position is a hypothetical 
situation.  We do not need to assume anything about human nature in order to follow the 
line of reasoning Rawls devises with the original position.  Instead, all we need to do is 
imagine parties existing in the original position who understand we will have certain 
interests to satisfy.  From this point of departure, Rawls then argues towards the principles 
of justice.     
 
Rawls developed the two principles of justice across A Theory of Justice itself, and in 
subsequent work, taking up a revised version of the principles for political liberalism, 
which read as follows: 
 
a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this 
scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be 
guaranteed their fair value. 
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to 
be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality 
of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged members of society (Rawls 2005, pp.5-6). 
 
The task here, however, is less to explicate justice, but to answer Rawls’ question: “How is 
it possible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live 
together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime?” (Rawls 2005, 
p.XVIII).  To achieve this, Rawls attempted to define a political conception of justice that 
could be endorsed within an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
(Rawls 2005, p.10).  The political conception of justice would legitimise the democratic 
regime itself, providing the basis for a stable and well-ordered society.  However, before 
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explaining how the conception of justice is purely political, it will be necessary to briefly 
explore how Rawls thinks about justice in Political Liberalism.     
     
The aim of Political Liberalism remains to find a conception of justice that works as a 
regulative principle for a democratic regime.  Defining justice, Rawls retains the idea of 
lexical priority, and the priority of right over the good.  However, in defining goodness as 
rationality, Rawls is careful not to commit political liberalism to a comprehensive 
philosophical doctrine.  Rawls states that it is incorrect to assume that no conception of the 
good can influence the political conception of justice, as the right and the good are 
complimentary (Rawls 2005, pp.173-174).  In order to identify the size of the scope 
necessary to allow for various systems of belief and ways of life, justice must entail a 
perspective on the good; justice cannot be entirely neutral on all matters relating to the 
good. Certain conceptions of the good would be entirely at odds with the values of justice 
as fairness.  However, the way in which conceptions of the good inform justice must be 
subject to restrictions.  Rawls states: 
 
a. That they are, or can be, shared by citizens regarded as free and equal; and 
b. That they do not presuppose any particular fully (or partially) 
comprehensive doctrine (Rawls 1971, p.176). 
    
Though justice is informed by the good, priority is always given to the right to ensure that 
the conceptions of the good people hold are compatible with justice as fairness.  While we 
are free to develop our own conception of the good within the limits of what is just, there 
must be common features of the good that all reasonable people can agree on.  Expanding 
on the thin theory of justice, there are five ideas of the good within justice as fairness, all of 
which are subsequent to the right:  
 
1. The idea of goodness as rationality 
2. The idea of primary goods 
3. The idea of permissible comprehensive conceptions of the good 
4. The idea of the political virtues 
5. The idea of the good of a well-ordered (political) society (Rawls 1971, p.176).   
 
Goodness as rationality is the idea that the citizens of a well-ordered society have rational 
plans of life, and that they arrange their actions around this plan (Rawls 2005, pp.176-178).  
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The primary goods, as noted in 2.1, grant individuals the ability to follow their rational 
plans of life.  The idea of permissible conceptions of the good, and the idea of political 
virtue, refer to the range of ideas that inform these rational plans.  Justice as fairness does 
not remain neutral between these ideas (Rawls 2005, p.192).  Some ideas will be 
encouraged, while others will be discouraged if they fail to be compatible with the 
principles of justice (Rawls 2005, pp.195-200).  Finally, Rawls states that a well-ordered 
society is good for two reasons: it allows persons to exercise their two moral powers and to 
secure their self-respect, and it enables a system of fair cooperation in which individuals 
can work together towards shared final ends (Rawls 2005, pp.202-204).  These ideas 
delimit the conceptions of the good that individuals are able to formulate, and help identify 
the societal structure that will allow the citizens of a society to realise these goods.       
 
As in A Theory of Justice, in Political Liberalism, “the basic structure of society is the first 
subject of justice” (Rawls 2005, p.257).  The agreement of the social contract provides the 
principles that regulate it.  Rawls posits that the role of the basic structure is to provide 
“background justice” while fair and voluntary social transactions are made within this 
setting (Rawls 2005, pp.265-267).  Supporting the basic structure are the basic liberties, as 
indicated in the first principle of justice. Rawls views these liberties as necessary for 
allowing an individual to fully exercise their “two moral powers of personality over a 
complete life” (Rawls 2005, p.293).  The two moral powers will be fully explained in the 
following chapter.  These moral powers relate back to the idea of self-respect, and, as 
shown in 2.2 and 2.3, it is through self-respect that stability is maintained.  Stability is 
integral to the idea of justice as fairness in Political Liberalism.    
 
In Rawls’ later work, justice as fairness has two characteristics: it is free-standing, and it is 
also self-sustaining (Rawls 1989, p.234; Rawls 2005, pp.207-212).  It is free-standing as 
the idea of justice is derived only from political values: it is independent of religious, 
moral, and metaphysical values.  It is self-sustaining as it generates its own support:  
citizens are motivated to accept the principles of justice through their self-respect.  On 
finding that the principles of justice advance her ends, a person’s sense of self-respect is 
enhanced.  Thus, justice as fairness is stable.  Once it is found to satisfy people’s self-
interest, people are inspired to maintain their commitment to it.     
 
In sum, justice as fairness is shown to be a purely ‘political’ value in Political Liberalism.  
That is, justice is political rather than moral or metaphysical.  A person can accept justice 
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as fairness whatever their other beliefs as it is devised as not to conflict with other such 
beliefs.  Providing a person is reasonable – that is, committed to beliefs that are compatible 
with the beliefs of other reasonable people – then that person can accept justice as fairness, 
seeking out her own ends within the scheme of permissibility as established through 
goodness as rationality.  Once a person realises that she can achieve a successful plan of 
life in accord with her reasonable conception of the good, because she lives in a society 
that enables her to do so, justice as fairness becomes a self-sustaining doctrine.  
Reasonable people are motivated to continue supporting justice as fairness.  It is these 
features of political liberalism that make it ‘political’.  Whereas a person committed to 
comprehensive liberalism also commits to certain other philosophical beliefs, political 
liberalism requires only a political commitment.       
       
2.6 The Overlapping Consensus 
 
This explains how Rawls defines justice as fairness in his later work.  It remains to be seen 
how Rawls views individuals as coming to accept this conception of justice, and how it is a 
political conception of justice.  Citizens determine political arrangements through the 
process of public reason, according to which they appeal only to reasons acceptable to 
other citizens.  When citizens respect these arrangements, an overlapping consensus comes 
into existence.  This consensus will now be examined.          
 
As Rawls notes, “political power is always coercive power” (Rawls 2005, p.136).  In a 
democratic regime, the justification for the use of political power rests on the will of the 
public.  For the use of political power to be legitimate, it must receive continued public 
support.  This raises the question of when the public would view the use of political power 
as justifiable.  To this, Rawls responds that political power is justifiable when it is based on 
a constitution that is endorsed by free and equal citizens in light of their human reason 
(Rawls 2005, p.137).  However, citizens in modern democratic societies do not necessarily 
share one, homogenous belief system, complicating the task of reaching a consensus 
allowing for the stability of a constitution.  It is here that Rawls introduces the idea of the 
overlapping consensus.   
 
The overlapping consensus is an arrangement whereby a range of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines can cohere with a conception of justice (Rawls 2005, pp.144-
145).  It is through the agreement on a central conception of justice that they ‘overlap’.  
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Through affirming the same conception of justice, citizens recognise that the overlapping 
consensus is in their own interest.  Reasonable though opposed comprehensive doctrines 
can exist alongside one another.  Part of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine must contain 
a recognition that other doctrines are reasonable.  A person committed to a reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine does not attempt to use political power to suppress other 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 2005, p.61).             
 
There are three features of the overlapping consensus: it is a moral conception, it is based 
on moral grounds, and it is stable (Rawls 2005, pp.147-148).  Justice as fairness itself, the 
main object of the overlapping consensus, is a moral conception.  Rawls does not explicitly 
state what is meant here, but in his explanation of the second feature it is implicit that the 
political conception of justice is also a moral conception of justice.  That is, a certain sense 
of morality is entailed in the notion of justice as fairness.  Though political liberalism 
avoids commitments to comprehensive doctrines, the overlapping consensus is in accord 
with the various comprehensive doctrines held by citizens.  In this way, according to the 
second feature of the overlapping consensus, it is reached on moral grounds. Citizens come 
to endorse the political conception of justice through their commitment to their own 
comprehensive doctrines, including their sense of morality, as it is realised that their 
interests deriving from their comprehensive doctrines are advanced by the overlapping 
consensus.  Furthermore, it is stable because it is not based on a temporary agreement 
between citizens.  The citizens are committed to the political conception of justice 
alongside their other philosophical and religious commitments.  They would not rescind 
their support for the political conception of justice, even in the event of their 
comprehensive doctrine becoming dominant within society.  Seeing the opportunity to 
impose their doctrine on the rest of society, citizens would not seize it as they recognise 
that their interests are better served through the overlapping consensus.  
 
 Rawls’ example of an overlapping consensus features three doctrines: a doctrine of free 
faith, a liberal moral doctrine in the mould of Kant or Mill, and a less systematically 
unified doctrine, one containing non-political values (Rawls 2005, p.145).  Despite the 
tensions between these different modes of thought originating from the burdens of 
judgement, through their commitment to the principles of justice, Rawls shows how an 
overlapping consensus is achieved.  As all three doctrines are reasonable, any one doctrine 
would not attempt to use state power to prohibit the other two.  Each doctrine would also 
recognise the other two doctrines as being reasonable; as being compatible with a socially 
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cooperative world.  Through publicity, it would be recognised that the principles of justice 
enabled a mutually beneficial social environment that protected their rights and liberties, 
ensuring that they were able to advance their own ends in accordance with their 
comprehensive doctrines.  All three doctrines are, then, containable within the overlapping 
consensus.     
 
The overlapping consensus is built upon what Rawls terms the “constitutional consensus” 
(Rawls 2005 p.164).  Where there is consensus on the basic liberties and democratic 
procedures, the constitutional consensus becomes an overlapping consensus, which has 
both depth and breadth.  Depth relates to public discourse beyond that of the basics of the 
constitutional consensus, and of the citizens’ own comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 2005, 
pp.165-166).  It refers to how citizens come to justify their own political conceptions.  
Breadth relates to factors that ensure the freedom of all citizens to fulfil their political and 
social lives.  Rawls argues that there is a need for legislation that guards freedom of 
thought and conscience, but also to protect material well-being, as when well-being falls 
below a certain level, it becomes impossible for citizens to be politically and socially 
active. Through the overlapping consensus, it becomes possible for a society containing a 
number of comprehensive doctrines to be well-ordered.   
 
For Rawls, the well-ordered society consists of three elements (Rawls 2005, p.35).  Firstly, 
it is centred on principles of justice that everyone knows and accepts, and that everyone is 
also aware that everyone else knows and accepts.  Secondly, its basic structure complies 
with the principles of justice, and this is also known by citizens.  Thirdly, citizens both 
endorse and comply with the principles of justice.  With these three conditions satisfied, a 
well-ordered society can be established.  Within a well-ordered society, unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that are incompatible with the overlapping consensus will 
eventually cease to exist (Rawls 2005, pp.195-201).  Conceptions of the good that threaten 
to undermine the principles of justice are not compatible with political liberalism.  Society 
is justified in using the coercive power of the state to discourage these doctrines.  
Following Isaiah Berlin, Rawls states that there is “no social world that does not exclude 
some ways of life” (Berlin 1990; Rawls 2005, p.197).     
 
Political Liberalism further developed the conception of justice Rawls first explicated in a 
Theory of Justice.  Retaining the central idea of justice as fairness, and the basic elements 
of the original theory of justice – the original position, the veil of ignorance, primary 
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goods, the two principles of justice, lexical priority, and democratic equality – Rawls 
revised these ideas in order to respond to the realities of modern democratic societies.  As 
these societies contain a variety of different belief systems, Rawls sought to identify a 
formulation of justice which could be endorsed by all reasonable persons, and that could 
contain all reasonable comprehensive doctrines.  Rawls provides two key ideas in 
response: public reason and the overlapping consensus.  Public reason provides the means 
by which citizens are able to advance their own ends. The overlapping consensus is a 
framework in which reasonable comprehensive doctrines exist together in a society.  
Though these doctrines may not be in accord with one another on specific religious, moral, 
or metaphysical grounds, they are in accord in their endorsement of justice as fairness.  
This is due to justice as fairness being a political conception of justice.  As it is not 
dependent on wider philosophical commitments that would preclude other beliefs, 
reasonable persons can support justice as fairness without rejecting the beliefs to which 
they are committed.  With these conditions satisfied, a well-ordered society that is also 
stable can function.  Other aspects of political liberalism regard Rawls’ conception of the 
person and autonomy, though these will be more fully explained in the subsequent 
chapters.  For now, a basic outline of Rawls’ argument in political liberalism has been 
provided.  
 
2.7 Political Liberalism and Contemporary Political Thought              
 
Kukathas states that Rawls’ formulation of a liberal conception of justice has been 
recognised by both intellectual allies and opponents as the most substantial work of its kind 
for some time (Kukathas 2003, p.3).  Given its influence, Rawls’ work has been subject to 
a number of criticisms.  Rawls’ theory of justice has been critiqued from right-libertarian, 
communitarian, Marxist, and utilitarian perspectives.  Robert Nozick and Michael Sandel 
have provided two particularly prominent critiques of Rawls’ theory (Nozick 1974; Sandel 
1984).  However, I focus here on responses made to the doctrine of political liberalism.  
Specifically, I look at criticisms pertinent to the critique devised in this thesis.  I begin by 
examining critiques of Rawls’ ideas and then assess their strength.  First, I focus on 
criticism of the idea of the comprehensive doctrine, problems with the overlapping 
consensus, and Rawls’ underestimation of the problem of disagreement.  Second, I 
examine the role of truth in political liberalism. Third, I assess G.A. Cohen’s argument for 
the need of an “egalitarian ethos”.  Fourth, I examine Samuel Scheffler’s argument that 
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political liberalism has limited applicability.  Finally, I assess the merits of these 
arguments, preparing for their development in relation to the critique devised in this thesis.      
 
First, for Scheffler, political liberalism does not give an accurate account of the range of 
comprehensive doctrines contained in a modern democratic society.  The example of an 
overlapping consensus referred to in 2.6 – a doctrine of free faith, a comprehensive liberal 
moral doctrine, and a partially comprehensive doctrine (Rawls 2005, p.145; Scheffler 
1994, p.8) – does not represent the range of diverse beliefs in a modern democratic society.  
Though these three doctrines may cohere in an overlapping consensus, this does not imply 
that the multiplicity of doctrines in a modern society could be contained in such a 
consensus.  In addition, Scheffler states that in endorsing the principles of justice through 
their own comprehensive doctrines, citizens will also be forced into maintaining incoherent 
beliefs.  Utilitarians would endorse the principles of justice through their comprehensive 
doctrine of utilitarianism, yet simultaneously reject utilitarianism through the principles of 
justice (Scheffler 1994, p.9)      
 
Iris Marion Young argues that Rawls’ idea of the comprehensive doctrine is “too thin” 
(Young 2003, pp.183-185).  Very few people live their lives strictly according to a 
comprehensive doctrine; philosophical systems tend to be too abstract to give meaning to 
everyday life.  Instead, the values that influence people’s beliefs and shape their everyday 
lives generally originate from a variety of sources.  Young states that only a religious 
fundamentalist would live their lives according to a single comprehensive doctrine (Young 
2003, pp.183-185).  With people living their lives according to a number of different 
values and beliefs, Young argues that there may be overlap between these beliefs, but there 
is little chance for consensus.  For Young, Rawls underestimates the depth of the 
disagreements inherent in modern societies.             
      
Tim Hurley’s criticism of political liberalism follows on from those of Scheffler and 
Young.  Whereas Scheffler and Young critiqued the idea of the comprehensive doctrine, 
Hurley focuses on what he views as Rawls’ inadequate solution to the problem of 
disagreement.  Examining the burdens of judgement, Hurley argues that Rawls does not 
provide an adequate response to the problem of reasonable disagreement.  Hurley states 
that while it is possible to disagree on questions of the good, Rawls would argue that any 
disagreement on the right was unreasonable (Hurley 2003, p.45).  For the well-ordered 
society to function, there must be agreement on the priority of the right over the good, 
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which is then reflected in public reason and the overlapping consensus.  Anything 
incompatible with this arrangement is unreasonable.  There are two problems Hurley finds 
with the dichotomy between the reasonable and the unreasonable.  The first is that people 
will not be acquiescent in rejecting their comprehensive doctrines, where these doctrines 
are judged to be unreasonable (Hurley 2003, pp.46-47), as Andrew Murphy also argues 
(1998).  Within a comprehensive doctrine there will be an account of what is and is not 
reasonable, and this may differ from Rawls’ account.   
 
Hurley’s second criticism bring us to the second line of criticism assessed here: the 
relationship between the truth and political liberalism.  As Hurley notes, Rawls is not 
concerned if the true comprehensive doctrine is rejected by other reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.  In formulating justice as fairness, the truth is not of importance 
for Rawls.  Due to this absence of truth, Rawls would be left on shaky ground in the event 
of a comprehensive doctrine rejecting his account of the reasonable, as there is no recourse 
to the truth. The second of Hurley’s problems relates to what he calls the “doctrine of 
conscientious refusal” (Hurley 2003, p.47).  Hurley argues that while some societies have 
instances where they respect the right of individuals to follow their own conscience in 
contradiction to what the law demands of them – such as conscientious objection to 
military conscription – these cases are rare.  However, in Rawls’ theory, this idea plays a 
central role.  Citizens will be able to disobey the law whenever their reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine gives them reason to do so (Hurley 2003, pp.47-48).  Thus, even 
in cases where the law is reflective of the truth and human reason in general, if a citizen 
has reasonable grounds for disobeying it in light of their reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine, they will be justified in doing this.   
 
Joseph Raz also argues that Rawls’ position on truth in political liberalism exposes its 
weaknesses.  Raz argues that political liberalism is reliant on what Raz terms “epistemic 
abstinence” (Raz 1990, p.4).  Coming to a theory of justice without committing to 
metaphysical or moral doctrines means that justice will lack epistemological foundations.  
Without these foundations, a theory of justice cannot hold a position on the nature of truth.  
This would be to assert that justice could exist without truth, which as Raz argues, is 
evidently untrue (Raz 1990, p.15).  To claim that something is just, there must be a 
standard of truth against which the claim can be measured.  Yet this does not lead Raz to 
reject political liberalism.  Instead, Raz argues that the overlapping consensus should be 
reconfigured, and that political liberalism requires a standard of truth.  This truth is that 
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society requires a fair system of cooperation (Raz 1990, pp.17-18).  Therefore, the 
overlapping consensus, and the stability to which it leads, are necessary, as without them, a 
fair system of cooperation is impossible.  If this is the standard against which we judge 
something to be just, and this standard can be turned from theory into practice, then we can 
say that this theory of justice is true.  Justice, for Raz, cannot be independent of the truth.       
 
Raz’s line of criticism is similar to Jean Hampton’s.  While not rejecting Rawls’ overall 
argument for political liberalism, Hampton argues that political philosophy need not be 
separated from metaphysics (Hampton 1989, p.813).  Hampton distinguishes between 
“Socratic philosophising” and the sort of discourse Rawls has in mind when discussing 
public reason (Hampton 1989, p.808).  Socratic philosophising is a method whereby 
matters of truth can be deduced through reasoning.  According to Hampton, Rawls would 
allow for Socratic philosophising in the private realm but not in the political realm.  
Whereas in other schools of philosophy – ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of science – 
matters of truth are of importance, in political philosophy, according to Rawls, truth is not 
the aim.  When deciding on matters of justice through public reason, Socratic 
philosophising on the nature of truth must be avoided.  For Hampton, this is an error.  
There are certain issues that have political significance, but that are impossible to discuss 
without invoking moral doctrines that incorporate a stance on truth.  The legal status of 
pornography is such an issue according to Hampton (Hampton 1989, p.810).  Some would 
argue that pornography is immoral; this might be due to religious reasons or a feminist 
stance against pornography.  Others may argue that laws against pornography violate 
freedom of speech.  If such an issue was to be approached through public reason, Hampton 
argues that allowing the expression of personal moral views would be beneficial.  The 
expression of these views would allow people to revise or change their own opinions in 
light of the strength of the arguments.  Hampton posits that in matters of tolerance, it is 
tolerance of people that is of importance, not tolerance of ideas (Hampton 1989, p.811).  
People may vehemently reject ideas, but there is nothing objectionable about this if these 
people are tolerant of those who hold these ideas.  The nature of ideas expressed within 
public reason should not concern us, and the allowance of metaphysics within public 
reason would grant the conclusions reached greater depth.    
 
Third, G.A. Cohen criticises the inequalities Rawls considers just on the difference 
principle.  Part of Cohen’s criticism hangs on Rawls’ primary focus on the basic structure 
of society.  Justice, for Cohen, requires more than this.  For the kind of justice that Rawls 
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envisions, Cohen argues that an ethos, or a “culture of justice”, is necessary (Cohen 1992, 
p.315).  People in such a society need to be motivated by this ethos.  To illustrate this, 
Cohen describes two interpretations of the difference principle: one strict and one lax.  On 
the lax reading, while the basic structure of society functions in accord with the principles 
of justice, people do not necessarily act from these principles.  Thus, while I might respect 
the difference principle being applied at the societal level, in my everyday life, I may act 
contrary to the principle.  If I am offered a job with a high salary that will exacerbate 
inequalities, I can justify this by saying that justice does not require me to devote my life to 
the less well-off, and I can still pursue my self-interest while acting justly (Cohen 1992, 
p.313).  This lax reading of the difference principle, Cohen claims (1992, p.315), draws an 
arbitrary line between self-interest and the needs of others.  Cohen argues that Rawls could 
not defend such an interpretation of the difference principle, as it is representative of an 
imperfect balance rather than a “fundamental principle of justice” (Cohen 1992, p.315).  
This leads instead to the strict interpretation.  On this interpretation, more is required than 
governmental implementation.  Rather, we are all required to cultivate a sense of justice, 
acting from this sense of justice in our everyday lives; what Cohen calls the “egalitarian 
ethos” (Cohen 1992, pp.315-316).  The person acting from this ethos could justify her acts 
through reflection on the principles of justice, though Cohen stresses that constant appeal 
to these principles is unnecessary.  Instead, the principles of justice are internalised and 
come to inform an individual’s acts.  For a society to be just, it must be characterised by 
less equality than a lax application of the difference principle would allow.      
 
Fourth, as Rawls conceded, political liberalism cannot be universally applicable (Rawls 
1993; Scheffler 1994, pp.20-22).  Political liberalism is dependent on the existence of 
certain liberal traditions and institutions.  There is no reason to suppose that societies 
without liberal values would adopt them.  Thus, Scheffler argues that political liberalism 
has little to offer aspiring democracies.  If political liberalism is then only applicable to a 
few modern liberal democracies, Scheffler posits that its defence of liberal principles is 
“intolerably weak” (Scheffler 1994, p.21).  Because Rawls was writing in defence of 
liberal democracies, there is little to offer in response to this objection.  If people are to be 
convinced by Rawls’ arguments, they must already find something of value in existing 
liberal institutions; their moral psychologies must sit roughly in accord with what Rawls 




I now turn to assess the validity of these critiques, drawing out aspects that are further 
explicated throughout this thesis.  First, the comprehensive doctrine and the range of 
disagreement in modern societies.  In response to Scheffler’s first argument, it could be 
argued that the range of comprehensive doctrines is of no consequence.  What is of 
importance is that the comprehensive doctrines affirm the principles of justice.  Even a 
society containing many different doctrines that stand in complete contradiction to one 
another could endorse justice as fairness, providing the doctrines are reasonable.  Doctrines 
that are unreasonable and incompatible with justice as fairness would eventually cease to 
exist Rawls (2005, pp.195-201), as a democratic society that adopted justice as fairness 
would be justified in discouraging such doctrines.  Nevertheless, Scheffler draws our 
attention to the level of disagreement in modern societies, which is also developed in 
Young’s critique.  A response to Scheffler’s second argument is more problematic.  That a 
utilitarian would accept justice as fairness through utilitarianism and then reject 
utilitarianism through the same principle seems an inevitable fact of political liberalism.  
This is, then, a powerful critique of political liberalism, especially regarding doctrines with 
political aspirations.  While it is conceivable that religious groups may not wish to use state 
power to advance their ends, it is unlikely that those who hold deep political convictions 
would not desire to use the mechanisms of the state to further their aims. 
 
A similar response to Scheffler’s first argument could be made to Young’s critique.  While 
it is true that Rawls does not accurately reflect the beliefs people in modern societies hold, 
Rawls states that the comprehensive doctrine can be fully or partially comprehensive 
(Rawls 2005, p.152).  The idea is not designed to anticipate every possible belief in a 
modern society.  The content of the comprehensive doctrine matters little if the doctrine is 
compatible with justice as fairness.  Despite this, Young and Scheffler both raise the 
problem of disagreement in modern societies.  In a society deeply divided by many 
conflicting sets of belief, it is highly optimistic to imagine the citizenry could all hold one 
conception of justice.  As mentioned in the Introduction, in addition to disagreeing with 
one another, many people in modern democracies hold little faith in the institutions that 
uphold liberal ideals.  Furthermore, as Hurley notes, people may not willingly adjust their 
ideals should they be found to contradict the principles of justice.  The task of identifying a 
conception of justice that everyone endorses is perhaps a more demanding one than Rawls 




Second, the role of truth in political liberalism.  Jonathan Quong responds to Raz by stating 
that there is a difference between metaphysical and mundane truths (Quong 2011, pp.226-
229).  If the truth plays any role in political liberalism, it is only the mundane kind of truth.  
To state that if a theory of justice establishes what it set out to establish then it can be 
considered true is only a mundane truth claim.  The important aspect of this for political 
liberalism is that the theory of justice does not preclude other philosophical and religious 
doctrines.  Quong argues that Raz does not show this to be the case.  If we consider justice 
as fairness as being true, this truth is mundane, not metaphysical.  However, as I argue in 
Chapter 3, this overlooks distinctions between different types of truth claims that are not 
merely mundane.  Such claims have a place within political liberalism.  Rawls argues that 
scientific knowledge, where it is well-established and not controversial, can be drawn out 
to offer support to public reason (Rawls 2005, p.67).  Thus, certain types of truths are 
included within political liberalism.  How to determine what a scientific truth is as opposed 
to a metaphysical truth is a less straightforward task than Rawls appears to assume.  This is 
further developed in Chapter 4; I draw on the arguments of Raz and Hampton to support 
the position that metaphysical claims are sometimes necessary within politics.       
 
Third, the egalitarian ethos.  In Chapter 9, I argue, in agreement with Cohen, that such an 
ethos is necessary for a just society, though for different reasons.  Rawls is dependent on 
the truth of free will and a particular conception of moral psychology; we must be able to 
freely choose a conception of the good, while ensuring this conception remains within the 
bounds of justice.  To do so, we must be considered as possessing a degree of control over 
our thoughts.  If we do not have free will and do not exercise full control over our thoughts 
in this way, something else is needed to ensure the stability of a just society.  This is why 
an ethos of justice is necessary.     
 
Fourth, the applicability of political liberalism.  I agree that political liberalism has limited 
applicability outside of a relatively small number of contemporary liberal democracies.  
Without pre-existing democratic institutions and a history of liberal ideals that have 
influenced the moral psychologies of citizens, there is little reason for someone to be 
persuaded to endorse political liberalism.  However, this is not only a problem for post-
authoritarian regimes.  As both Scheffler and Young note, Rawls underestimates the level 
of disagreement in modern democracies.  In addition, I argue that Rawls assumes a degree 
of commitment to democratic institutions on the part of citizens that is not necessarily held.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, many citizens in modern liberal democracies may be 
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persuaded of the superiority of authoritarianism.  Leaving citizens to determine their own 
good may lead them to reject the value of liberal ideals.  This is further reason for the need 
of something akin to the egalitarian ethos.  In later chapters, I argue that Rawls’ 
formulation of full autonomy provides a counterpart to this ethos.     
 
While political liberalism has been critiqued in several ways, these four points are pertinent 
to the critique developed here.  First, political liberalism is highly optimistic.  As Young 
notes, Rawls underestimates the extent to which modern societies are divided, and the 
types of disagreement they are divided by.  Second, the relationship between the truth and 
political liberalism.   This is more complex than Rawls assumes.  Certain truth claims must 
be accepted within any political regime. Fourth, political liberalism has limited 
applicability.  Societies without democratic traditions and liberal institutions are offered 
little to persuade them of why it is preferable.  This problem, however, stretches beyond 
authoritarian regimes.  If citizens in modern democracies fail to be convinced by liberal 




Throughout his work, Rawls’ aim is to defend his theory of justice: justice as fairness.  In 
A Theory of Justice, defines this theory, intending it as a regulative principle for modern 
constitutional democracies.  Modern societies, however, are divided by many different sets 
of belief systems.  Critics of A Theory of Justice posited that this theory was incompatible 
with this plurality of beliefs.  In Political Liberalism, Rawls attempted to reformulate 
justice as fairness to make it compatible with the range of comprehensive doctrines 
contained in modern societies.  Concepts such as goodness as rationality were 
reformulated, while public reason and the overlapping consensus were devised to show 
how people within modern democracies could unite around a common understanding of 
justice without rejecting their own beliefs.  Through these concepts, justice as fairness is 
conceptualised as a free-standing theory of justice, which is not committed to 
philosophical, religious, or moral concepts, and is compatible with all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.   
 
I have identified four criticisms that of political liberalism that are developed throughout 
this thesis: the range and types of disagreement in modern societies being underestimated; 
the relationship between the truth and politics being more complicated than imagined; the 
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need for a stronger commitment on the part of citizens, and to importance of justice in 
everyday life; the need for prior commitment to the value of democratic institutions and 
liberal ideals.   
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explain the basic argument running throughout 
Rawls’ thought, with particular attention given to Political Liberalism.  In subsequent 
chapters, I define Rawls’ political conception of the person and the concepts of rational 
and full autonomy.  With an understanding of the basic argument of political liberalism, 
the relationship between these ideas and the overarching aim of Rawls’ work will be 






Chapter 3 – Autonomy and the Person  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The “political conception of the person” is Rawls’ attempt to explain the basic features of 
human nature and psychology without committing to a comprehensive view of human 
nature (Rawls 2005, p.29).  Rawls’ theory of autonomy is supported by this conception of 
the person.  This chapter explains the conception of the person and Rawls’ theory of 
autonomy.  For the state and society to function according to the ideals of political 
liberalism, at least some citizens must be fully autonomous.  Attainment of autonomy is 
dependent on the development of first moral powers as to recognise justice as fairness.  I 
argue that the state requires the moral development of its citizens to accord with the 
Rawlsian values of fairness and reasonableness, but in order to achieve this, the state’s 
education system becomes partially perfectionist.  This argument is further developed in 
Chapter 9.  Though Rawls attempts to avoid commitments to comprehensive doctrines, 
these commitments are unavoidable in regard to moral education.  Furthermore, within 
these commitments is, I argue, an unacknowledged commitment to the truth of free will.  I 
develop this argument across this chapter and Chapter 5.  To begin, it will be necessary to 
understand how Rawls thinks about human nature and psychology in Political Liberalism, 
how he tries to avoid commitments to metaphysical doctrines, and the level of his success 
in this task.  In Chapter 5, I then show how within this way of thinking about the person is 
a commitment to the truth of free will.   
 
Other theories of moral psychology, as found in the work of Kohlberg and Haidt, are 
assessed in this chapter.  Through this assessment, I draw out the importance of the group 
and the environment in shaping our autonomy and moral psychology.  While Rawls 
thought political liberalism was compatible with any reasonable theory of human 
psychology, I argue that Kantian moral psychology undergirds Rawls’ thought.   
 
In this chapter, I define the political conception of the person in 3.2, discussing the role it 
plays within political liberalism.  Both rational and full autonomy are explained in 3.3.  I 
explore the dilemma of moral education in political liberalism in 3.4.  Following M.V. 
Costa and Eamonn Callan, I argue that in order to develop autonomy in citizens, moral 
education must necessarily become partially perfectionist.  The dominant theories of moral 
development are explained in 3.5. In 3.6, I further develop the argument for why aspects of 
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perfectionism are necessary, using these theories for support.  Throughout this chapter, I 
explain why the fully autonomous citizen is necessary for political liberalism, assessing 
some problems arising from psychology for the realisation of full autonomy.   
 
3.2 The Political Conception of the Person 
 
Rather than a political philosophy stemming from an understanding of human nature, as in 
the case of Hobbes (Macpherson 1985), political liberalism is a free-standing construct that 
is designed to work independently of psychological theories.  Basic features of human 
nature and psychology place limits on what can be proposed in political philosophy, but 
they do not determine the conclusions (Rawls 2005, p.87).  All that is required of 
conclusions in political philosophy is that they do not contradict certain well-known basic 
aspects of human nature.  In the political conception of the person, Rawls states what 
underlies a person’s moral psychology, and their basic motivations.  Claims that go beyond 
this limited description, such as what individuals’ main objectives in life should be, or how 
individuals should act or generally behave, are avoided.  For instance, the political 
conception of the person is not an Aristotelian perspective on man as a political animal, as 
such a view presupposes a comprehensive view of human nature, one that prescribes how 
humans should act across their lives.  As Soran Reader notes, Aristotle’s conception of the 
person includes a metaphysical perspective on human nature (Reader 2007, p.581).  
Instead, Rawls is only interested in the basic features of human nature as would generally 
be accepted, attempting to reveal their compatibility with justice as fairness.  In this 
section, I explain these basic features, assessing how Rawls constructs the political 
conception of the person.     
 
This understanding of human nature differs from that which was offered in A Theory of 
Justice.  Thomas Baldwin argues that the account of human nature in A Theory of Justice 
was premised on a comprehensive understanding of psychology (Baldwin 2008, pp.248-
249), in which certain characteristics of human nature are considered essential for a 
fulfilling life.  These characteristics include the necessity of behaving in accordance with 
principles of justice, and feelings of guilt and shame resulting from a person acting against 
these principles (Rawls 1971, pp.440-446).  As it incorporates a view on how humans 
generally do and should behave, this effectively constitutes a comprehensive moral 
doctrine, the type of moral philosophy Rawls wishes to avoid committing to in Political 
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Liberalism.  Thus, in Political Liberalism Rawls refined this conception of human 
psychology.       
 
At the centre of this refined understanding of human nature is the claim that all individuals 
have two moral powers: the ability to form a sense of justice and a conception of the good 
(Rawls, 2005, p.19).  This, in combination with the human capacity for reason, enables 
people to be free. People desire to be free due to their possession of the second moral 
power.  They wish to be free to live a life of their own choosing.  Because they have these 
powers, people are capable of living in a cooperative well-ordered society.  Their capacity 
for a sense of justice allows them to ensure that the terms of cooperation in a society are 
fair, and their ability to form a conception of the good enables them to pursue their own 
aims in life, formulating such aims in accord with the fair terms of cooperation.  The 
person’s social existence is of great importance for Rawls.  Reader notes that Rawls’ basic 
definition of the person is “someone who can take part in social life” (Rawls 2005, p.233; 
Reader 2007, p.585).  While Rawls’ understanding of the person is different from 
Aristotle’s, the social world is still essential for Rawls.  On the political conception of the 
person, a person must be capable of acting cooperatively in a society.  This basic 
understanding of human nature informs Rawls’ idea of the political conception of the 
person.   
 
Through the political conception of the person citizens think of themselves as being free.  
It is this understanding of their own freedom that motivates citizens to live in a free, 
democratic society.  According to Rawls, they think of themselves as free in three regards.  
First, they do so because of the moral powers, particularly the ability to form a conception 
of the good (Rawls 2005, p.30).  They will pursue this conception across the course of their 
life through having a “rational plan of life” (Rawls 2005, p.177).  Once a person has 
formulated a conception of the good, they may also continually revise how they conceive 
of the good.  Changes made have no bearing on the person’s political or institutional 
identity.  People are free to decide for themselves what constitutes the good life, living 
accordingly.  This is the first aspect of a person’s freedom.     
 
The second way in which people think of themselves as being free relates to social and 
political institutions (Rawls 2005, pp.32-33).  People think of themselves as being the 
authors of valid claims.  These claims are self-authenticating: they are valid because a 
rational and reasonable person made them.  Because people can make valid claims, they 
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view themselves as being able to make claims on social and political institutions in order to 
advance their own conceptions of the good.  Rawls contrasts this aspect of freedom with 
the lack of freedom of the slave.  A slave is not able to make claims on their institutions as 
a slave has no political rights.  Slaves are therefore not viewed as being the authors of valid 
claims.  For all citizens to be free in a liberal democracy, the state must ensure that all 
persons are able to make claims on their institutions.  Citizens can, then, pursue their aims 
politically, ensuring that society is structured as to allow them to live lives of their own 
choosing.   
 
The final aspect of freedom relates to a person’s ability to take responsibility for their 
conception of the good (Rawls 2005, pp.33-35).  As rational and reasonable agents, 
citizens ensure that their conception of the good is compatible with the political conception 
of justice; such goods cohere with a society based on a system of fair cooperation.  They 
are therefore capable of realising that, when pursuing their conception of the good, they 
must be able to provide for what they expect to receive in return.  When making claims on 
their institutions, they will also realise that their claims will be assessed in relation to their 
reasonableness.  Citizens take responsibility for their conception of the good by ensuring it 
is a reasonable conception.  Such a conception is reasonable because it does not challenge 
other citizens’ freedom to formulate a similarly reasonably conception of the good.   
 
As they think of themselves as being free in these regards, individuals desire to live in a 
society that allows for their freedom.  Rawls’ understanding of the basic features of human 
nature leads him to state what people would think of as being just within a society, and 
what would be sought to achieve this sense of justice.  This relates back to the idea of the 
primary goods discussed in Chapter 2.  As there are certain innate characteristics of 
individuals, there are certain goods that they will need to satisfy needs deriving from these 
characteristics.  Rights and liberties will be necessary to allow people to obtain these 
goods.  
 
Self-respect is also part of the person’s basic psychology, and constitutes the most 
important primary good (Rawls 2005, pp.81-82).  It is through self-respect that the stability 
of society as a system of fair cooperation is achieved.  Self-respect provides the self-
generating support of a society.  Though little is said about how self-respect relates to the 
political conception of the person, Rawls later says a person who had no interest in 
developing their conception of the good, not caring about her basic liberties, would show a 
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lack of self-respect.  Such a person not be considered a “full person” (Rawls 2005, pp.76-
77).  While less is said in Political Liberalism about the types of virtues society should aim 
to cultivate, Rawls nevertheless maintains the belief that people should wish to live as part 
of a cooperative society, developing the necessary skills to achieve this.  A person with no 
such desire has some kind of moral defect.   
 
To summarise, the two moral powers are at the centre of Rawls’ thought on human nature.  
They also provide the basis for the political conception of the person, through which 
people think of themselves as being free in three regards: free to form a conception of the 
good, living a life in accord; free to make claims on their institutions in light of this 
conception; free to take responsibility for this conception.  Other ideas regarding human 
nature are carried over from A Theory of Justice, such as the idea of self-respect.  
Throughout all of Rawls’ thought on human nature in Political Liberalism, an attempt is 
made to avoid making commitments to comprehensive doctrines.  The political conception 
of the person is not designed to be dependent on broader psychological or philosophical 
theories of human nature.         
 
3.3 Autonomy: Rational and Full 
 
There are two forms of autonomy distinguished in political liberalism: rational and full.  
Rawls’ thought on these forms of autonomy predates Political Liberalism, as he devised 
them in the paper ‘Rational and Full Autonomy’ (Rawls 1980).  Rational autonomy relates 
to the citizen’s self-interest and ability to for a conception of the good (Rawls 2005, pp.72-
73).  Parties in the original position are considered rationally autonomous; it is the citizen 
in the well-ordered society who becomes fully autonomous.  Through their rational 
autonomy, parties in the original position will have established principles that allow for 
citizens to realise their self-interest.  The citizen who acts from these principles is 
considered by Rawls to be fully autonomous (Rawls 2005, pp.77-78).   Rawls’ thought on 
autonomy follows the same logic as his thought on the conception of the person.  The 
theory of autonomy must not be conditional on the truth of a comprehensive philosophical 
doctrine.  In contrast with the comprehensive liberal doctrines of Kant and Mill, Rawls set 
out to establish a conception of autonomy as a purely political value.  This constraint 
informs both rational and full autonomy.  I begin by defining rational autonomy before 
moving on to full autonomy.  The existence of fully autonomous citizens is, I argue, a 




Rational autonomy is based upon a person’s “moral and intellectual powers” (Rawls 2005, 
p.72).  To help define rational autonomy, it will be necessary to understand what Rawls 
means by ‘rational’.  As discussed in Chapter 2, for Rawls, rationality refers to self-
interest.  It is rational to want certain goods and rights, as it is in a person’s self-interest to 
want these things.  Rational autonomy relates to what would be sought by parties in the 
original position in order to satisfy self-interest.  A person is then deemed to be rationally 
autonomous if she possesses the ability to use her moral and intellectual powers to further 
her rational self-interest. 
 
In addition to the two moral powers, there are two further conditions necessary for rational 
autonomy.  First, parties must be able to decide upon fair terms of cooperation (Rawls 
2005, pp.72-73).  There is no external standard by which to judge the fair terms of 
cooperation; people must have the capacity to decide what is fair for themselves.  Their 
ability to do this allows for them to be considered rationally autonomous.  Second, because 
individuals have two moral powers, they also have two higher-order interests in developing 
these powers (Rawls, 2005, pp.73-74).  Rawls argues that a person must have these moral 
powers, and be capable of developing them, in order to function as a cooperative member 
of a well-ordered society.  This relates back to Rawls’ views on self-respect; people who 
are not concerned with developing their moral powers would show a lack of self-respect 
(Rawls, 2005, pp.76-77), as they have no values upon which to base a rational plan of life, 
and no sense of morality to guide them.  If the parties in the original position did not 
account for these higher-order interests, they could not be considered rationally 
autonomous.  There is also a third higher-order interest: the parties must want to secure 
those they represent the conditions necessary for realising their moral powers.  Due to the 
second moral power, people have the ability to form a conception of the good.  Parties in 
the original position will therefore be motivated to ensure that the principles decided on 
allow for citizens to develop this conception, and to live according to it (Rawls 2005, 
p.74).   
 
These three higher-order interests, along with the capacity to determine fair terms of 
cooperation, allow for rational autonomy.  Rawls stresses that rational autonomy, as 
opposed to full autonomy, is applicable to the original position (Rawls 2005, p.75).  In the 
original position, it refers to the rationality of parties, who are “artificial” representatives of 
citizens.  Parties are rationally autonomous as they understand that citizens have certain 
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self-interests deriving from their second moral power, and, in their deliberations, parties 
are motivated to secure these interests.  Citizens are rationally autonomous when they 
come to exercise their second moral power.  He also asserts that rational autonomy is not a 
matter of pure self-interest (Rawls 2005, pp.76-77).  Though citizens are assumed to have 
self-interests, they are not only self-interested.  They must also recognise others as having 
their own self-interests.  Their self-interests might also be of an altruistic nature.  This is 
not a matter of egoism.  Parties are not aiming to maximise gains for those they represent 
with no regard for others.  The aim of rational autonomy is also not to secure material 
goods, but to obtain the necessary conditions for citizens to develop their moral powers.  It 
may be that the citizens a party represents are neither egoistic nor driven by the need for 
materialistic goods.  In turn, with these conditions obtained, a citizen enhances her self-
respect when she is able to develop her moral powers.  This leads to the self-sustaining 
stability of a well-ordered society.  As Rawls states, in order to obtain these conditions, 
principles of justice decided on in the original position must be conducive to this aim.   
 
Full autonomy is also dependent on aspects of the original position, but it is not parties in 
the original position who are considered fully autonomous, it is the citizens of a well-
ordered society (Rawls 2005, p.77).  Citizens become fully autonomous when they act in 
accordance with the principles of justice determined in the original position.1  Rawls 
argues that full autonomy requires not only compliance with the principles, it requires that 
citizens act from these principles.  As citizens recognise the principles as being just, they 
are motivated to apply the principles in their political lives.  This relates back to the idea of 
publicity.  Through publicity, citizens recognise that justice as fairness enhances their self-
interest, and are thus motivated to act according to the principles of justice.  Therefore, full 
publicity must be attained in order to satisfy the conditions of full autonomy (Rawls 2005, 
p.78).  Once a citizen understands and acts in accord with the principles of justice, she can 
be considered fully autonomous.  With full autonomy realised, citizens enjoy the rights and 
liberties of a well-ordered society; they can participate in that society’s collective self-
determination (Rawls 2005, pp.77-78). The fully autonomous citizen is able to develop the 
two powers, living a rational plan of life according to her conception of the good, revising 
this conception when she desires to.            
 
 
1 Hence why parties in the original position cannot be considered fully autonomous.  As the principles are not 
yet determined, parties cannot act from them.   
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Full autonomy is essential to political liberalism.  If citizens did not act as fully 
autonomous citizens should, political liberalism would be left highly unstable.  For the 
values of political liberalism to be realised, there needs to be people who are motivated to 
realise them.  Thus, it is necessary that at least some citizens act as fully autonomous 
citizens.   
 
While rational autonomy can be thought of as comparable to the ways in which Joseph Raz 
(1986) and John Stuart Mill (1859) defined autonomy, full autonomy is closer to the 
Kantian formulation.  For Raz and Mill, autonomy is a matter of self-realisation.  As Raz 
puts it, “the autonomous person is a (part) author of his own life” (Raz 1986, p.369).  
Similarly, a person is rationally autonomous if she is capable of determining the good for 
herself, living a life, then, of her own choosing.  Rational autonomy is, however, a thinner 
understanding of autonomy than that identified by Raz.  On Rawls’ definition of rational 
autonomy, a person could choose to live a life of voluntary servitude and still be thought of 
as rationally autonomous.  She has made a rational decision in light of her conception of 
the good.  Her autonomy remains, then, intact.  For Raz, a person needs an adequate range 
of options to be considered living an autonomous life (Raz 1986, p.373).  Full autonomy, 
on the other hand, is closer to Kant’s notion of moral autonomy.  The morally autonomous 
person, for Kant, is the person who acts from universally applicable moral laws.  There are 
two important aspects here.  First, the autonomous person, for Kant, acts from principles 
that would be chosen by the exercise of reason in the noumenal realm, as for Rawls, the 
fully autonomous citizen acts from the principles of justice that would be chosen within the 
original position.  Second, such a citizen recognises that her own legitimate sphere of 
action ends where another person’s begins.  She will not, then, transgress the bounds of 
another person’s autonomy.  Likewise, the fully autonomous person acts from the 
principles of justice.  In doing so, she acts reasonably, not attempting to impose her own 
doctrine on others.   
 
The two forms of autonomy are, thus, incorporated within the scheme of political 
liberalism.  There is, however, a tension between the two.  Though she should develop her 
rational autonomy within the bounds of reasonableness – she should not wish to impose 
her conception of the good on others – a person could exercise her capacity for rational 
autonomy to live a life in which she never acted from the principles of justice.  For 
example, she may decide that a life free of political concerns was her route to happiness.  
This person is rationally autonomous, but we cannot consider her fully autonomous.  On 
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the other hand, a person who had been conditioned to act in accord with the principles of 
justice from a young age, never having been offered the opportunity to act otherwise, 
would not meet the conditions necessary to be considered autonomous by Raz.  She does 
not have a range of adequate options from which to choose, as she has no motivation to 
choose otherwise.  Thus, while she is acting as a fully autonomous citizen should, Raz 
would not consider such a person autonomous.  The tension between these two conceptions 
of autonomy is further explored later in this chapter.       
      
In sum, through rational autonomy, parties in the original position ensure that fair terms of 
cooperation are decided on, so that citizens can develop their moral powers.  This ensures 
that fair terms of cooperation are enshrined in the principles of justice.  Through full 
autonomy, citizens come to act from these principles.  A citizen who is motivated to act 
from these principles can be considered fully autonomous.  At the root of Rawls’ thought 
on both autonomy and the person is the claim that we have two moral powers, in addition 
to the capacity to develop these powers, which is realised through full autonomy.  A 
tension exists between rational and full autonomy, however.  A person’s capacity for one 
may preclude the development of the other.  Without fully autonomous citizens, the values 
of political liberalism cannot be realised.  The tension between the two forms of autonomy 
is, then, highly problematic.   
 
3.4 Moral Education in Political Liberalism 
  
Later in this chapter, I explain how our moral development is influenced by the 
communities we belong to, and the environment in which we are raised.  I explain this in 
order to develop the argument that autonomy, as Rawls formulates it, is subject to 
influences beyond the individual, which Rawls does not recognise.  It should not be 
assumed that an individual can become fully autonomous if left to her own devices.2  To 
begin, however, I examine how moral development could occur within the well-ordered 
society of political liberalism.  While Rawls believed political philosophy need not be 
dependent on a comprehensive view of human nature, a particular sort of person inhabits 
the well-ordered society.  This person has the ability to realise a sense of justice and a 
conception of the good; her self-respect is dependent on this ability’s realisation.  Without 
 
2 As Rawls admits when he notes that full autonomy can only be attained when the full publicity condition is 
reached (Rawls 2005, p.78).  We must know what the principles are if we are to act justly.  However, though 
Rawls recognises that external factors can influence the development of full autonomy, he does not offer a 
complete explanation of how this development is to occur.   
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the existence of the person possessing these attributes, political liberalism would face an 
existential threat.  It must be ensured that this person does come into existence, that the 
person is able to develop her moral powers, and that this person is continually replicated 
across society.  While in A Theory of Justice, Rawls explains how the process of moral 
development should occur, little is explicitly said about moral development in Political 
Liberalism.  Nevertheless, Political Liberalism provides several mechanisms through 
which moral development could occur, which I assess in this section.  In 3.5, I then explain 
the role of the group in shaping an individual’s moral development, in order to draw out 
the complexity of moral development in the politically liberal state.  To begin, I examine 
how Rawls explained moral development in A Theory of Justice.     
 
As James Scott Johnston notes, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls thought that the purpose of 
education was to guide the moral development of an individual in accordance with the 
principles of justice, allowing the individual to realise her self-respect (Scott Johnston 
2005, pp.205-207).  Though he commits to neither, at least ostensibly, Rawls identifies two 
courses of moral education in A Theory of Justice: one based on empiricism and the other 
on rationalism (Rawls 1971, pp.458-462).  The empiricist approach uses what Rawls calls 
“missing motives”.  To guide the individual towards the desired sense of morality, the 
empiricist supplies a motive to do so where that motive is missing.  Punishment or reward 
may be utilised early in the process.  Later on, the aim is to develop psychological 
inclinations to follow certain courses of action.  Rawls associates this approach with 
utilitarianism (“from Hume to Sidgwick”) and Freud.  The rationalist approach sees no 
need to supply missing motives.  Instead, there are innate emotional and intellectual 
capacities within the individual.  The purpose of moral education is, then, to allow the 
individual the freedom to realise these innate capacities.  This approach Rawls associates 
with Rousseau, Kant, Mill, and Piaget.   
 
Though Rawls states that his ideas on moral education are compatible with both 
approaches, in what follows, his ideas appear to remain faithful to the rationalist approach.  
Three stages of moral development are identified.  In the first stage, a person learns to 
respect the morality of authority through the love she has for her parents (Rawls 1971, 
pp.462-467).  The morality of association is learned in the second stage (Rawls 1971, 
pp.467-472).  During this stage, a person learns the moral rules that guide the behaviour of 
people within groups.  The importance of fairness and cooperation are learned; people who 
follow the rules are more successful in achieving their aims.  Finally, the morality of 
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principles is learned (Rawls 1971, pp.472-479).  In this stage, the individual comes to 
understand abstract moral principles.  It is in this way that Rawls imagines the individual 
comes to understand the principles of justice, and to be motivated to act from them.  While 
Rawls argues this scheme of moral education is compatible with both the empiricist and 
rationalist approaches, Rawls does not mention the need to supply missing motives.  
Throughout his description of this scheme, Rawls appears to imagine the process occurring 
naturally, with the educational scheme only allowing the individual to develop her innate 
capacities.  Rawls notes how his approach coheres with that of Kohlberg (Rawls 1971, 
pp.461-462).  The morality of association is similar to the conventional level of moral 
development, in which the individual comes to learn the importance of following the 
behaviour of the group.  This is further explored in 3.5 and 3.6.        
 
There is little said regarding education in Political Liberalism, as Johnston notes (Johnston 
2005, p.204), though educational theorists such as Kenneth Strike have looked at how 
Rawls’ thought could be used to support a theory of education (Strike 1994).  Johnston 
charts how Rawls’ thought on education developed from A Theory of Justice to Political 
Liberalism (Johnston 2005, pp.205-207).  Education in Political Liberalism turns away 
from the moral towards the political.  That is, the focus on a scheme of moral development 
is omitted.  The ordering of social and political values takes precedence over the realisation 
of individual autonomy and other moral values.  Instead of the education system’s primary 
purpose being the realisation of future citizens’ autonomy and self-respect, its purpose now 
is found in publicity.  Through education, the child must become aware of the importance 
of being a citizen, and the rights and liberties that come with citizenship (Johnston 2005, 
p.209).  Self-respect is not abandoned; it remains imperative, but Johnston argues that its 
priority over other goods is moderated. 
 
Contra Johnston, I argue the realisation of full autonomy is integral to political liberalism.  
Without the existence of the fully autonomous citizen, political liberalism loses its 
stability.  As there would be no one who both recognised, and acted from, the principles of 
justice, political liberalism would lose its support.  This raises the question of how the fully 
autonomous citizen is to come into being without making autonomy’s realisation the 
ultimate aim of education.  Rawls states that the basic structure of society has a formative 
psychological effect on citizens (Rawls 2005, pp.269-271), although through the concept 
of public reason, the institutions that make up the basic structure should not promote 
comprehensive moral doctrines.  Based upon the principles of political liberalism, a school 
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would be able to teach moral principles in accordance with the political conception of 
justice, but would be unable to instruct pupils in metaphysical, moral, or religious 
doctrines, where such instruction was aimed at encouraging the child to endorse a 
particular view.  Education would be confined to what is right rather than what is good.  
Though a child would be educated in the idea of justice as fairness, and the Rawlsian value 
of reasonableness, her moral development outside of the school would be dependent on the 
family and experiences in the private sphere.  Values taught in the private sphere could 
conflict with those taught in the school.  If the motivation to endorse values taught in the 
private sphere outweighed the motivation to support justice as fairness, political 
liberalism’s continued support would be under threat.   For children to develop into the 
functioning citizens of a well-ordered society that Rawls hopes for them to be, it would be 
necessary to recognise the influence of institutions such as the school in enabling moral 
development.   
 
Instead, as M. Victoria Costa notes, Rawls leaves instruction in moral values to political 
and judicial institutions (Costa 2004, pp.5-6).  Rawls states that the political conception of 
justice has to act as an “educator”, but that this is achieved through the “public culture and 
its historical traditions of interpretation” (Rawls 2005, pp.85-86).  Costa argues that 
instructing people in the idea of justice as fairness would be the equivalent of teaching a 
comprehensive doctrine (Costa 2004, p.7).  On this approach, a child would be educated in 
the importance of fairness so that, as an adult citizen, she comes to accept justice as 
fairness.  If a person were to be educated through the idea of justice as fairness, that person 
should come to view its principles as being morally right.  Being motivated to act in accord 
with what is right, the child would come to see this as a good.  Moral principles drawn 
from other philosophical doctrines that, though reasonable, exist in tension with justice as 
fairness – libertarianism or utilitarianism, for example – would be recognised as morally 
inferior to Rawls’ principles of justice.  There would be no reason for a person to endorse 
other philosophical doctrines. The diversity of modern societies, which Rawls sought to 
maintain, would be lost.   
 
The Rawlsian response, as anticipated by Costa, is to point out the difference in scope 
between the comprehensive doctrine and the idea of justice as fairness.  Costa argues that 
this is inadequate.  Political liberalism’s education system would be required to teach 
political and social values that conformed to the idea of reasonableness.  These teachings 
would also have a deep effect on a person’s character and moral development.  The effect 
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of this would be to mould an individual into being a liberal subject, which appears to bear 
little difference to the prescribed autonomy of Kant.  This could preclude a person from 
desiring to endorse doctrines deriving from other philosophical or religious traditions, as 
even if the doctrine was reasonable, there may be little reason for a person with a 
fundamentally liberal moral psychology to wish to adhere to it.    
 
Instructing children in the moral value of fairness, these institutions cease to be 
independent of comprehensive doctrines.  The liberal ideal of fairness would come to hold 
great power over the child’s development, prohibiting the child from desiring to accept 
alternative doctrines.  Political liberalism then faces a dilemma.  One option is to teach the 
values of justice as fairness in order that the moral powers are developed in accordance 
with this concept.  With this approach we risk losing the diversity of moral doctrines 
within a society.  The other option is to leave instruction in morals entirely to the private 
sphere, through which the moral powers may be developed in accordance with alternative 
belief systems.  On this approach, there would be no reason to assume that a person whose 
moral powers had developed under an alternative religious or philosophical comprehensive 
doctrine could be reconciled to the idea of justice as fairness.  Fairness may hold no value 
within this doctrine.   
 
Due to Rawls’ belief that the political conception of justice should act as an educator, it is 
fair to assume the former option should be chosen.  However, as Eamonn Callan argues, 
education must be at least partially comprehensive, because of the strong effect it has on a 
person’s development (Callan 1996, p.6).  The potential result of this, Callan argues, could 
be that children reject the doctrines held by their parents, as they are unmotivated by ideals 
and values drawn from sources other than liberalism (Callan 1996, pp.22-23), a problem 
which Rawls recognised and saw as regrettable (Rawls 2005, p.200).  As the purpose of 
political liberalism is to devise a conception of justice that is acceptable to all the 
reasonable systems of belief in modern societies, an education system that reduced support 
for these beliefs would undermine political liberalism’s objective.  For a citizen to become 
fully autonomous, however, this would be unavoidable.  The fact of whether citizens are 
able to make reasonable claims on their institutions and take responsibility for these claims 
is dependent on the development of their moral powers.  A person who had developed an 
entirely illiberal, unreasonable sense of justice and conception of the good would not be 
deemed capable of making reasonable claims on institutions, nor of taking responsibility 
for them.  This person would therefore not be considered fully autonomous.    
60 
 
3.5 Theories of Moral Development  
 
At the heart of Rawls’ thought on human nature is the claim that we have two moral 
powers.  Amartya Sen, agreeing with Rawls, argues that the presumption of the moral 
powers is central to “the tradition of democratic thought” (Rawls 2005 pp.18-19; Sen 1999, 
p.272); to deny this would be to depart from this tradition, and to undermine human 
rationality.  In this section, I explore how moral development is understood in psychology 
in order to assess how we come to develop a sense of justice and a conception of the good.  
The purpose is not to endorse any one theory of moral psychology, but to draw out the 
importance of the group and emotion in determining the individual’s moral development.  
This importance of the group is recognised in both the dominant strands of the study of 
moral development: in Lawrence Kohlberg’s conventional level of moral development and 
in Jonathan Haidt’s idea of the “moral community”.  I turn first to Jean Piaget and 
Kohlberg, then assess the work of Haidt.  Following this, I assess Patricia Churchland’s 
critique of Haidt.  Though there is much disagreement between the various approaches, I 
argue that there is agreement on two matters: the importance of community and emotion in 
determining our sense of morality.       
 
Study of moral development in psychology is commonly thought to begin with Piaget 
(Haidt 2008, p.65).  Piaget argued that moral development occurred across stages.  This 
theory was revised by Kohlberg, who posited six stages of moral development (Kohlberg 
and Hersh 1977, pp.54-55).  The six stages come under three levels.  During the 
preconventional level, the child considers only what is culturally considered to be good or 
bad, and their behaviour is guided by the avoidance of punishment, or the obtainment of 
hedonistic pleasure.  At the conventional level, the family, group, and nation are 
considered important for their own sake; behaviour conforms to the expectation of the 
collective.  Finally, at the postconventional level, individuals determine what is right 
according to abstract moral principles, which exist apart from the group of which the 
individual is a member.  With the realisation of the postconventional level, the individual 
can deduce what is morally right through a process of moral reasoning.  The following 







Stage 1 – Punishment and Obedience 
Orientation 
Avoidance of punishment provides the sole 
determination of whether an action is deemed to 
be good or bad.  There is no respect for a moral 
order outside of the person’s obedience to 
authority.     
Stage 2 – The Instrumental-Relativist 
Orientation  
Actions are deemed to be right if they satisfy 
one’s own needs, or sometimes the needs of 
others.  The satisfaction of needs is considered in 
pragmatic ways, occasionally in terms of 
fairness, but only insofar as fairness supports the 
obtainment of satisfaction.    
Conventional Level 
Stage 3 – The Interpersonal 
Concordance Orientation 
Actions begin to be judged by intention.  It is 
important that one’s actions are considered to be 
good by others, and behaviour should conform to 
the norms of the social order.   
Stage 4 – The "Law and Order" 
Orientation 
Actions should uphold the social order, and 
persons come to hold respect for authority and 
doing one’s duty. 
Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled 
Level 
Stage 5 – The Social-Contract, 
Legalistic 
Orientation 
Actions are considered in terms of what has been 
determined to be right by society as a whole 
through a process of critical examination.  
Consideration is given to the relativism of 
personal values, and it is thought that procedural 
rules should be followed in order to reach 
consensus.     
Stage 6 – The Universal-Ethical-
Principle 
Orientation. 
Abstract universal principles guide moral 
behaviour.  Justice, fairness, and equality are 
considered important for their own sake.   





Kohlberg thought that these stages of moral development were universal.  To prove this, 
Kohlberg undertook cross-cultural empirical studies, interviewing participants across a 
number of years (Colby et al 1983; Gibbs 2013, p.86; Gibbs et al 2007).  Unfortunately for 
Kohlberg’s theory, the empirical studies revealed its inconsistencies.  During college years, 
in which participants would be expected to be at the conventional level, 20% of Kohlberg’s 
sample regressed to stage two.  There were also problems with stages five and six (Gibbs 
2013, pp.89-90).  Stage five was rarely reached, and stage six was never reached.  John 
Snarey argued that stage five was based on the philosophy of Kant and Rawls (Snarey 
1985, p.228), being based as it is on procedural rules toward determining a consensus, and 
that there were difficulties with its cross-cultural translatability.  Not all, or even many, 
cultures would ascribe to a Kantian notion of morality.  Furthermore, Kohlberg admitted 
that stage six was based on an elite sample, which would only be recognised in persons 
with philosophical training (Gibbs 2013, p.90).  Rather than being a universal process, in 
which individuals progress linearly from stages one to six, there is significant variation in 
moral development.  Kohlberg underestimated the importance of the conventional level 
and the power the group has over the determination of its members’ sense of morality.      
 
Despite the inconsistencies in the stages of moral development, the theory of cognitive 
development has remained one of the primary understandings of moral development in 
psychology (Haidt 2008, p.68).  An alternative understanding is found in Haidt’s “new 
synthesis”, which brings together evidence from social psychology, neuroscience and 
evolutionary theory (Haidt 2008.).  Instead of attempting to understand moral development 
from the perspective of universal moral principles, the new synthesis looks to 
communities.  The ‘moral community’ is the ultimate arbiter of morality, according to the 
new synthesis.  E.O. Wilson, who originally invented the phrase “the new synthesis”, 
thought that morality would become better understood through sociobiology (Wilson 
2000), as human behaviour would come to be assessed through knowledge of neural and 
evolutionary processes.  According to Wilson’s theory, our brains have been shaped 
through evolution to experience moral emotions.  It is these emotions that determine our 
intuitions regarding what is right and wrong.   
 
Haidt used this biological evidence to posit a theory of moral development on which these 
emotional reactions are contingent (Haidt 2007).  Verbal reasoning – the kind of reasoning 
important to Kohlberg’s sixth stage of moral development – still plays a part in the new 
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synthesis theory of moral development, but it is of less significance than in Kohlberg's 
theory.  Instead of learning to decipher between right and wrong through verbal reasoning, 
Haidt argues we learn through our emotional reactions to stimuli in childhood (Haidt 2007, 
p.998).  In these emotional reactions, we learn to distinguish between good and bad.  The 
process of moral reasoning occurs at a later stage, and usually concludes only to confirm 
the initial hypothesis based upon the emotional reaction.  This process, in which emotional 
reactions take precedence over moral reasoning, continues throughout adult life, and is also 
noted in subjects whose brain injuries led them to perform unusual or illogical actions 
(Haidt 2007, pp.999-1000).  Rather than express confusion at their own actions, these 
subjects would invent a narrative to justify the action.  A moral justification for actions is 
always of importance to individuals, but humans are capable of finding moral reasons to 
justify almost any kind of behaviour.  These moral reasons do not provide the basic 
motivation for our actions; instead, they follow behind our actions.   
 
It is in the realm of affect where Haidt locates the roots of our actions and beliefs, though 
the roots go deeper than the emotional reaction itself.  There are evolutionary reasons why 
people are predisposed to certain emotional reactions.  A sense of morality contingent on 
emotional reactions allows for the formation of moral communities (Haidt 2007, p.1000).  
The moral community has a shared set of values that it expects its members to adhere to, 
along with a system of rewarding cooperation and punishing violators.  As the moral 
community comes to realise that certain types of behaviour are beneficial to the group, the 
genes of its members will be modified to encourage these behaviours.  Thus, people will be 
genetically predisposed to the values of the moral community to which they belong, with 
their emotional reactions to stimuli reflecting this evolutionary process.  These genetic 
predispositions affect all aspects of our individual and social lives.  As Haidt argues, "it is 
clear that we are prepared, neurologically, psychologically, and culturally, to link our 
consciousness, our emotions, and our motor movements with those of other people" (Haidt 
2007, p.1001). 
 
Christopher L. Suhler and Patricia Churchland have criticised Haidt’s approach to the 
study of moral development (Suhler & Churchland 2011).  Innateness, they argue, is highly 
controversial within philosophy.  Making too strong an argument about the innateness of a 
characteristic will lead it to being unapplicable in many situations.  Too weak an argument 
leads to claims which are so broad and widely applicable that their explanatory power is 
negated.  While Haidt is aware of the former problem, Suhler and Churchland argue he 
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overlooks the latter (2011, p.2105).  For Suhler and Churchland, Haidt’s claims about the 
innateness of certain moral characteristics amount to nothing more than saying we are 
“prepared” to act in certain ways.  In the same sense, we are prepared to ride bicycles, as 
many humans are well-equipped for the task from an early age.  The task itself still has to 
be learned, however; we are not born knowing how to ride bicycles.  Furthermore, Suhler 
and Churchland argue that Haidt’s theory is not supported by the neurobiological data 
(Suhler & Churchland 2011, pp.2109-2111).  Too little is known about the workings of the 
brain to be able to state that certain traits are innate.  At this stage, they argue, it is overly 
ambitious to draw connections between neural activities and behaviour, and argue that 
these relationships are innate within the human condition. 
 
Despite this critique, there are similarities between Haidt’s and Churchland’s approaches to 
moral development.  Churchland also looks to neurobiological and evolutionary data to 
explain moral behaviour (Churchland 2011).  Churchland links our biological nature with 
evolutionary survival; we have developed traits that better ensure our survival in the world.  
Our sense of morality is dependent on these biological traits (Churchland 2011, p.11).  
Primarily, these traits concern cooperation and care.  Those who cooperate with others 
increase their chances of survival through receiving benefits from others in return 
(Churchland 2011, pp.63-94).  The hormones oxytocin and arginine vasopressin are 
particularly important in encouraging us to care for each other.  Churchland posits that 
high levels of these hormones lead individuals to form long-term attachments to others 
(Churchland 2011, pp.48-53), and to care for offspring.  People with lower levels of these 
hormones struggle with these behaviours.  From the possession of these traits, we are then 
prepared for social life (Churchland 2011, pp.118-162).  We learn primarily to care for 
those close to us, and then to care for others beyond our closest social group.  At this stage 
of Churchland’s argument, there is a clear similarity with Haidt’s approach.  Churchland 
also argues for the importance of emotion and sociability in the development of our sense 
of morality.  Rather than thinking of morality through our capacity for reason, learning to 
obey rules as deontologists posit, or thinking about the outcomes of actions as 
consequentialists argue, we develop our sense of morality through our intuitions 
(Churchland 2011, pp.163-190).               
 
These theories do not provide an exhaustive account of the study of moral development in 
psychology.  Other theorists such as B.F. Skinner and Freud (Freud 1962; Skinner 1971; 
Haidt 2008, p.67) have developed psychological theories of moral development.  As Haidt 
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notes, however, Freud’s theories are rarely discussed in contemporary study of moral 
development.  Despite their epistemological and methodological differences, a common 
theme throughout theories of moral development is the importance of environment and 
sociability on the one hand, and emotion on the other.  In Kohlberg, this is particularly 
evident at the conventional level of development, in which the individual’s primary 
concern is respect of the rules and values of the group to which they belong.  For Haidt, it 
is the group that moulds the individual’s sense of morality, with evolutionary and 
biological factors feeding into this process.  For Churchland, too, it is through the learning 
of social skills that we develop a sense of morality.  The environment is the only concern 
for Skinner, who thought that human behaviour was reactive, and that it was the 
environment that dictated our thoughts and actions (Skinner 1971).  Both Haidt and 
Churchland argue that the process of evolution leads to the development of emotions that 
determine our sense of morality, in conjunction with how our social group encourages their 
development.  Emotion is of less importance for Kohlberg.  However, empirical studies 
revealed that people do not all reach the final stage of moral development, in its Kantian 
formulation.  Rather than through processes of moral reasoning leading to either 
deontological or consequentialist conclusions, it is the group to which we belong and our 
emotions that, in the main, determine our sense of morality.      
 
In sum, Kohlberg's theory of moral development and Haidt's new synthesis provide the two 
main strands of knowledge in psychology on the origins of moral judgements.  They do not 
stand in direct opposition to one another.  Though there are differences in their approaches, 
there are also similarities.  Both recognise that groups – whether families, communities, or 
nations – are of importance, and that the environment in which a person is raised shapes 
their moral development.  However, whereas Kohlberg thought that the process of moral 
development was universal, with stage six being the result of any person's complete moral 
development, Haidt understands morality as being divisive.  According to the new 
synthesis, different moral communities have different motivations guiding their 
development.  A community at high risk of war would develop different moral values from 
a community that was peaceful and stable.  The way in which a person's moral 
development occurs will be dependent on the community to which she belongs, and the 





3.6 Kantian Morality and Moral Communities   
 
As political liberalism requires some kind of moral education in order for the individual to 
develop into a fully autonomous citizen, I assess the compatibility of a politically liberal 
moral education with theories of moral development.  Following Dwight Boyd, I argue that 
there is congruence between the work of Kohlberg and Rawls.  However, political 
liberalism is then subject to the same concerns revealed by empirical tests as Kohlberg’s 
theory.  The majority of people do not develop beyond the conventional level of moral 
development, meaning individuals respect the moral values of the group, but only 
appreciate these values insofar as they are of importance to the group.  The person who 
acts as an aspiring moral philosopher, understanding the importance of moral values in the 
abstract, is a rarity.  Haidt’s findings pose further problems.  Our moral development, 
according to this theory, is dependent on the moral community to which we belong; the 
moral community begins to shape our sense of morality even before birth.  For the stability 
of political liberalism, these moral communities would need to be highly regulated to 
ensure a commitment was made to justice as fairness.  The result of this would be to 
construct a system of moral education that prevented citizens from being psychologically 
motivated to endorse unreasonable doctrines.   
 
Boyd has drawn connections between the work of Rawls and Kohlberg.  As 
aforementioned, Snarey thought that Kohlberg’s postconventional level of moral 
development reflected the philosophical ideals of Kant and Rawls.  Kohlberg himself 
thought that stage six was comparable to the Kantian categorical imperative (Kohlberg and 
Hersh 1977, p.55).  A person living in accord with such a sense of morality understands 
and acts from abstract moral principles, the basis of which would be universally applicable 
in any circumstance.  The Kantian categorical imperative – on which a person acts as if the 
act was to become a universal moral law – is such an abstract moral principle.  It is not a 
concrete command, as are the Ten Commandments.  Kohlberg and Rawls both belong to 
the social contract tradition, and their philosophical ideals are in harmony, according to 
Boyd (2015, p.34).  They both begin from the same premise; though in social relations 
there can be disagreement, there is a right that can act as an adjudicator (Boyd 2015, 
pp.37-38).  Boyd argues that Kohlberg and Rawls both come to Kantian conclusions 
regarding the equal worth of all (Boyd 2015, pp.44-43).  This is echoed by Rawls in the 
importance he ascribes to respect, and by Kohlberg in his understanding of sympathy, 
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through which individuals come to respect others.  According to both, individuals are 
capable of following rules, and they are self-determining agents (Boyd 2015, pp.48-52). 
 
Rawls acknowledged that the political constructivism of justice as fairness had a Kantian 
basis (Rawls 1980, p.515).  Both Rawls and Kant view the liberal values of equality and 
freedom as founded on respect, and its correlate, dignity,3 according to Martha Nussbaum 
(2011a, p.2).  Because of their inalienable dignity, humans must be respected as ends, 
never means, as embodied in Kant’s categorical imperative.  As Martha Nussbaum argues, 
this is why respect is so crucial for Rawls (Nussbaum 2011a, p.2).  Through respect for 
others and our own self-respect, we recognise the necessity of political and social 
arrangements that promote freedom and equality.  Furthermore, our freedom is restricted 
by the consideration of respect.  In Kant, this is achieved through the recognition that our 
aims in life must be compatible with the autonomy of others (Anderson and Honneth 2005, 
p.127; Kant 1797).  In Rawls, the same aim is achieved through reasonableness (Rawls 
1980, p.530), which ensures our rationality, or self-interest, is restrained by ensuring its 
compatibility with the rationality of others.  Full autonomy also recognises the constraints 
of reasonableness.  A course of moral development leading to Rawlsian full autonomy 
would, then, come to largely Kantian conclusions.  
 
Kohlberg thought that the stages of moral development were universal.  If this were true, 
the moral development of any person, in any culture or society, would accord with the 
moral ideals of Kant and Rawls.  Empirical evidence, however, revealed that Kohlberg’s 
theory lacked universality.  Most people’s moral development ends at the conventional 
level; only a select few develop a sense of morality at the post-conventional level, where 
they view abstract moral principles as being important in their own right.  As the majority 
of people only develop to the conventional level, the group to which they belong will be 
the primary arbiter of their sense of morality.  People would not view justice as fairness as 
an important ideal in the abstract, but only insofar as obedience to the ideal was important 
for the group’s stability.  Values such as duty would take priority; upholding the social 
order would be of the utmost importance for the majority.  For the citizens of political 
liberalism to become autonomous in the way Rawls intended it would be necessary for 
them to reach the post-conventional level.  Once attained, they would be able to appreciate 
universal moral values for their own sake, endorsing principles through their capacity for 
 
3 Nussbaum notes that Rawls does not write about dignity, but she argues that the concept of dignity 
embodies the perspective on human nature he aims to defend.   
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moral reasoning.  Through this capacity, they would be able to recognise the importance of 
justice as fairness for its own sake, and through reflection on differing conceptions of the 
good, decide on the development of their second moral power.  Without the ability to do 
this, a person’s sense of morality could not transcend the values of the moral community.  
 
According to the new synthesis, however, the stages of moral development do not exist.  
Instead, we are primed for making moral decisions from birth, but rather than developing 
through a set of universal stages, development is hinged on the needs of our social group, 
or our moral community.  This theory poses further challenges for political liberalism.  If 
the theory were true, the moral communities in which we live would have a great deal of 
influence over our senses of morality.  The way in which the two moral powers developed 
would be, to a large extent, dictated by our circumstances and surroundings.  In order to 
ensure the first moral power developed to recognise justice as fairness, the moral 
communities would have to be strictly regulated.  This would bring the state into tension 
with groups such as religious communities and families who home school.  Moreover, as 
aspects of morality are genetic according to this theory, unreasonable values could enter 
society through birth.  Public education would have to ensure that these unreasonable 
values were not developed.  If education were left under the auspices of the private sphere, 
values at odds with justice as fairness would have the opportunity to develop, and the 
strength of their support could outweigh that of justice as fairness.  The truth of the new 
synthesis would necessitate a robust public education system.  Regulation of the private 
sphere to discourage the development of not only unreasonable beliefs, but also 
unreasonable genes, would be necessary for the stability of a well-ordered society.    
 
A state that recognised that its stability and continued existence was dependent on ensuring 
the elimination of certain genes would appear to be highly authoritarian and illiberal.  But 
if we assume the truth of the new synthesis, this would be the reality of all social groups: 
the family, public institutions, the nation, and the state.  All of these groups prime their 
members toward certain dispositions, and in so doing, over time, ensure the development 
of some genes and the eradication of others.  The state and well-ordered society of political 
liberalism would be no different.  Through ensuring the realisation of psychological 
dispositions toward fairness and reasonableness, the state of political liberalism would be 
affecting our genetic heritage.  If this process were implemented across the whole of 
society, in both the public and private sphere, the individual would become genetically 
primed to accept the values of political liberalism.  This would undermine our motivation 
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to endorse other doctrines alongside justice as fairness, as we would be emotionally 
predisposed to accept the principles of justice.  In developing full autonomy, rational 
autonomy is undermined.          
 
In addition to the problem of emotional predisposition – which is both necessary for an 
individual to become fully autonomous, and problematic for the diversity of beliefs – is the 
question of the good.  For Rawls, the development of our second moral power is a matter 
of choice.  We are to choose how to develop our conception of the good.  If we are all to 
become fully autonomous citizens, however, developing to the final stage of moral 
development, a great demand is placed on our sense of morality.  There are perhaps two 
ways the development of autonomy can occur in accord with theories of moral 
development.  Either a society can be committed to ensuring citizens reach the final stage 
of moral development, where they can act from abstract moral principles, or ensure 
citizens are emotionally predisposed to accept justice as fairness.  Each approach would, I 
argue, reduce the diversity of beliefs in a society.  I now assess each in turn. 
 
On the Kohlbergian scale of moral development, reaching the final stage of moral 
development, an individual learns to act from abstract moral principles.  Empirically, only 
a small amount of people reach this stage of moral development; essentially those who 
study moral philosophy.  If we are to attempt to enable everyone to reach this stage, then 
the whole of a society must be committed to the importance of moral philosophy.  Citizens 
would need to view this as part of their conception of the good.  That is, people would need 
to see the life of a moral philosopher as an ideal way of life.  The outcome of this is 
necessarily perfectionist.  Without this motivation, however, the existence of the fully 
autonomous citizen is something that can only be hoped for.   
 
The alternative is to follow an approach which prioritises emotion over reason.  Rather 
than developing to the post-conventional level of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, 
and understanding the importance of abstract moral values, most people remain at the 
conventional level of moral development.  They take their moral ideals from the group to 
which they belong.  However, Kohlberg underestimated the strength of the group’s 
influence.  Individuals do not endorse their group’s ideals through their capacity for moral 
reasoning.  Instead, as Haidt argues, they do so because they are emotionally predisposed 
to these ideals.  The citizens of the politically liberal state would then be predisposed to the 
ideal of justice as fairness, at the expense of competing ideals.  A system of moral 
70 
 
education that inculcated a strong psychological motivation to endorse justice as fairness 
would preclude an individual from endorsing other doctrines.  There is an implicit problem 
of comprehensiveness in any system of moral education, and the influence that the group 
has over the individual’s sense of morality.  For a citizen to become fully autonomous, 
however, some form of moral education would be necessary.  Given the absurdly 
ambitious aim of developing a society inhabited solely by moral philosophers who act 
from abstract principles, it seems that ensuring citizens are emotionally predisposed to 
accept justice as fairness is the more appropriate way to ensure the development of full 
autonomy.     
 
3.7 Conclusion    
 
Political liberalism’s approach to human nature is restricted by its need to avoid 
metaphysical commitments.  Therefore, Rawls devised the political conception of the 
person, a concept that enables us to imagine certain basic features of human nature without 
reference to a comprehensive philosophical or religious perspective on the matter.  Central 
to this conception are the two moral powers: the ability to form a sense of justice and a 
conception of the good.  Through this conception, we come to think of ourselves as free: 
free to form a conception of the good, pursuing a rational plan of life in light of this 
conception; free to make claims on institutions; free to take responsibility for ends arising 
from our conception of the good.  This line of thought undergirds Rawls’ thought on 
autonomy.  Through rational autonomy, an individual is able to determine her own 
conception of the good.  In addition, the rationally autonomous citizen is able to decide on 
fair terms of cooperation.  This leads to the acceptance of the principles of justice, in which 
fair terms of cooperation are embedded.  Citizens are fully autonomous when they come to 
act from the principles of justice.  They recognise that the principles of justice promote 
their self-interest as the principles allow an individual to advance her conception of the 
good.  Because of this, individuals are motivated to endorse justice as fairness.    
 
In order to realise the values of political liberalism – fairness, reasonableness, and a well-
ordered society based on terms of fair cooperation – a person’s moral powers have to 
develop in accordance with the principles of justice.  This raises the problem of how this is 
to occur without the state imposing a perfectionist doctrine on future citizens through 
moral education.  Rawls recognises that the political conception of justice must act as an 
educator.  A state must impose certain values on to a society in order for it to function, 
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excluding values that are antithetical.  However, in the crucial stages of a person’s moral 
development during childhood, imposing the values of political liberalism would have a 
strong psychological effect.  The results of this psychological effect could potentially 
preclude a person from endorsing other religious or philosophical ideas.  Though justice as 
fairness is devised so as to be compatible with other doctrines, if a person’s moral 
development had been exclusively informed by liberal ideals, she may not be motivated to 
commit to other modes of thought.     
 
Nevertheless, this may be a necessary course of action if we are to allow for the 
development of full autonomy.  The stability of the society Rawls imagines is dependent 
on citizens who act as to uphold the principles of justice.  Without citizens motivated to act 
in this way, political liberalism faces an existential threat.  Rawls recognises that the 
psychological effects a society has on its citizens will reduce the diversity of beliefs within 
that society.  He sees this as regrettable but necessary (Rawls 2005, p.200).  In conflicts 
arising between the senses of rational and full autonomy, then, preference must be given to 
full autonomy.   
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to assess how Rawls understands human nature and 
autonomy in political liberalism, in order that this understanding may be assessed against 
theories of free will in Chapter 5.  In arguing that we must be held responsible for our 
conceptions of the good as rationally autonomous citizens, Rawls is tacitly committing to 
the truth of free will.  If we are to be thought of as morally responsible, we must be held 
capable of freely choosing our own courses through life.  On Rawls’ understanding of 





Chapter 4 – Metaphysics and Science  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Following the explanation of the basic argument of Political Liberalism, and the role that 
Rawls’ accounts of human nature and autonomy play within this argument, I now turn to 
the matter of metaphysics and science.  Rawls thought that, as modern societies are already 
divided by many philosophical and religious doctrines, the justificatory reasons for 
constitutional essentials should not appeal to the truth of any one such doctrine, as this 
would be to risk deepening these divides.  Instead, the realm of politics – processes of 
political deliberation, the functions of public institutions, constitutional matters – should be 
detached from wider philosophical questions, depending only on public reasons that all 
reasonable citizens can accept.  Thus, metaphysics – which are, for Rawls, claims about 
universal truths – should be avoided throughout the course of political deliberation.  In our 
justifications for the use of state power, we should not rely on the truth of one particular 
metaphysical doctrine.  
  
In this chapter, I argue that Rawls was mistaken.  This is partly due to the premises from 
which Rawls himself began.  Rawls thought that there was a sense of self-respect within 
the human condition tied to the two moral powers.  I argue that this in itself is a conception 
of the self containing metaphysical implications, as such a conception precludes other 
metaphysical conceptions of the self.  Hence, Rawls does not remain entirely 
metaphysically neutral.  Rawls’ own account of human nature exists in tension with other 
doctrines within science, religion, and philosophy.  Another problem with Rawls’ attempt 
to restrict metaphysics from politics is that he argued that public reason should be 
restricted by the limits of well-established and non-controversial science.  The relationship 
between science and metaphysics is close and complex.  Through the methodological tools 
Rawls offers us, we cannot parse where the division between the two domains lies.  Thus, I 
argue that if we are to consider the implications of science within public reason, we must 
also consider the metaphysical aspects of the science.  We have reason, then, to consider 
neuroscience and its metaphysical implications within politics.     
 
With the theoretical problems explained in Chapters 1 and 2, in this chapter, I establish the 
methodology that is used across subsequent chapters.  Rawls’ method of reflective 
equilibrium is used as a way of assessing theoretical claims against empirical data.  I 
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explain reflective equilibrium – including Rawls’ original formulation and how it has been 
developed by other political theorists – before discussing its role in this thesis.  This sets 
out the position I take in regard to the relationship between science and political theory.        
 
The relationship between science and politics as Rawls understands it is assessed in 4.2.  
While Rawls allows for the inclusion of science within political deliberation, conditions 
limit what aspects of science we can consider.  I argue against these conditions, arguing 
instead that, providing the implications of science do not challenge the basis of moral 
equality, we are justified in considering them within the political domain.  In this section, I 
also explain reflective equilibrium, and establish the position I take with regard to how 
science and empirical data should be assessed against political principles.  I then turn to the 
relationship between metaphysics and politics in 4.3.  In arguing that we have two moral 
powers and a sense of self-respect, Rawls, I argue, is committed to a conception of human 
nature that does not cohere with many other theories within religion and philosophy.  
Following Jean Hampton and Joseph Raz who argue for the consideration of metaphysics, 
I argue that, as political liberalism is not entirely void of metaphysical considerations, we 
have reason for considering metaphysics within politics.  Instead of drawing assumptions 
regarding human nature, we should ground how we think about human nature on an 
appreciation of the empirics.  Thus, in 4.4, I argue that we should consider the 
metaphysical implications of science.  It is on these grounds that I argue we should assess 
theories of human nature against the data in neuroscience.     
         
4.2 The Place of Science within Political Liberalism  
 
Public reason, Rawls argues, can be supported by well-known and non-controversial 
scientific knowledge.  To lend support to the political principles we propose, we can appeal 
to such scientific knowledge.  In this section, first, I offer an explanation of reflective 
equilibrium.  I argue that if scientific theories are considered within reflective equilibrium, 
the implications of scientific knowledge must take precedence over political principles.  
While we might revise the political principles chosen in light of scientific knowledge, it 
seems unlikely we would wish to revise our understanding of science due to conflict with 
the political principles we find most convincing.  Second, I argue that while this gives us 
reason to consider science as possessing authority within political deliberation, this 
authority must be placed within certain confines.  The moral equality of all citizens, as 
understood from the perspective of the original position, should limit what sorts of claims 
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can be made in light of scientific knowledge.  Claims must not challenge moral equality 
between citizens.  Third, I question the conditions Rawls placed on the consideration of 
scientific knowledge.  Rawls argued that if science was to be considered within public 
reason, it must be well-established and not controversial.  I present reasons for rejecting 
these conditions.   
 
A note here about Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium is apposite.  Reflective 
equilibrium is a method by which our considered judgements and moral principles are 
assessed against one another (Rawls 1971, pp.47-50).  It is through a process of reflective 
equilibrium that Rawls arrives at the two principles of justice.  Judgements, here, are our 
thoughts on issues at any level of generality, that we have arrived at in a clear frame of 
mind – we are not in a state of terror or inebriated, for instance – whereas principles are 
rules that guide deliberation in an enquiry (Rawls 1971, pp.46-50; Knight 2017, p.46).  
Where there is discord between a judgement and a principle, we revise either in an attempt 
to reach a state of equilibrium between judgements and principles.  As Rawls notes (Rawls 
1971, pp.49-50), a comprehensive survey of every principle relating to the subject under 
study, and all of the considered judgements that might arise while considering that 
principle, is impossible, but that if we consider the dominant principles from within moral 
philosophy that are familiar to us, this will move us closer to the ideal state of reflective 
equilibrium.   
 
Though Rawls originally devised the concept of reflective equilibrium, it was further 
developed by Norman Daniels (1979).  Daniels argued that reflective equilibrium should 
not only include principles and judgements, but also what he calls “background theories”.  
While the main task of reflective equilibrium remains one of finding consistency between 
judgements and principles, background theories may alter the judgements we make.  
Background theories could be, for instance, conceptions of human nature or particular 
scientific theories that force us to further revise our considered judgements.  To provide an 
example, if we found that the judgements we held in response to the principles guiding 
deliberation contradicted basic aspects of evolutionary theory, we would wish to revise our 
judgements rather than attempt to explain why evolutionary theory is incorrect.  This may 
not always be the case; where a scientific theory is particularly controversial, we may 
choose to attribute greater weight to our moral and political judgements.  For example, if 
empirical data appeared to show that there were biological differences between groups of 
people, we would still reject the judgements of those who argue against moral equality.  As 
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Carl Knight notes (2017), it can be difficult to identify each component within reflective 
equilibrium – whether a particular aspect of an argument is a principle, a judgement, or a 
theory – but that this should not necessarily cause us a problem.  The method of reflective 
equilibrium is a way for us to organise our thinking.  For our purposes here, then, we are 
largely dealing with background theories within political liberalism.  Conceptions of 
autonomy and the implications of neuroscience would be considered background theories 
within reflective equilibrium, which may force us to revise our judgements.   
 
Considering science leads to further problems within reflective equilibrium.  Knight states 
that it would be unreasonable to revise our understanding of science because it does not 
accord with our preferred political judgements (Knight 2017).  We would not alter our 
understanding of the laws of gravity if it was somehow found that these laws contradicted 
certain aspects of our preferred political doctrine.  Instead, we would revise the judgements 
we made in light of this doctrine, where these judgements sat in discord with such well-
established science.  In this sense, science possesses a higher level of authority over 
deliberation than do our moral convictions.   
 
However, this is not always the case.  Science, or at least the implications we draw from 
science, should not always possess a higher degree of authority than our moral convictions.  
For instance, a scientific theory on the psychological differences between men and women 
should not lead us to accept that there is not moral equality between the sexes.  It is 
possible that scientific theories could be used to support fascistic ideas, for instance; ideas 
which would be rejected by parties in the original position.  It should be this condition – 
the protection of moral equality between people – that determines whether we should 
consider the implications of science as possessing authority within political deliberation.  
This is not to say that would necessarily reject the truth of empirical data or a scientific 
theory on these grounds, but that this condition determines the appropriate implications we 
can draw from the science.  Moreover, it seems unlikely empirical data or scientific 
theories would ever directly conflict with the concept of moral equality.  While the 
implications of such data or theories may be used to support inegalitarian claims, we can 
reject these claims without making claims regarding the accuracy of the data or correctness 
of the theory.   In sum, we should consider science as possessing a degree of authority 
within political deliberations, providing scientific knowledge is not used in an attempt to 
undermine moral equality, as such arguments would be rejected within the original 




There is also a question of where it is appropriate to consider science.  While Rawls argues 
that science can be considered within public reason, I argue it should be considered 
throughout the scheme of political liberalism.  Congruence should be sought between the 
conditions of the original position and public reason.  Suppose the implications of 
scientific knowledge were considered through public reason, but not in the original 
position.  Public reason may reveal flaws in the conclusions reached in the original 
position.  Thus, rather than risk the consequences of divergence between the original 
position and public reason, we should consider the implications of science across both.     
Scientific knowledge can, then, be used to support public reasons for the adoption of 
political principles (Rawls 2005, p.67).  However, Rawls stated that this knowledge should 
be “well established and not controversial”.  Rawls only mentions these conditions briefly 
in Political Liberalism (see p.67 and p.224).  There is little explanation offered as to what 
these conditions mean, or examples used to explain what aspects of science meet these 
conditions.  However, we could imagine that the phenomena of gravity, evolutionary 
theory, atomic theory, or cell theory might fall into the category of well-established and 
non-controversial science.  These theories have been accepted within the scientific 
community for generations, and most people should know something about the very basics 
of each theory through the course of their education, meaning they are well-known and 
established.  There is also little disagreement over the general tenets of each theory – 
though there might be disagreement over the correct formulation, such as interpreting 
gravity through the theory of relativity or quantum theory – making such theories non-
controversial, at least to scientists.  Perhaps the theory of relativity or quantum mechanics 
may also qualify, though there is a deeper level of disagreement over the correct 
formulation of either theory, meaning appealing to specific aspects of one of these theories 
may prove controversial.  If we are to appeal to such science, then, we should appeal only 
to the most general tenets of either.   
 
There is also the question of who it is that finds the science controversial, as William 
Galston (1995, p.520) and Karin Jønch-Clausen and Klemens Kappel have noted (2016, 
p.7).  Some religious and spiritual groups may question the validity of any of these 
theories, due to the science clashing with their theological or metaphysical perspective.  
Rawls is not clear on whose concerns about controversiality are to be respected.  As Jønch-
Clausen and Kappel argue (2016, pp.7-8), it is likely that Rawls was referring to the 
concerns of the scientific community when he spoke of controversiality – the science 
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supporting public reason should not be highly controversial within this community – but 
this leaves us with the problem of what to do if the public disagree with the scientific 
community.     
 
Presumably, though again Rawls does not explain his reasons for these conditions, making 
the acceptance of science within public reason conditional is to avoid a situation in which 
political principles are premised on highly contentious scientific knowledge.  In the event 
of this knowledge being rejected, we would be forced to also reject the political principles.  
However, it could be the case that, whether or not political principles are knowingly 
premised on scientific theories, political principles come into conflict with science due to 
the progression of scientific knowledge revealing flaws in the assumptions undergirding 
these political principles.  It would be irrelevant, then, whether or not political principles 
are premised on scientific theories.  If we are to respect the validity of scientific 
knowledge, then we must acknowledge that political principles may come into conflict 
with such knowledge, and in the event of it doing so, we should revise the political 
principles.  For instance, consider what Bertrand Russell states in regard to the state of 
scientific knowledge following advances in the seventeenth century: 
 
The first thing to note is the removal of all traces of animism from the laws of 
physics.  The Greeks, though they did not say so explicitly, evidently 
considered the power of movement a sign of life . . . The soul of an animal, in 
Aristotle, has various functions, and one of them it to move the animal’s body.  
The sun and planets, in Greek thinking, are apt to be gods, or at least regulated 
and moved by gods (Russell 1946, pp.493-494). 
 
Following the discovery of the first law of motion, it was revealed that the external 
causes of motion were material.  Suppose that, upon an animistic understanding of 
the laws of physics, we thought that there must be gods responsible for the laws of 
motion, and therefore considered it natural to codify respect for these gods within 
political principles.  This codification may not be the result of considered judgements 
made knowingly in light of science, but the result of what is considered common 
sense.  After Newton’s discovery of the laws of motion, what was previously thought 
to be common sense could no longer be considered as such.  That is, any argument 
for the necessary existence of gods could not rest on common sense appreciation of 
the laws of nature. It would no longer be a matter of common sense to codify respect 
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for the gods within political principles once Newton had revealed the flaws in such 
assumptions.  Hence, arguments could be made for altering these political principles.  
In such a case, it does not matter whether the political principle was knowingly 
premised on science.  Its instability is revealed anyway through the progression of 
scientific knowledge.     
 
Whatever the state of knowledge a political principle is devised in, however, there is 
the risk that untested assumptions are carried over into the principle.  Understanding 
of what is common sense may alter as scientific knowledge progresses, revealing 
flaws in the assumptions.  As what might be considered common sense alters, the 
sorts of political principles that appear sensible to adopt will need to adjust.  Hence, 
whether or not political principles are knowingly premised on scientific knowledge, 
principles may conflict with such knowledge.  Rather than seek to avoid the 
implications of controversial scientific knowledge, we should instead consider such 
implications through public reason.  By bringing science and its implications into 
consideration, through a process of reflective equilibrium, the chances of error 
should be reduced.   
 
Furthermore, the extent to which aspects of science are well-established and non-
controversial is itself a political question.  Michel Foucault claimed there was a 
relationship between truth and power in which the powerful can determine what is 
true (Foucault 1972).  Whether or not we agree with Foucault, it can be admitted that 
what kind of scientific knowledge comes to be considered well-established and non-
controversial depends on this relationship, at least to some extent.  Through the basic 
structure of society, certain strands of scientific knowledge can be promoted while 
others are placed to one side.  Governments can fund certain areas of scientific 
research, education systems can provide students with an understanding of some 
aspects of science, and the media can choose which areas of development in 
scientific knowledge to report, while other areas of science are ignored or 
suppressed.  Those strands of scientific knowledge that are not promoted will neither 
become well-established nor non-controversial, due to the making of political 
decisions.  To state that only those strands of scientific knowledge that are well-
established and non-controversial can be considered within political deliberation 
would be to uphold the power the state has over the truth.  Where science can reveal 
inconvenient truths, the state, appealing to Rawls’ conditions, could justify the 
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suppression of scientific knowledge from political consideration.  This gives us 
reason to consider science within democratic processes, rather than allow the state to 
determine what sorts of scientific knowledge become well-established and non-
controversial, and, in turn, which aspects of science can be considered within 
political deliberation.          
 
Thus, I argue that we should reject the two conditions Rawls placed on the inclusion 
of science within political liberalism.  Instead, the only condition for the inclusion of 
science should be that science is not used to defend the views of those who reject 
moral equality.  There are two possible objections here, the second following from 
the first.  First, the inclusion of all aspects of science would lead to instability.  The 
political principles we endorsed would need to alter continually as the state of 
knowledge within science develops, leading to constitutional instability.  Second, 
within this instability, there is no way of determining where the truth lies.  There is 
no widely accepted position in the philosophy of science that can be appealed to in 
order to determine which aspects of science are appropriate to support political 
principles.  Furthermore, the majority of citizens, who we can assume are not experts 
in science, have little ability to decide which is correct between two contrasting 
perspectives within the scientific community.  Thus, the support which science was 
intended to lend political principles would be lost amidst confusion surrounding how 
to interpret data and theories within science.  As Rawls states in his explanation of 
the burdens of judgement, often scientific and empirical data is too “conflicting and 
complex” for there to be common agreement on its interpretation (Rawls 2005, p.56).     
 
These concerns should not trouble us, however.  In response to the first objection, as 
stated earlier, whether or not political principles are premised on a knowing 
consideration of science, we may have to alter political principles as scientific 
knowledge progresses.  Thus, knowingly committing to a position within science 
when devising political principles does not lead to constitutional essentials that are 
any less stable.  In response to the second objection, I follow Hampton in arguing 
that disagreement is not problematic in itself; it does not matter, then, that most 
citizens are not experts in science and may disagree over how to interpret findings 
within science.  As Hampton noted in her critique of Rawls’ view on metaphysics, 
the main problem with disagreement is not one with metaphysics, but with “true 
believers” (Hampton 1989, p.812).  The true believer is someone who is willing to do 
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anything in order to advance the doctrine to which she is committed, will not listen to 
contrary opinions, and will shun those who object to her beliefs.  Likewise, the 
problem here is not with science, but with those who would reject science without 
good reason due to their ‘true belief’.  It should be remembered that the limits of 
public reason apply primarily to constitutional essentials.  Outside of these essentials 
– though Rawls argues public reason should still be respected (Rawls 2005, p.215) – 
citizens are free to appeal to any aspects of science that support their favoured 
policies.  In these instances, citizens may feel marginalised if their perspective on 
science is disfavoured by the majority, but that does not mean that the views of these 
citizens are suppressed or not tolerated.  Instead, these citizens are free to maintain a 
belief in the correctness of their interpretation of the science, arguing the case for this 
interpretation, and attempting to garner support.  Returning to public reason and the 
attempt to establish constitutional essentials, the same rules should apply.  There is 
no need to make the consideration of science conditional.  Using findings within 
science to support a constitutional essential is not to be intolerant to those who reject 
these findings.  Furthermore, to place conditions on the consideration of science is to 
risk rejecting matters of great urgency.  For instance, a finding on climate change 
may be rejected from political deliberation due to its not being well-established.  The 
consequences of ignoring this science could be a series of disasters making the state 
uninhabitable.  From the perspective of the original position, then, parties would 
recognise the need to consider science within public reason due to its protecting of 
citizens’ interests.           
        
If we are to consider science within political liberalism, we should, then, consider it 
as possessing authority.1  Though some may reject the empirical data, if we are to 
consider science as possessing authority within political deliberation, we may 
discount those who reject scientific knowledge as being unreasonable.  Rejection of 
scientific knowledge is not reasonable disagreement; it reveals an unwillingness to 
recognise the burdens of judgement (Rawls 2005, pp.54-57).  This claim may seem 
to be at odds with Rawls’ original explication of the burdens of judgement.  On 
 
1 Of course, this leaves us with the problem of who is to determine the quality of the scientific data if this 
data is to hold such authority.  Elizabeth Anderson has offered a solution to this problem, devising a 
hierarchy of expertise between the layperson and the leading scientists in their field (Anderson 2011, 
pp.146-147).  Anderson also proposes democratic reforms to allow for better dissemination of scientific 
knowledge, enabling the lay person to become informed.  Whatever aspects of science are incorporated 
within the political domain, the question will remain of who is to determine the most appropriate 
interpretation of the science.  Anderson’s solution is a sensible one.      
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Rawls’ view, as we are to respect the views of other reasonable people, not 
attempting to use the power of the state to suppress their views, we should accept 
that empirical and scientific evidence can be complex, and respect the judgements 
people make in light of this evidence.  The power of the state should not be used to 
suppress the views of alternative interpretations of the evidence.  However, if a 
person wishes to reject the scientific evidence because she finds it unappealing, 
despite making no attempt to offer an alternative explanation of the evidence, we 
should not consider this reasonable disagreement.  Thus, a person who wishes to 
prevent the state from using force to mitigate the effects of climate change, though 
who does not offer a plausible alternative account of the data, should not be 
considered as reasonable.  The problems of disagreement arise not from science and 
metaphysics, but, as Hampton argued, from the true believers who refuse to listen to 
reasonable arguments.    
 
Removing the conditions stipulating which aspects of science can be considered 
means that we are free to appeal to all aspects of science in the use of public reason.  
As I argue in later chapters, considering the implications of neuroscience should lead 
us to revise how we think about autonomy.  Nevertheless, the proponent of political 
liberalism may object to its inclusion on the grounds of its controversiality and its 
metaphysical implications.  I have explained why we should not consider 
controversiality a problem, while I address the problem of metaphysics in 4.3 and 
4.4.               
 
To sum up, through a process of reflective equilibrium, we should consider science 
as holding a degree of authority within political liberalism.  This authority should be 
tempered, however.  Scientific knowledge should not be used to challenge the notion 
of moral equality between citizens.  Rawls also thought that science should only be 
considered if it was knowledge that was well-established and not controversial.  I 
have argued against adopting these conditions.  There are two reasons for this.  First, 
while science may not have been knowingly considered within the deliberative 
processes behind the devising of political principles, it may nevertheless have 
indirectly influenced these processes.  What sorts of claims are considered common 
sense can be influenced by the current state of knowledge within science.  Thus, the 
political principles we adopt may be influenced by scientific knowledge 
unknowingly.  Rather than restrict the consideration of controversial scientific 
82 
 
knowledge from political deliberation, we should allow it to inform deliberation in 
order to understand the sorts of assumptions that undergird political principles.  
Second, whether or not an aspect of science is well-established and not controversial 
is itself a political question.  To reject scientific knowledge from political 
deliberation on these grounds is to increase the extent to which the state can control 
the development of knowledge and hide inconvenient truths.  Thus, we should 
consider science within political liberalism; those who reject scientific evidence 
without an alternative explanation of the evidence can be considered unreasonable.  
However, this is not to say that those who reject science are not to be tolerated.         
 
4.3 Political Liberalism and Metaphysics  
  
Metaphysics, for Rawls, belongs to the domain of philosophical doctrines that should not 
be considered within the political realm.  The sorts of truth claims that are the subject of 
metaphysics relate to the ways in which individual citizens may conceptualise the good 
life.  Committing to a certain metaphysical doctrine within political deliberations over 
constitutional essentials would deepen divisions between citizens, as those who object to 
such a metaphysical claim would likely feel that the state is forcing them to obey a 
constitution premised on ideas they think untrue.  In this section, I explain how Rawls 
attempted to remain neutral between metaphysical claims in politics, before examining 
how such arguments have been extended in the work of Rawlsian thinkers.  I argue that 
Rawlsians are mistaken in thinking that they are entirely neutral in matters of metaphysics.  
In the conception of human nature they endorse, there are metaphysical implications 
preventing us from accepting the truth of other perspectives on human nature.    
 
To begin, an explanation of metaphysics is necessary.  The meaning of metaphysics is 
often unclear, and there is no universally accepted definition of the term (Van Inwagen 
2018, p.1).  For our purposes here, we will assess what Rawls understood metaphysics to 
be.  As Jean Hampton notes (1989, pp.794-795), Rawls does not offer a precise definition 
of what he means by metaphysics.  His loose definition of the term will inform our 
discussion.  The closest Rawls comes to offering a precise definition of metaphysics is in a 
footnote in his reply to Jurgen Habermas.  Rawls says here that metaphysics is a:  
 
general account of what there is, including fundamental, fully general 
statements – for example, the statements ‘every event has a cause’ and ‘all 
83 
 
events occur in space and time’, or can be related thereto.  So viewed, W.V. 
Quine also is a metaphysician.  To deny certain metaphysical doctrines is to 
assert another such doctrine (Rawls 2005, p.379).   
  
It is the final sentence here that is of especial importance.  The problem with metaphysical 
claims, for Rawls, is their uniqueness; if a metaphysical truth is espoused, alternative truths 
are denied.  In his essay ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, Rawls explains 
that his conception of justice is political rather than metaphysical because it provides a 
basis for political agreement, rather than a conception of justice that is considered to be 
true (Rawls 1985, pp.230-231).  Expanding on this, Rawls claims the way in which he 
imagines citizens coming to this agreement as free and equal persons is not dependent on 
any metaphysical conception of the self.  Though Rawls does not offer an explicit 
definition of metaphysics, his understanding of the term centres on universal truth claims.  
As Rawls puts it, “I should like to avoid, for example, claims to universal truth, or claims 
about the essential nature and identity of persons” (Rawls 1985, p.230).  Thus, a 
conception of justice would be metaphysical if a person argued it was the true theory of 
justice.  This true theory of justice would preclude all other theories of justice.  
Committing to it would prevent a person from endorsing an alternative conception of 
justice.  Likewise, if someone were to argue that a theory of the self was the true 
understanding of the self, it would be a metaphysical perspective on the self, rather than a 
political conception of the self (a conception of the self that all people can agree is 
reasonable).  These sorts of truth claims are metaphysical.  While Rawls does not provide a 
substantive definition of the type of truth that undergirds metaphysics, the problem of a 
metaphysical truth is its uniqueness; that endorsing such a truth would negate alternative 
metaphysical perspectives.      
 
Of course, this leaves certain problems unsolved.  What types of truth claims are to be 
considered metaphysical, as opposed to scientific or empirical?  Hampton argues that 
Rawls’ thought on metaphysics is Hobbesian rather than positivistic (Hampton 1989, 
pp.794-795).  That is, it is not merely non-empirical claims that we can dismiss without 
further consideration, but claims for which an “incontrovertible demonstration is not 
possible”.  On this definition, we can delineate between the scientific and the metaphysical.  
The metaphysical is that which cannot be demonstrated.  However, this is not sufficient.  
As Raz claims (1990), if it can be shown that a theory can achieve its aims in practice, then 
we can consider it true.  In this case, we have empirical proof of a theoretical claim, and 
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can, then, consider it true.  It would seem odd, however, to consider a theory of justice as a 
scientific rather than a metaphysical truth.  That Rawls considers it possible for a theory of 
justice to be metaphysical, and claims made in regard to justice are demonstrable, suggests 
that Hampton’s explanation of Rawls’ thought on metaphysics fails.   
 
To gain a clearer understanding of what metaphysics means for Rawls, it is better to 
consider the central problem of metaphysics for politics as Rawls sees it.  The problem, as 
mentioned earlier, is that of exclusivity.  Believing something to be universally true 
precludes any alternative perspective on that truth.  A person who believed a theory of 
justice to be universally true would not countenance any other theory of justice.  Though 
aspects of a theory of justice are demonstrable, its universal and exclusive truth cannot be 
demonstrated.  Thus, Hampton’s explanation succeeds if we think about the exclusivity of 
universal truths.  This suggests, then, that the problem for Rawls is not one of metaphysics 
but of belief, as Hampton also argues (Hampton 1989, p.812).  A scientist may believe her 
scientific theory to be universally true.  Again, aspects of a scientific theory can be tested 
and proved false, but this may not challenge the belief.  A person may continue to believe 
in the truth of a theory despite the availability of contrary evidence.  While we may have a 
better understanding of what the problem of metaphysics is for Rawls, it is still not clear 
whether scientific truths are different from metaphysical truths if the truth claim is 
intended to be universal.  More on this is said in 4.4.  
                
For Rawls, metaphysics belong to what he calls the “background culture” of society 
(Rawls 2005, p.14).  The background culture contains all of the ideas and beliefs people 
hold as they go about their everyday lives.  While this culture is social – people form 
institutions on its basis, and interact with others with regard to the values they hold as a 
result of this culture – it is not political.  We should not draw on aspects of the background 
culture in order to support our political principles.  To do so would be to argue for 
comprehensive, rather than political, liberalism.  Such a liberal doctrine contains views not 
only on what is just, but also on what is good and true, and guides all aspects of human 
behaviour on this basis.  Political liberalism, on the other hand, confines itself only to what 
is just.  The task of determining what is good and true is left for citizens to decide for 
themselves.  From the constitutional essentials determined through political liberalism, we 
cannot necessarily determine what is good or true, and so – outside of the realm of what is 
just – human behaviour ought not to be guided by this doctrine.  Providing that people act 
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in accordance with what is just, how they act and think in relation to what is good and true 
is for them to decide.   
 
Thus, citizens living in a politically liberal society should not expect their favoured 
metaphysical doctrine to be enforced by the state over other citizens.  Given that Rawls 
thought that public reason should be restricted by certain aspects of scientific knowledge, 
however, it is not necessarily the case that political liberalism abstains entirely from 
making commitments to the truth.  Quong’s response to this problem is to determine what 
kinds of truths political liberalism wishes to avoid.  Arguing here against Raz’s claim that 
justice cannot be independent of the truth (Raz 1990), Quong distinguishes two types of 
truth: mundane and metaphysical (Quong 2011, pp.226-229).  I focus here on Quong’s 
interpretation of Raz in order to convey Quong’s argument: 
 
1. Rawls's theory aims at stability and social unity. 
2. Aiming at stability and social unity explains the need for an overlapping consensus. 
3. But we need to know why we should aim at stability and social unity.  
4. The reason must be that these goals are what a true or valid theory of justice should 
do (according to Rawls).  
5. But this means that Rawls's theory must accept certain claims as true, namely, that 
social unity and stability are of great value and should be the focus of a theory of 
justice.  
6. Therefore Rawls's theory cannot successfully abstain from certain truth claims 
(Quong 2011, p.227). 
 
Thus runs Raz’s line of argument, according to Quong.  If 6 is correct, and political 
liberalism cannot avoid truth claims, it is only the mundane type of truth claim, according 
to Quong (2011, p.228).  That is, it is mundane rather than metaphysical.  We may say that 
it is inherently true that social unity and stability are of great value to a society, but this 
sort of truth claim does not commit us to any one metaphysical doctrine, at the expense of 
opposing metaphysical positions.  A Kantian, a Hindu, and a utilitarian could all agree that 
it is true that social unity and stability are important, despite their respective metaphysical 
perspectives being irreconcilable.  Whether we say that justice as fairness is true, or only 
that it is reasonable, it remains the case that we can accept the precepts of justice as 




Though Quong, I argue, is partly correct here – justice as fairness in itself is compatible 
with various metaphysical perspectives – some of the ideas Rawls uses to support justice as 
fairness are not entirely void of metaphysical implications.  This is particularly true of the 
way in which Rawls thinks about self-respect and the moral powers.  Assuming that there 
is a sense of self-respect and two moral powers within the human condition – and that this 
provides the basis of our motivation in life, as it undergirds our moral psychology – 
precludes many other metaphysical perspectives on human nature.  For instance, if we 
thought, as Locke did (1690), that the mind begins as a tabula rasa – that knowledge is 
dependent on experience, and the mind at birth, having no experience, can contain no 
knowledge – then we could not assume also that self-respect and the two moral powers are 
inherent within the individual.  Such attributes of the human condition would be dependent 
on the knowledge produced by certain social circumstances.  For instance, whether a sense 
of justice was maintained within a society, or whether it was considered appropriate to 
develop a sense of self-respect in response to personal success.  On Lockean empiricism, 
we could assume nothing in regard to the human condition from the perspective of the 
original position.  Or if we thought that humans were naturally egoistic, with no sense of 
morality other than that of self-preservation, as Hobbes perhaps did (1651), the notion of 
self-respect is entirely at odds with our account of human nature.  The individual of 
Hobbes’ state of nature could not be thought of as increasing her self-respect through 
realising her moral powers, nor would Hobbes imagine that this became the focus of 
human life under the sovereign.  Freud thought that unconscious drives, primarily 
concerned with sex and death, were what motivated human behaviour (Freud 1920).  The 
death drive in particular has a self-destructive aim.  Any kind of moral power we might 
have would perform a secondary function to these primary drives.  Freud would see that 
we are primarily focused on what derives from these unconscious drives; our success in 
realising our moral powers, or that of anyone else, is ultimately irrelevant in terms of our 
overriding motivations.  This is a short summary of three ways of thinking about human 
nature that are inconsistent with Rawls’ idea of self-respect and the moral powers as the 
basis of motivation.  From the history of religion and philosophy, we could draw many 
others.  Rawls’ view of human nature precludes any other metaphysical perspective that 
does not find humans to be inherently capable of social cooperation due to their innate 
capacity for a sense of morality.     
 
While justice as fairness may indeed be committed to nothing more than the mundane sort 
of truth, the same cannot be said of the way in which Rawls thinks about human nature.  If 
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we endorse Rawls’ conception of human nature, we will be precluded from accepting 
many other philosophical conceptions of human nature.  Thus, as I argue in 4.4, rather than 
base our understanding of human nature on such assumptions, we should instead appeal to 
empirical data.  This allows for a more stable basis on which to form a conception of 
human nature.  Furthermore, in thinking about human nature, remaining neutral in regard 
to metaphysics is not possible.  Our understanding of human nature will come into conflict 
with other ways of thinking about human nature.   
 
As Hampton argued (1989), considering metaphysics within the scheme of political 
liberalism lends the deliberations greater depth.  Joseph Raz also argues for the need to 
consider metaphysics within political deliberation (Raz 1990).  Raz argues that justice and 
truth cannot be independent of one another (Raz 1990, p.15).  If a theory of justice attains 
the values which it was established to realise – in this case, fairness – then we can consider 
that theory to be a true theory of justice.  The mere achievement of its aims means that 
justice cannot be independent of the truth.  Jean Hampton also worries about the 
relationship between justice and truth.  Disallowing metaphysical reasoning within 
political liberalism could lead to a situation in which political leaders and citizens use 
emotional rhetoric to support their principles, rather than attempting to establish the truth 
of their principles (Hampton 1989, p.807).  Opening up political liberalism to deliberation 
on metaphysics allows for better grounds on which to debate certain issues.  Controversial 
matters over which there is no consensus would sometimes be better settled on 
metaphysical grounds.  To use Hampton’s example (1989, p.810), a debate on the legality 
of pornography could not be determined through appealing to the principles of justice 
alone, or to questions of reasonableness.  Those who argue pornography violates dignity 
and should be banned, and those who argue its being banned is a violation of freedom of 
speech are both being reasonable, in the Rawlsian sense.  Our stance on such an issue is 
dependent on what we think is metaphysically and morally true; our understanding of 
human nature and dignity.  Enabling the inclusion of metaphysics within public reason 
allows us to incorporate deeper reasoning to support our stance.   
 
As noted in 4.2, Hampton stresses that this does not necessarily promote intolerance.  
While Rawls wished to keep metaphysics out of politics to avoid deep epistemic 
disagreements being transposed into the political realm, the presence of metaphysics is not 
an indication of intolerance in itself.  Relying on metaphysical reasoning to support the 
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principles we endorse is not to say that we think our opponents should be prevented from 
endorsing opposing metaphysical views.   
 
As political liberalism fails to remain entirely neutral in metaphysical matters regarding the 
nature of the self, we should, I argue, resolve matters of metaphysics within political 
liberalism.  Avoiding metaphysics within politics entirely is neither possible nor desirable.  
Where metaphysical issues arise, such as the nature of the self, rather than attempt to 
devise a conception of the self that is devoid of metaphysical commitments, we should 
instead attempt to brings judgements on human nature into accord with empirical data 
within science, seeking to attain reflective equilibrium.   
 
Finally, there is the matter of what aspects of metaphysics are to be incorporated; whether 
any metaphysical perspective should be considered as grounds for a legitimate public 
reason, or only certain kinds of metaphysical claims.  For instance, a person may wish to 
appeal to her faith in God, her understanding of the meaning of life, or her belief in the 
immortality of the soul in order to support her claims within public reason.  Hampton’s 
solution here is Socratic philosophising (1989, p.812-814).  A search for truth through 
Socratic philosophising is quite different from attempting to impose a belief system on 
another.  Through Socratic philosophising, we agree to respect the views of others in 
attempting to establish the truth.  Our aim is not to simply impose what we regard as true 
on the rest of society.  Whether we are attempting to reach political conclusions by Rawls’ 
method of public reason or Hampton’s proposed Socratic philosophising, the problem, as 
aforementioned, is the true believer.  The true believer has no respect of alternative ideas to 
her own, as she wishes only to impose one belief system on the whole society.  This is a 
problem regardless of the method of political deliberation.  This will be further explored in 
Chapters 8 and 9.  For our purposes here, Hampton’s method of Socratic philosophising 
can be used to determine what sorts of metaphysical claims can be considered within 
politics.  Where the implications of science – or other assessments of the truth relevant 
within political deliberation – lead us to considerations of metaphysics, the truth claims 
arising can be tested against opposing conceptions of the truth.  Thus, we are not simply 
appealing to what we believe to be metaphysically true, but attempting to sharpen our 
understanding of the truth.  Commitments to preconceived metaphysical beliefs are thus 




To conclude, Rawls argues that as metaphysics are to be placed aside from the political 
domain, in political considerations, we should not draw on a metaphysical conception of 
the self.  However, I have argued that Rawls fails to remain entirely metaphysically neutral 
in his account of the self, at least in regard to a Rawlsian understanding of metaphysics.  
Whether we say that the political conception of the person is a reasonable way of thinking 
about the self, or the true way of thinking about the self, should we accept this conception, 
we are precluded from accepting many other conceptions of the self drawn from the history 
of religion and philosophy.  Thus, rather than base our understanding of the self on general 
assumptions made about human nature, we should instead look to the empirical evidence, 
and base any claims made about the self on an understanding of the empirics.  
 
4.4 Why the Metaphysical Implications of Neuroscience Should be Considered  
 
Due to the absence of metaphysics from political liberalism, free will is not a subject 
Rawls would have considered appropriate to deliberate in the original position.  In this 
section, I argue that Rawls was mistaken.  Metaphysics and science are entwined.  As 
Martha Nussbaum notes, Rawls left it to future students of political theory to determine the 
boundary between the two (Nussbaum 2011a, pp.7-8).  If science is to be considered, I 
argue the metaphysical assumptions underlying scientific knowledge need to be unpacked 
if we are to understand the implications of this knowledge.  My aim is not to develop a 
theory of metaphysics, or to argue in favour of a particular approach to the philosophy of 
science, but to show that the methodological tools Rawls offers us do not allow us to 
determine where science ends and metaphysics begins.  I argue that if, as Rawls claims, 
science should be considered within political liberalism, then there is a need to consider 
metaphysics.  This discussion supports the four reasons that are then presented for 
considering neuroscience within politics.  First, we can cannot distinguish metaphysics 
from science on Rawlsian grounds.  Second, to consider the metaphysical implications of 
science is to gain a better understanding of what science tells us.  Third, there are already 
metaphysical implications within political liberalism due to Rawls’ conception of the 
person.  Rather than allow for the inclusion of this conception of human nature based only 
on assumptions made regarding human nature, we should test these assumptions against 
the data in neuroscience.  Fourth, to consider these matters is not necessarily to be 
intolerant of alternative perspectives.  Through the consideration of neuroscience, we gain 




There is a blurred line of division between science and metaphysics.  Craig Callender 
states that philosophers of science are troubled by what aspects of metaphysics to 
incorporate within their work as “metaphysics is deeply infused within and important to 
science” (Callender 2011, p.33).  If public reason is to be supported by well-known 
scientific knowledge, the limits of this knowledge – what is strictly scientific as opposed to 
metaphysical – would also need to be understood, yet Rawls does not offer us the tools to 
determine this limit.  While Karl Popper (1963) and Rudolf Carnap (1963) attempted to 
draw a sharp distinction between the domains of metaphysics and science, this distinction 
has become of less importance to some working in contemporary metaphysics and science 
(Callender 2011; Mumford & Tugby 2013).  This is not to say that there are no longer 
dividing lines between the two domains, but that those such as Callender, along with 
Mumford and Tugby, recognise that each domain must inform the other.  As Mumford and 
Tugby posit, scientific knowledge requires an ordered world.  In a world that suffered from 
complete disorder, scientific knowledge could tell us nothing; there could be no way of 
applying this knowledge within this disorder.  Within an ordered world, we can apply 
scientific knowledge, as its hypotheses are predictable and testable.  The systems 
themselves that are constitutive of this order, however, are not knowable through scientific 
knowledge alone.  To understand these systems, we need to look to metaphysics.  Through 
combining scientific knowledge with metaphysical analysis, we can not only understand 
scientific data, but also how this data fits into the order of the world in which it exists, or at 
least a perspective on this order.   
 
Determining what is scientific as opposed to metaphysical is, though, not a straightforward 
task.  Perhaps a simple way of thinking about the distinction is to regard metaphysics as 
concerning abstract and speculative claims, and science as concerning what is empirical 
and testable.  As Callender notes (2011, pp.10-11), however, this does not suffice.  A 
scientific theory such as superstring theory contains claims that are speculative.  In 
addition, the proponent of superstring theory posits that extended simples – simples being 
objects with no proper parts – are the building blocks of the universe, an idea some 
metaphysicians would argue is metaphysically impossible, as simples cannot be spatially 
extended.  The relationship between the two domains is thus complex and far from clear.  
While recent work on the relationship acknowledges that metaphysics cannot simply be 
stripped away from science, there is no common agreement on how the one should relate to 
the other.  Ross et al (2007) argue that contemporary metaphysics should consider science 
only as it is, discarding a priori intuitions and common-sense ideas uninformed by science.  
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Against this, Anderson and Becker Arenhardt (2016) argue that intuitions are important, 
and science presupposes the truth of certain metaphysical intuitions.  Science and 
metaphysics are complexly related and there is no simple way of determining the 
boundaries between the two, or how they should inform one another.   
       
If we are to consider science within public reason, but not metaphysics, we must know 
where the dividing lines between the two domains exists.  Rawls does not offer us the 
ability to determine this through his methodological tools alone.  The original position 
cannot solve this problem as deliberations are guided by the parties’ interpretation of the 
citizens’ interests, and we can assume that the interests of citizens are in no way dependent 
on the distinction between science and metaphysics.  It would be of no benefit to citizens 
to define metaphysics in a particular way or science in another.  Public reason also fails to 
offer a solution.  We are to keep metaphysical considerations out of public reason; 
determining a distinction between what is metaphysical as opposed to scientific is itself a 
metaphysical question.  Perhaps this is also why his definition of metaphysics is loose; to 
commit to a certain picture of metaphysics is, in itself, to commit to a metaphysical truth.     
A possible solution for Rawls exists in the demonstrability of a truth.  If a truth can be 
demonstrated, then we can consider this truth within politics.  Truths that are not 
demonstrable – a belief in God, the afterlife, or the meaning of life – are what should be 
avoided within politics, whether we consider these truths metaphysical or scientific.  As 
Hampton noted, however, the problem here is one of belief, not truth.  We have reason to 
exclude indemonstrable beliefs from politics – as Hampton argued, it is the true believer 
who is the problem for politics, rather than the truth – but we do not have reason to exclude 
truths.  Using the implications of science and metaphysics to support our public reasons 
offers them a greater depth.    
       
Though we can support public reasons with the conclusions of science, without 
metaphysical analysis of science, certain knowledge is of no value.  This is not true of all 
scientific knowledge.  For instance, we could understand that carbon emissions cause 
global warming through looking at the scientific evidence, with no need to unpack the 
metaphysical assumptions underlying the evidence.  Science, here, has only practical 
implications; there is no need to question the metaphysical basis of the work.  This is not 
the case, however, when scientific knowledge is considered in relation to other matters.  
Consider how scientific knowledge might be relevant to the legality of abortion at certain 
stages of pregnancy.  We may wish to look to the scientific data in order to determine 
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when certain physical processes begin – the heartbeat, the development of the central 
nervous system – in order to determine where life, consciousness, or the ability to feel pain 
begin.  Scientific data relating to when such phenomena begin between conception and 
birth can tell us little without a metaphysical perspective on the meaning of these concepts.  
From the scientific data, we can learn about the beginnings of various physical processes, 
but not what these processes signal in relation to our understanding of life.  Why the 
beginning of certain physical processes should be considered as the beginning of life, or 
personhood, is a metaphysical, rather than scientific, question.  While scientists might 
make claims regarding what the data tells us, when they do so, there are certain 
metaphysical assumptions underlying their claims that are unacknowledged.  As Peter Van 
Inwagen argues (2018, pp.7-8), when the scientist Carl Sagan asserts that the world and the 
physical universe are identical, he is making a metaphysical claim, not a scientific one.      
 
Such issues raise metaphysical questions that need to be resolved metaphysically, not 
scientifically.  Hume claimed that what ought to be cannot be inferred from what is (1740), 
yet there is a deeper problem here: the metaphysical is and the scientific is are not 
synonymous.  The science alone can tell us about what there is scientifically, but not 
metaphysically.  Empirical data without metaphysical analysis does not tell us how science 
should inform our perception of the truth.  A scientific theory may tell us more about our 
perception of the truth, yet there will be certain metaphysical assumptions underlying this 
theory.  Rather than attempt to include science within political liberalism while excluding 
metaphysics – a move which is impossible without defining each term, which Rawls does 
not allow us to do – we should include both.  This allows us to consider the metaphysics 
that undergird scientific theories, and the metaphysical implications following from 
science and empirical data.  From this consideration, we gain a better understanding of the 
science, as those such as Mumford and Tugby argue, while also allowing us to think about 
how the conclusions of science can inform our lives.  Unpacking these metaphysical 
considerations allows us to draw conclusions on matters such as abortion.   
 
If we allow for the consideration of the metaphysical implications of science, we can 
consider neuroscience.  The political conception of the person can be assessed against the 
empirical evidence.  From the metaphysical implications arising from this evidence, we 
can deepen our understanding of human nature, considering whether this conception of 
human nature coheres with our political principles.  Due to the implications it may hold for 
how we think about autonomy, we should consider the empirical data relating to free will.  
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Because of the authority we grant science within public reason, where conceptions of 
autonomy do not cohere with the empirical data, we should revise how we think about 
autonomy.  This is also true for other political concepts which can be related to human 
nature: moral and legal responsibility, political decision-making, or our sense of morality.  
Through assessing such concepts against the empirical data, we can better appreciate how 
political principles cohere with the implications arising from human nature.  Though there 
are other aspects of human nature that are of political importance, it is the relationship 
between free will and autonomy that is considered here.          
  
The subject of free will incorporates both metaphysical and empirical aspects, both of 
which, I argue, should be considered.  Philosophical discussion of free will has tended to 
examine its metaphysical aspects, while neuroscience looks at free will from an empirical 
perspective.  Empirical data necessarily leads us to metaphysical considerations, however.  
Without considering the metaphysics, empirical data alone tells us little about free will, as 
we are left without a metaphysical understanding of the meaning of free will.   
 
Metaphysical explanations tell us how the empirical data challenges free will.  Hence, 
whether we think there are implications from science for free will and moral responsibility 
depends on our metaphysical commitments, whether explicit or implicit.  Libet’s reading 
of the data is premised on the truth of mind-body dualism.2  On this premise, we have free 
will due to our conscious will being independent of neural activity, the mind and body 
being two distinct entities.  The data obtained from Libet’s experiment challenges this 
conception of free will as it suggests unconscious neural activity has a large role to play in 
the process of human action (though this conception of free will is rescued by Libet’s 
insistence on the indeterminism of the veto function).  Without understanding this premise, 
we can learn only about a series of physical processes.  We cannot draw conclusions 
regarding what these processes mean for whether or not we have free will.  If we are to 
consider neuroscience, the metaphysical implications of neuroscience should also be 
considered.       
 
 
2 See Libet (1999) and Dennett (2003, pp.232-236).  This is further explained across Chapters 5, 6, and 7.  As 
Libet notes (2006), this is not necessarily to say that any part of the mind-body relationship needs to be 
immaterial, but that what determines the actions we choose to make needs to be independent of other causal 




Rawls would presumably respond here by saying that while we are justified in considering 
the data within Libet’s experiments, providing it is well-established and non-controversial, 
we are not justified in considering its metaphysical implications.  This response fails, I 
argue, due to four reasons.  First, with the methodologies of political liberalism alone, we 
cannot know what is scientific as opposed to metaphysical.  While Libet was a scientist, 
many of his claims were metaphysical.  Without a clear distinction between the two, we 
cannot determine which claims belong to which domain.  To commit to the truth of a 
distinction would be, however, to commit to a metaphysical claim.  Second, from 
considering the metaphysics of science, we gain a deeper understanding of the data and 
theories within science.  It would be fruitless to consider certain aspects of science without 
assessing the underlying metaphysics.  Third, in his way of thinking about the self, Rawls 
commits to a picture of human nature that rules out other ways of thinking about the 
subject.  Instead of committing to such a conception, we should test assumptions regarding 
human nature against the empirical data.  To do this will involve assessing of metaphysics 
alongside the data.  From this assessment, however, we gain an understanding of human 
nature that withstands scrutiny from an empirical perspective.  Such a conception of human 
nature cannot be rejected without an explanation of why either the data is incorrect, or the 
analysis of the data fails.  Fourth, it is not the truth of the conception of human nature that 
is problematic, as Hampton argued.  It is indemonstrable beliefs to which people are 
committed, and the attitude the person holds towards this belief.  None of this is 
necessarily true in the case of neuroscience or its metaphysical implications.  
          
On these grounds, we can include the implications of neuroscience within the scheme of 
political liberalism.  Theories of human nature can, then, be tested against the data within 
neuroscience, along with its philosophical implications, in order to devise a theory that 
coheres with the data.  Such a theory will be cognisant of the problems for liberalism 
arising from human nature.  Rather than assume a theory of human nature that sits well 
within liberal political theory, this theory is informed instead by the empirical data, 
assessing the relationship between human nature and liberalism.  As I argue in Chapters 8 
and 9, this will lead us to revise how we think about rational and full autonomy.   
 
To conclude, if scientific knowledge is to be considered within public reason, metaphysics 
should also be included.  The line between science and metaphysics is often blurred.  
Political liberalism does not offer us the tools we need to determine the boundaries of each 
domain.  Furthermore, considering the metaphysical perspectives that lie behind scientific 
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knowledge assists us in understanding the implications of this knowledge.  Rather than 
consider science and metaphysics as two separate and independent domains, we should 
assess both together.  This is reason, then, to consider the implications of neuroscience 
within political liberalism.  This allows us to assess whether our way of thinking about 
human nature coheres with the empirical evidence.       
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
I have attempted here to define the place of science and metaphysics within political 
liberalism.  While Rawls claimed certain aspects of science should be considered through 
public reason, I have argued for a much wider consideration of science and its implications 
throughout political liberalism.  While Rawls placed conditions on what aspects of science 
to include – those of its being well-established and non-controversial – I argue these 
conditions should be discarded.  On these grounds, within certain limits, we can consider 
all aspects of science within political deliberation. 
 
If we are to consider science, we should consider neuroscience.  Rawls draws on several 
assumptions regarding human nature in his political conception of the person.  Rather than 
deriving our understanding of human nature from assumptions, we should instead assess 
such assumptions against empirical evidence.  There is, then, a need to consider 
psychology and neuroscience.  This is relevant in considerations of moral development, 
how we come to hold moral responsibility, and how human behaviour relates to the 
structure of society or the legitimate use of force.    
 
While it might be argued that these are matters of metaphysics rather than science, and as 
such have no place within political liberalism, I have argued that the distinction between 
what is metaphysical as opposed to scientific often is not clear.  Rawlsian methodologies 
also do not offer us a way of making this distinction.  Instead of attempting to draw this 
distinction, we should instead consider the metaphysical implications of science.  
Hampton’s method of Socratic philosophising offers us a way of determining what sorts of 
truths are appropriate to consider.  This is not a matter of appealing to beliefs and 
attempting to use the power of the state to suppress alternative beliefs.  Instead, it is a 
method through which we can attempt to gain a better understanding of matters, while 
respecting opposing beliefs.  Thus, through such a method, we can consider what science 
tells us about free will, bringing such considerations to bear within political theory.
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Chapter 5 – Free Will and Political Liberalism 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Political liberalism requires a particular liberal subject.  The main requirement of this 
subject – as identified in Chapter 3 – is that she is fully autonomous.  That is, she has 
developed her second moral power as to recognise justice as fairness, acting in accord with 
the principles of justice.  At the same time, we respect a person’s right to choose; we 
respect her ability as a rationally autonomous citizen to determine her own good.  In this 
chapter, I argue that Rawls’ conception of the person is dependent on a particular 
metaphysical doctrine.  Though Rawls attempted to configure political liberalism as a 
fundamentally Kantian project without the metaphysical aspects, Kant argued that people 
possessed free will and could thus be considered morally responsible.  Rawls retains a 
belief in moral responsibility, yet the grounds on which we consider people morally 
responsible are not clear.  Though moral responsibility is not the central concern of this 
thesis – it is not responsibility but control that I argue is fundamentally undermined in later 
chapters – I argue there is a tacit acceptance of the truth of free will in Rawls’ theory due 
to his acceptance of moral responsibility.  As Saul Smilansky has argued, though Rawls 
sets out from a position of hard determinism – goods are not to be distributed according to 
desert, due to its arbitrariness (Rawls 1971, pp.310-315) – the rest of Rawls’ work is 
“infused with the assumption of free will and moral responsibility” (Smilansky 2003, 
p.132).        
 
There are two central problems I identify in this chapter.  First, due to this tacit acceptance 
of the truth of free will, Rawls is not remaining neutral in regard to metaphysics.  Thus, 
political liberalism’s supposed neutrality between reasonable philosophical doctrines is 
broken.  Second, Rawls assumes people have a degree of control over their thought 
processes.  On Rawls’ view, we can freely choose our own ends as rationally autonomous 
agents, while ensuring these ends remain within the limits of what is just, as we are also 
fully autonomous agents.  If this is the case, then I argue Rawls requires us to hold a large 
degree of control over our thought processes.  It is this view I challenge in subsequent 
chapters.  In order to establish why this is a problem, however, a discussion of moral 
responsibility and free will in relation to Rawls’s theory is necessary.  If we are to be the 
free, responsible agents Rawls supposes us to be, we require a degree of control over our 




I begin in 5.2 by explaining the dominant positions on free will in metaphysics.  In 5.3, I 
explore how Rawls thinks about freedom in A Theory of Justice.  I argue that Rawls’ 
conception of self-respect, which plays an important role throughout Rawls’ work, is 
dependent on a social world that recognises the truth of free will.  There is a particular 
conception of the person that Rawls holds; in 5.4, I argue that this is still the case with 
Political Liberalism.  Despite Rawls’ aim to configure political liberalism without the need 
for metaphysics, in 5.5, I argue that there are nevertheless metaphysical considerations 
underlying political liberalism.  I argue that Rawls’ thought is dependent on the human 
capacity for free choice, and that it thus presupposes the truth of free will.  Though Rawls 
attempted to formulate Kantian politics without the metaphysical component, Rawls 
retains certain metaphysical assumptions.  This is particularly problematic in regard to 
Rawls’ conception of rational autonomy; if we cannot formulate a conception of the good 
in the way Rawls imagines, aspects of Rawlsian theory should be revised.  As it is 
necessary for citizens to become fully autonomous, we must consider how it is we expect 
people to do so.      
 
5.2 Metaphysical Perspectives on Free Will 
 
There are three perspectives on free will that dominate discussion on the metaphysics of 
free will: hard determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism.  I now explore these three 
perspectives, and the various ways in which they have been formulated.  The aim of this 
section is to provide an explanation of some key ideas within the subject, and an 
understanding of the terminology.  
 
Before explaining hard determinism, it is necessary to understand what is meant by 
determinism.  The thesis of determinism states that from one moment in time to another 
there is only one possible eventuality (Fischer et al 2007, p.2).  Someone accepting 
determinism endorses the view that in the universe, at any given moment in time and in 
any situation, one event will necessarily lead to another event, and this could never have 
been otherwise.  Everything is subject to the laws of physical causation; all of the events 
that occur throughout time and space are necessitated by the events that preceded them.  





The first philosopher to notice the antinomy between determinism and free will was 
Epicurus (Weatherford 1991, p.19; Epicurus 2004), who modified his account of 
determinism to allow for human free will.  Others think that determinism negates the 
possibility of free will completely.  Hard determinism is the view that determinism is true, 
and as a result, we do not have free will.  The laws of nature, and of physical causation, 
determine how any event unfolds.  Human actions are no different.  We had no control 
over past events, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature (Van Inwagen and 
Griffiths 1985).  Therefore, we have no choice in regard to the actions we make.  The hard 
determinist argues we could never have acted other than we did.  As our inner mental 
states are the result of laws over which we have no control, we cannot be the original 
creators of our own ends, making our inner motivations irrelevant in regard to the question 
of free will.    
 
This can be illustrated through the example of Laplace’s Demon (Weatherford 1991, 
pp.52-60).  While Isaac Newton’s understanding of mechanics is generally thought to be 
deterministic, in his theory of gravity, Newton left space for the existence of God, who was 
thought to occasionally intervene in the workings of the universe.  Roy Weatherford writes 
that it was Pierre Simon de Laplace who took Newtonian mechanics to a deterministic 
conclusion (Weatherford 1991, pp.52-60; Laplace 1814), as witnessed in the idea of his 
Demon.  Laplace’s Demon holds a complete understanding of the universe.  From 
knowledge of the position of all the particles in the universe at any one moment, Laplace’s 
Demon can predict with certainty both the particles’ past and future.  Thus, from being 
given a complete picture of an individual’s place in the universe at a moment in time, the 
Demon could tell the individual her future.  The individual cannot be viewed as holding 
any meaningful control over her life, given that the Demon knows with certainty her entire 
life story, there being nothing she can do to alter this story.  This view of the universe 
holds no place for the concept of free will.           
 
Compatabilism accepts that determinism is true, or at least could be true, but the 
compatibilist argues that determinism does not negate free will.  Ted Honderich argues that 
Hobbes was the first philosopher to posit a theory of compatibilism (Honderich 2002, 
p.105-108).  Arguing that determinism negated free will, Bishop Bramhall provoked 
Hobbes into formulating the compatibilist defence (Hobbes & Bramhall 1999).  For 
Hobbes, a person was to be considered free providing that nothing was externally 
restricting her actions.  David Hume followed Hobbes in presenting the case for 
99 
 
compatibilism.  Accepting the probable truth of determinism, Hume argued that the 
supposed problem of free will was merely a problem of language and could be rectified 
with "intelligible definitions" (Hume 1748, p.59).  Going on to define liberty as "a power 
of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will" (Hume 1748, p.125), 
Hume argues that everybody holds the capacity to choose whether or not to act, apart from 
a prisoner in chains.  Early modern compatibilists, such as Hobbes and Hume, thought that 
determinism did not negate free will as to have free will was only a matter of the will being 
determined in a particular way.  Whether or not determinism is true, providing we are not 
externally restrained, we have the capacity to choose.  Therefore, for Hobbes and Hume, 
free will is compatible with determinism.     
 
Rather than asking whether the agent could have done otherwise from a metaphysical 
perspective, we need only enquire whether anything was preventing the agent from acting 
otherwise: was the agent physically restrained, threatened, or were her mental capacities 
impaired.  However, ascertaining whether we could have done otherwise does not 
necessarily determine whether or not we have free will for the compatibilist.  Instead, some 
compatibilists instead consider whether an act was in accord with our inner motivations.  
Illustrating this argument, John Martin Fischer devises a thought experiment based on 
those of Harry Frankfurt (Fischer 2012, pp.33-35; Frankfurt, 1969).  Fischer asks us to 
imagine a person voting in an election in the United States.  The woman intends to vote for 
the Democratic candidate.  However, a neuroscientist has placed an implant in this 
person’s brain.  If they decide to vote for the Republican candidate instead, the implant 
will intervene to ensure the person votes for the Democrat.  If the person stays true to the 
original intention of voting for the Democrat, the implant will do nothing.  The woman 
does decide to vote for the Democrat; thus, the implant does nothing. While the woman 
remains unaware of the implant, she could never have done otherwise than she did.  
Frankfurt's original response to this dilemma was that it did not, though Fischer modifies 
his own response.  According to Frankfurt, rather than assess whether a person could have 
done otherwise than she actually did, we should instead look to inner motivational states, 
which are the most important factor in determining whether a person acted according to her 
free will (Frankfurt 1969, pp.837-839).  An action that is in accord with a person’s inner 
motivational state is an act of free will, whether or not that person could have done 
otherwise.  Therefore, Frankfurt argues that free will is not dependent on the falsity of 
determinism.  Fischer, on the other hand, states that this is not sufficient for free will, 
effectively agreeing with the hard determinist, though he argues that it does suffice for the 
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ascription of moral responsibility.  Fischer labels this position semi-compatibilism: free 
will is incompatible with determinism though moral responsibility is not.  
 
Kant can also be interpreted as a proponent of compatibilism, though Kant's compatibilism 
is rather different from the aforementioned versions of compatibilism.  Compatibilism, as 
formulated by Hume and Hobbes, was for Kant a "wretched subterfuge" (Kant 1788, p.78).  
In the same vein as the hard determinist, Kant argues that the thief who could not have 
avoided being a thief due to the laws of determinism could not be viewed as having freely 
chosen to be a thief.  Hume and Hobbes, by way of their "wretched subterfuge", were 
avoiding the implications of determinism's truth.  The notion of transcendental freedom 
enables Kant to argue for a formulation of free will that is compatible with determinism, 
yet not dependent on the reconciliation of freedom and necessity.  For Kant, it was true 
that, empirically speaking, all things are determined causally (Kant 1781, p.169).  This 
empirical evidence, however, is only an appearance.  The way in which we witness the 
workings of causal determinism belongs to the phenomenal realm.  In the phenomenal 
realm, we see the thing as it appears.  It is in the noumenal realm that we find the thing as 
it is.  The laws of causal determinism are not applicable to the noumenal realm.  This 
distinction allows for transcendental freedom.  Our transcendental selves belonging to the 
noumenal realm are not subject to causal laws and are therefore free (Kant 1781, pp.405-
408).  Kant offers a unique conception of free will that is compatibilist insofar as it 
reconciles freedom with determinism, though transcendental freedom is far removed from 
a Humean understanding of free will.            
 
Libertarianism is the view that we do have free will.  Like the hard determinist, the 
libertarian views free will as being incompatible with determinism.  To have free will, not 
only must we be able to act otherwise, we must be the creator of our own ends.  
Determinism would mean that neither of these propositions is true, and, as we have free 
will, determinism must be false.  Though he is not the only contemporary proponent of 
metaphysical libertarianism, Robert Kane has formulated what has become the dominant 
theory of libertarianism.  Kane argues that to consider an agent as having acted from her 
free will, she must hold “Ultimate Responsibility” for this action (Kane 1996, pp.72-75).  
 
To hold ‘Responsibility’ means to have acted voluntarily, and to be involved in the causal 
determination of an event.  Without the agent’s role, the event would not have occurred.  
However, this level of responsibility does not imply “Ultimate Responsibility”.  For the 
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condition of “Ultimate Responsibility” to be met, an agent must be the original creator of 
her own ends, and her ends must determine the actions she chooses to make.  Thus, if an 
agent carried out an action due to her Protestant faith, she must also be responsible for 
deciding to adhere to Protestantism.  “Ultimate Responsibility” requires that if an agent is 
responsible for X, but Y was also necessary for the occurrence of X, then the agent must 
also be responsible for Y (Kane 1996, pp.72-75.).  Thus, if a particular mental state was 
required in order for a person to act, for this act to be an act of free will, the person must 
also be responsible for freely choosing that mental state.  We form these mental states 
through what Kane calls “self-forming actions” (Kane 1996, pp.75-76).  When we are 
faced with a moral dilemma, our decision in regard to the dilemma becomes a “self-
forming action”: through making this decision, we have decided upon a crucial aspect of 
our own character.   With these conditions met, the agent then holds “Ultimate 
Responsibility”.  Kane follows Aristotle in arguing that if our actions are judged to be free, 
it must be because they stem from our characters, which we have formed through our own 
free choices (Kane, 2011, p.383).  Our characters provide the roots from which free will 
stems; thus, the decisions that brought about our characters ground how Kane formulates 
responsibility.  Kane recognised that the theory of “Ultimate Responsibility” could lead to 
an infinite regress, but argues that it need not entail events prior to a person’s birth nor 
regress further than “self-forming actions” (Kane 1996, pp.72-76).   
 
If determinism is true in all cases, then the agent could never hold “Ultimate 
Responsibility”. In any scenario, if there were always a Y that caused X, and this Y was 
beyond the control of the agent, then the agent could not be considered to have free will.  
In a deterministic universe, there would always be a cause antecedent to the agent’s own 
intentions and actions, negating the sense in which she could be considered the creator of 
her ends.  We could not hold responsibility for the creation of our ends if Laplace’s Demon 
knew our ends even before our own births, and we could choose no other ends.  Because 
determinism is not true, according to the libertarian, there is the possibility of free will.  
Thus, the libertarian argues there are ways in which a person can be the creator of her own 
ends.  As we can freely create our own ends, we can freely choose our actions based upon 
these ends.  Kane’s libertarianism is demanding of free will; not only must we be able to 
act otherwise, we must be able to freely choose our own ends, and make free actions based 




Though determinism is not true according to the libertarian, as Kane notes (Kane 1996, 
pp.106-107), the flipside of arguing for an indeterminist account of free will is that if all of 
our actions are indeterminate, this looks as though they are subject to chance, which hardly 
suggests we have control over these actions.  This was why Hume thought that not only did 
determinism not negate free will, it was a necessary condition for free will (Hume 1748, 
pp.58-59).  In order for us to have control over events, there must be uniformity in the 
predictability of outcomes.  Free will, for Hume, consisted in our will cohering with 
deterministic laws in the right way.  For the plausibility of libertarianism, then, the inner 
workings of the brain can neither be wholly deterministic or indeterministic, insofar as 
complete indeterminism would be total randomness.  Drawing on evidence from quantum 
mechanics and neuroscience (Kane 1996, p.9), Kane argues science has not proved 
determinism to be true, and it is plausible that the right level of indeterminacy exists in the 
human brain for the truth of libertarian free will.  Our actions cohering with our will, which 
has been formed through our “self-forming actions”, reflects this sufficient level of 
indeterminacy, negating the sense in which our actions can be said to be a result of chance.   
 
Derk Pereboom, on the other hand, takes the view that free will is neither compatible with 
determinism nor indeterminism, labelling this view hard incompatibilism.  Following 
Hume, Pereboom argues that indeterminism suggests that all events are due to chance.  
Using Kane’s example of a businesswoman considering whether to stop to help the victim 
of an assault or attend a meeting on time, Pereboom argues that the decision made is 
dependent on chance.  If we imagine that there is equal motivational force for either action, 
the action eventually decided on will be a chance result (Pereboom 2007, pp.101-103).  
This level of chance does not suggest free will played an important role in the action.  
Elsewhere, Pereboom agrees with the hard determinist and the libertarian that free will is 
incompatible with determinism.  Pereboom agrees with David Widerker’s rebuttal of 
compatibilists such as Frankfurt (Widerker 2000; Pereboom 2007, pp.87-92).  While 
Frankfurt thought that a person with no alternative possibilities could still be held 
responsible for the action she committed, Widerker asks the proponents of this view to tell 
us what else she could have done.  Pereboom argues that there is no suitable response to 
Widerker here.  The agent could never have done otherwise, and the fact of coherence 
between her will and her actions does not provide sufficient grounds for her will to be free.  




This completes a brief description of each metaphysical perspective.  Though there are 
other theories of free will, such as Saul Smilanksy’s illusionism and Manuel Vargas’ 
revisionism (Smilansky 2000; Vargas 2004), these alternative theories are broadly 
compatibilist – arguing for the compatibility of determinism and free will – but focus 
instead on the precise way in which free will is formulated.   
 
To conclude, libertarians and compatibilists agree we have free will; however, they 
disagree on the precise ways in which we have free will; while the compatibilist views free 
will as independent of the issue of determinism, libertarians argue that in order for free will 
to be true, determinism must be false.  Hard determinists agree with the premise of 
libertarianism – determinism negates free will – though the hard determinist inverts the 
argument, and states that because determinism is true, we cannot have free will.   
 
5.3 Freedom in A Theory of Justice   
 
In this section, I explain Rawls’ thought on freedom in A Theory of Justice.  Throughout 
his work, Rawls rarely approached the subject of free will, and when the subject comes 
into view, it is generally sidestepped.  The only sustained discussions of free will in Rawls’ 
oeuvre are found in his analyses of the works of others, such as Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel 
in Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, and Rousseau in Lectures on the History 
of Political Philosophy (Rawls 2000; Rawls 2007).1  Though Rawls is concerned with 
freedom in A Theory of Justice, he considers political freedom to be distinct from 
metaphysical freedom.  I argue that Rawls explicitly endorses a thin form of compatibilism 
in his definition of freedom.  Rawls, following Hobbes and Hume, argues that a person can 
be considered to be free providing there are no external restraints.  However, within the 
original position, Rawls tacitly endorses Kantian compatibilism, as shown in the Kantian 
interpretation of justice as fairness.    
 
Defining freedom, Rawls attempts to avoid becoming embroiled in the debate between 
negative and positive liberty, and instead explains freedom through three items, allowing 
for a formulation of freedom that encompasses both positive and negative liberty (Rawls 
1971, pp.201-202).  Freedom concerns the agent who is free, the restrictions she is free 
 
1 G.A. Cohen notes that, in private conversation between them, Rawls expressed doubt whether the moral 
worth of people would hold if all actions were causally determined (Cohen 2008, p.14).  Cohen was pleased 
that Rawls appeared to share his scepticism regarding the compatibilist position on free will.    
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from, and the acts that she is free to do.  Freedom is lexically prior to equality throughout 
Rawls’ work, with the first principle of justice taking precedence over the second.  The 
reason Rawls provides for freedom’s priority is the importance generally ascribed to 
freedom in modern societies.  Rawls writes that it is usually accepted that there is 
competition between the values of freedom and equality, and that, in general, preference is 
given to freedom (Rawls 1971, p.28).  Freedom, as Rawls is attempting to avoid becoming 
tied to a particular philosophical definition of freedom, is understood as the attribution of 
basic rights and liberties.  People would not be willing to cede their liberties in favour of a 
more egalitarian society.  Basic liberties protect the interests of citizens; under a scheme of 
basic liberties, a citizen can be sure that they have the right to practise her religion, or to 
pursue a plan of life in accordance with her own personal values (Rawls 1971, pp.205-
207).  Thus, the basic liberties are lexically prior to the ensured social and economic 
equalities.   
 
Both the citizen of the well-ordered society and the parties in the original position are 
considered to be free.  The citizen is free as the first principle of justice safeguards her 
liberty.  Parties in the original position are intended to be free, constrained in their 
deliberations only by the conditions imposed in the original position (Rawls 2005, pp.74-
75).  Rawls takes an implicitly compatibilist approach here; as the choices are made by 
people who exist in equal relations to one another, and there are no external obstacles to 
their making choices, the choices can be considered to be free.  No commitment is made, 
however, to the deeper metaphysical aspects of compatibilism.   Rawls does not, for 
instance, suggest that a person’s inner motivations must be aligned with her actions in 
order for her to be considered free.  The stance assumed here recalls the compatibilism of 
Hobbes, rather than compatibilism with its deeper metaphysical commitment to the 
noumenal self in Kant, or Frankfurt’s argument for coherence between psychological 
motivations and actions.  Nevertheless, through the original position, Rawls retains 
elements of Kantian compatibilism, as I explain later.       
 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls includes a Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness 
(Rawls 1971, pp.251-257).  Rawls claims that the principles of justice are comparable to 
Kant’s categorical imperative.  The principles have universal applicability in the same 
sense as does the categorical imperative.  When we come to act from the principles, we act 
from a universal moral law that is applicable to all, regardless of our own interests.  Here, 
Rawls’ view of duty and obligation in relation to the principles of justice begins to 
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resemble Kantian autonomy, as Rawls himself notes.  However, following Sidgwick 
(Sidgwick 1888), Rawls does not accept the conception of the self in the distinction Kant 
draws between the noumenal and the phenomenal.   
 
Kant thought that the self was only realised when the person acted from the moral laws 
(Kant 1797).  When a person acts against the moral laws, she acts according to the 
phenomenal laws of nature, as the desires that led her to disobey the moral laws belong to 
the phenomenal realm.  A person acting in accord with moral laws recognised through the 
use of reason would not act egoistically.  The noumenal self, a self that is detached from 
the phenomenal realm and able to comprehend the moral laws, remains unrealised when a 
person acts against the moral laws.  According to Sidgwick’s reading of Kant, the saint and 
the scoundrel both freely choose their characters in the noumenal realm (Sidgwick 1888, 
pp.409-410), and these characters are then subject to the same physical laws in the 
phenomenal realm.  Sidgwick argues that Kant does not explain why the scoundrel does 
not express his freely chosen self in the same way as does the saint, given that their 
characters are both the result of the same free choices.  Why, then, can we not consider the 
scoundrel as free?     
 
Rawls suggests that the answer to this problem is found in the original position (Rawls 
1971, pp.251-257.).  Parties in the original position look upon citizens in the same way that 
the noumenal self views the world.  As we can come to understand the importance of self-
respect through the original position, we can realise that failure to act in accordance with 
the principles of justice would detract from our self-respect, and lead to a feeling of shame.  
Due to Rawls’ belief that all rational persons would endorse the principles of justice in the 
original position, this sense of shame has universal applicability.  No one would agree to 
the scoundrel’s terms in the original position, and so the person who chooses to act as a 
scoundrel is not doing so based on the free choices made in the original position.   
 
An answer is thus given to the problem identified by Sidgwick.  Through the original 
position, Rawls strips Kantian morality of its metaphysical counterpart (Rawls 1971, 
pp.251-257).  The distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal selves is then 
abandoned within Rawlsian thought, though the original position provides an effective 
substitute.  Rather than thinking about the relationship between the self and the world from 
the perspective of Kantian metaphysics, Rawls allows us to consider the relationship 
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through the original position, devised as a thought experiment rather than a metaphysical 
claim.   
 
However, at the heart of the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal is the 
problem of free will, which Rawls does not consider through the substitute for this 
distinction, the original position.  Kant thought that the noumenal self salvaged the 
freedom of the person’s will, as without it, the phenomenal self would be determined only 
by the laws of physics (Kant 1788, pp.42-43).  Unless it is assumed that the original 
position offers us the opportunity to transcend the restrictions placed on us by the laws of 
physics, much in the same way as does the noumenal self, Rawls must accept that, if 
determinism is true, the self will be physically determined.  Thus, our sense of justice and 
conception of the good will be arrived at through deterministic physical laws, rather than 
our own capacity to reason creatively, independently of the laws of causation.   
 
To establish why is it necessary the original position salvages free will, we need to 
understand why freedom is important for Rawls.  As previously mentioned, freedom is 
prioritised within justice as fairness because of people’s general preference to be free.  
Rawls also writes that a regime not upholding basic liberties could not be considered a 
constitutional democracy (Rawls 1971, pp.197-198).  Though Rawls hints at some of the 
psychological and historical factors influencing our preference for freedom, he does not 
attempt to uncover why people prefer to be free over other goods.  Freedom’s importance 
in A Theory of Justice lies in ensuring our access to the primary goods, particularly in 
relation to the realisation of self-respect.  When we construct a rational plan of life and 
then witness our successes in light of this plan, our self-respect is enhanced (Rawls 1971, 
pp.440-446).  Our failure to construct a rational plan of life leads us to experience little joy 
in life, and we are left without a sense of value or purpose in our life.  Furthermore, we 
take pride in our plans when we receive praise, and we also find satisfaction in the 
successful plans of others.  Failing to live our life according to a rational plan leads to a 
feeling of moral shame; we experience this not only because of our own reduced 
satisfaction with life, but also because of the negative way in which others will regard us.  
Actions committed that contradict agreements made in the original position will be 
censured by the rest of society.  It is therefore in our interest to live according to a rational 




The sense of worth we experience due to our life plans’ fruition reflects pride in our 
capacity to choose, and our satisfaction that we exercised this capacity virtuously.  We 
essentially chose to be good rather than bad people, though the option was open for us to 
have chosen otherwise.  If we were told that we live in a deterministic universe, and that 
Laplace’s Demon could have foretold our characters, our plans of life, and all of our 
actions before the time of our own births, we would have no reason to feel this sense of 
worth, as it could never have been otherwise.  In such a universe, whether we are good or 
bad people is not due primarily to the free choices we have made; rather, it is due to the 
course of the universe, over which we have no control.  The fact that we act in accordance 
with rational plans of life and experience success, while others act against the agreements 
made in the original position, would not be reflective of our own agency and our ability to 
take responsibility for our actions.  Instead, all of our characters, plans, and actions would 
be predetermined, and we should feel neither pride nor shame in our successes and failures.  
Though we may still experience happiness when our plans are successful, we would 
recognise that, ultimately, this plan could never not have been successful.  Likewise, we 
could not castigate others for their moral failings, and though they may still feel shame due 
to these failings, it would also be recognised that they could not have done otherwise.  
Determinism’s truth would not entail a world devoid of emotion, in which no pride or 
shame could be felt.  However, it would be recognised that these emotions were only 
natural reactions to events, and lacked the deeper moral justification that hinges on the 
attribution of responsibility.   
 
In other respects, however, Rawls recognises the limits of free choice.  Rawls rejects the 
notion that goods should be distributed according to moral desert, where those who 
contribute more receive more in return (Rawls 1971, pp.310-315).  This is partly because 
the talents involved in making the contribution are developed according to the arbitrary 
factor of birth.  Some people will be born with a talent for singing, while others will not, 
and it would therefore not be just to award the person possessing the talent, as the person 
did not choose to possess this talent.  The idea of moral desert would then be rejected in 
the original position, as, according to Rawls, we would not accept distribution according to 
such arbitrary factors (Rawls 1971, p.310).  Here, Rawls’ thought is largely compatible 
with hard determinism; economic and social structures should be arranged only so as to 
encourage certain choices to ensure the efficiency of these arrangements, not to reward 
those who contribute more due to their talents (Rawls 1971, p.315).  However, as I later 
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argue, certain actions made as a result of free choices can affect the economic and social 
structure of a society, and through so doing, violate the second principle of justice.        
 
Though Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, quite explicitly accepts the thin compatibilism of 
Hobbes, by arguing that we are free if nothing is externally restricting us, in the 
construction of the original position, Rawls tacitly accepts Kantian compatibilism.  If we 
are to accept the senses of self-respect and shame that come with either following or failing 
to follow a rational plan of life, we must accept that people can freely choose, and can do 
otherwise.  The original position allows us an exterior vantage point, akin to Kant’s 
noumenal realm, from which we can imagine people as being free.  As these plans are the 
result of choices people have freely made, they are justified in feeling pride in their 
success.   
 
5.4 Political Liberalism and the Metaphysics of Free Will 
 
Political liberalism’s neutrality between reasonable metaphysical doctrines should lead it to 
be independent of any theories of free will.  The politically liberal state should not be 
committed to a particular metaphysical position on free will, and the citizens of this state 
should be free to endorse whatever doctrine they find convincing.  In this section, I explain 
Rawls’ own position on free will, elaborating on why the metaphysics of free will would 
be excluded from the scheme of political liberalism.  Following this, I explore certain 
claims made within Political Liberalism that bear on the metaphysics of free will.  Despite 
its aim, political liberalism does not remove the compatibilist position found in A Theory of 
Justice.    
 
Before publishing Political Liberalism, Rawls presented his reasons for avoiding 
metaphysical discussions in ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’ (Rawls 1985).  
Many metaphysical and moral problems are viewed by Rawls as being intractable (Rawls 
1985, pp.226-227).  The social contract existing at the heart of a democratic regime should 
not be devised so as to be dependent on a particular solution to such an intractable 
problem, as the problem could not be solved through that regime’s conception of justice 
without sacrificing the liberty of citizens to determine their own beliefs, further dividing 
society in the process.  In formulating how a well-ordered society could be realised 
through a conception of justice agreeable to the majority of citizens, the political theorist 
should not draw on metaphysical arguments.  This is not to say that these concerns are 
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unimportant; Rawls stresses that, in fact, they are “too important” to be approached 
through political deliberation (Rawls 1985, p.230).  However, while Rawls avoids 
attempting to settle metaphysical disputes, there are metaphysical assumptions within 
Rawls’ work.        
 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls further distances himself from metaphysical commitments.  
The conception of justice at the heart of the politically liberal state must not be dependent 
on a particular metaphysical doctrine.  Decisions made in the original position should, 
then, be neutral between the metaphysical positions on free will.  Hard determinism, 
compatibilism, and libertarianism would all be viewed as reasonable doctrines, as the 
objective of any one position is not to remove the other positions from society, or to use 
the power of the state to suppress other metaphysical doctrines.  A citizen would be free to 
endorse the metaphysical position she found most convincing, though no one metaphysical 
position should be used to legitimise the conception of justice.  
 
While Rawls is not particularly concerned with the metaphysics of free will in his 
explanation of public reason – as he is mainly considering other philosophical, religious, 
and moral doctrines (Rawls 2005, pp.212-254), aspects of thought over which, historically, 
people have been divided – it is nevertheless safe to assume metaphysical perspectives on 
free will would be excluded from public reason.  As Rawls writes, there is no reason why 
decisions on constitutional essentials ought to be based on reasons drawn from a particular 
comprehensive doctrine (Rawls 2005, pp.25-26).  Therefore, the state’s constitution should 
not favour one metaphysical perspective on free will over others.  Proponents of particular 
metaphysical views would also be prohibited from using the apparatus of the state to 
promote their views or suppress other views.  Though it may seem unlikely that a 
metaphysical libertarian would wish to use the power of the state to suppress hard 
determinism and compatibilism, these perspectives on free will are also contained within 
other religious and philosophical doctrines (Kane 1996, pp.7-8).  Historically, these 
doctrines have been hostile toward one another.  It is plausible to imagine that if the 
proponents of one of these doctrines controlled the power of the state, they would use it to 
the advantage of the metaphysical perspective belonging to their religious or philosophical 
tradition.  Free will is not a subject beyond political contention.     
 
Despite the fact that these metaphysical doctrines would be omitted from the public 
reasons used to support constitutional essentials, Rawls retains certain concepts from A 
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Theory of Justice.  I now turn to how Rawls defends the conception of the person he 
devises in Political Liberalism.  
 
In response to his communitarian critics, Rawls stresses that the original position is to be 
viewed as a thought experiment.  It is therefore not expressing a certain perspective on the 
nature of the self.  Rawls writes that when:  
 
We simulate being in the original position, our reasoning no more commits us 
to a particular metaphysical doctrine about the nature of the self than our acting 
in a play, say of Macbeth or Lady Macbeth, commits us to thinking that we 
really are a king or queen engaged in a desperate struggle for political power 
(Rawls 2005, p.27). 
 
However, Rawls still has a particular conception of the self within the original position.  
Self-respect remains the most important primary good.  Our motivation to endorse the 
principles of justice stems from our desire to advance our self-respect and the realisation 
that the principles of justice will realise this desire (Rawls 2005, p.318).  The motivation to 
become fully autonomous is primarily built upon our self-respect’s advancement.  Without 
self-respect, we will not be motivated to endorse nor act from the principles of justice, and 
our moral powers will remain undeveloped.  Hence, the scheme of basic liberties is 
necessary to ensure the conditions required for the development of our self-respect are met.   
 
Nothing here has changed from what was posited in A Theory of Justice.  Self-respect 
remains necessary for the construction of a society based on terms of fair cooperation, in 
which fully autonomous citizens will live cooperative lives, ensuring the realisation of 
their individual talents and conceptions of the good.  Without self-respect, none of this is 
possible.     
 
Rawls anticipated the Hegelian critique of his project.  Hegel, as an idealist, criticised the 
contractarian doctrines of Hobbes and Locke for two reasons, of which the second is 
pertinent here (Rawls 2005, pp.285-288; Hegel 1821).  Humans, in the thought of Hobbes 
and Locke, were thought to have innate characteristics, existing independently of society.  
For Hegel, humans are social animals and the characteristics we hold are a result of the 
societies in which we exist.  We do not, according to Hegel, hold characteristics that are 
independent of societal influences.  Rawls countered this argument by stating that political 
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liberalism was perfectly capable of accounting for the social nature of individuals; he 
writes that justice as fairness is “a moral conception that provides an appropriate place for 
social values without sacrificing the freedom and integrity of the person” (Rawls 2005, 
p.286).  We can hold whatever social and communal values we like, providing that these 
values are reasonable, and do not override our motivation to endorse the principles of 
justice.      
 
Unacknowledged in this defence, however, are the characteristics Rawls continues to 
attribute to humans, without which, political liberalism would be unworkable.  This 
perspective on the individual, in which we are viewed as attaining self-respect through 
acting from the principles of justice, is dependent on an individual accustomed to certain 
social and cultural norms.  A person in this society attains her self-respect from realising 
her rational plan of life, and the realisation that her plan acts toward advancing the aims of 
a fairly cooperating society.  Nowheresville, Joel Feinberg’s thought experiment, further 
clarifies the importance of self-respect through the imagining of its absence (Feinberg & 
Narveson 1970).  This imaginary location, Nowheresville, is a place in which the 
inhabitants do not have rights.  They therefore are unable to make claims based upon 
rights.  Feinberg claims that in a world in which people could not make claims based upon 
their rights, people would be unable to realise their self-respect (Feinberg & Narveson 
1970, p.257).  It is through the ability to make these claims that we come to realise our 
inherent worth as a human being.  Without this ability, we would see no value in self-
respect.  The members of such a society would, then, not find the attainment of self-respect 
a sufficient motivational force to compel them to commit to the social contract.  Hence, for 
Feinberg, rights are necessary preconditions for self-respect; it is only through our 
possession of rights that we are able to realise our self-respect.   
 
For the realisation of autonomy in the politically liberal state, self-respect must be an 
inherent part of the human condition.  Instead, as Feinberg shows, self-respect is 
constructed through the attribution of rights.  A person incapable of realising her own self-
respect, or even realising the importance of self-respect, would not be considered a fully 
autonomous citizen within political liberalism.  Furthermore, as previously mentioned, 
self-respect is a value representative of a world in which we recognise the importance of 
free choice.  Thus, there is a particular conception of the person situated within political 




With rights being prior to self-respect, we cannot assume that individuals consider 
themselves as possessing a sense of self-respect from the perspective of the original 
position, nor imagine that they will necessarily enhance their self-respect through the 
development of their moral powers.  Parties in the original position are denied knowledge 
of the citizens’ historical circumstances.  They could, then, not be certain of the 
psychological attributes of citizens.  If we are to imagine the veil of ignorance as being 
effective, then we must not make assumptions about psychological states that are 
historically contingent.   
 
Instead, Rawls assumes that psychological states are independent of history.  Whatever our 
historical circumstances, we are capable of developing the sense of morality Rawls 
imagines we hold.  Thus, Rawls must consider the two moral powers and the sense of self-
respect as innate characteristics.  From these powers, we have the ability to make free 
choices for which we can be held morally responsible.  It is this that allows for us to be 
rationally autonomous – capable of realising our two moral powers (Rawls 2005, 72-77).  
The notion of rational autonomy is, then, undermined if the truth of free will is rejected, as 
through its rejection, we also reject the idea that people hold the ability to make free 
choices for which they are to be responsible.  Full autonomy – our capacity to act from the 
principles of justice (Rawls 2005, p.77) – is less vulnerable to this critique.   
 
In sum, though in Political Liberalism Rawls attempts to show that justice as fairness is 
not dependent on a particular metaphysical conception of the self, in the importance Rawls 
assigns to the role of self-respect, we find a certain perception of the person.  This 
perception is based on the individual as she exists in a particular social group, in which 
certain values are expressed as social norms.  Without the acceptance of free will and 
moral responsibility in this social world, the motivational force of self-respect would be 
neutered.  While full autonomy is not necessarily undermined by this argument, rational 
autonomy is threatened in a universe without free will.   
 
5.5 Autonomy and Free Will  
 
Rawls is, then, dependent on a particular conception of human nature.  The person can 
choose her own good, and develops her sense of self-respect when she does so.  If citizens 
are to become fully autonomous in the way Rawls imagines, we must choose to do so 
through our capacity for rational autonomy.  In the way in which Rawls imagines us 
113 
 
making such choices, I argue that Rawls is dependent on the truth of free will.  Without the 
truth of free will and moral responsibility, we would need to revise how we think about 
rational autonomy, and how we imagine citizens becoming fully autonomous.  Though I 
focus here on the problem of free will and moral responsibility, the central problem I aim 
to uncover here is the demanding conception of psychology Rawls holds.  For us to attain 
rational and full autonomy in the way proposed by Rawls, we require a level of control 
over our thought processes.   
 
In a defence of Rawls’ position, Veljko Dubljevic (2013) has argued against the conflation 
of metaphysical free will with political autonomy.  Dubljevic’s definition is, however, 
quite different from Rawls’.  In his definition of political autonomy, Dubljevic essentially 
commits to the compatibilist position.  This reveals the difficulty of remaining 
metaphysically neutral when defining autonomy.  Dubljevic writes:  
 
An agent acts autonomously when she/he (a) endorses decisions and acts in 
accord with internal motivational states, (b) shows commitment to them in the 
absence of undue coercion and compulsion, and (c) could as a reasonable and 
rational person continue to do so after a period of informed critical reflection 
(Dubljevic 2013, p.46).   
 
Nothing here contradicts or distinguishes this position from Humean compatibilism.  When 
Hume says that anyone is free to choose to rest or move asides from the prisoner in chains, 
the argument is premised on the causal relationship between the will and act.  In stating 
that an act is autonomous if there is a relationship between the “internal motivational state” 
and the act, it is an autonomous act, Dubljevic commits to Humean compatibilism.  The 
two additional conditions – lack of coercion and compulsion, and endorsed on reflection – 
do not further distinguish Dubljevic’s position from Hume’s.  An act that was the result of 
a violent threat or delirium that the person regretted in reflection would presumably not be 
thought of as an act of free will, on Hume’s view.  The essential part of the argument, for 
Hume, is the connection between the will and the act, with the act revealing the contents of 
the will.  Where this connection does not hold, we could not view the act as being made of 
free will.  In much the same way, this act would not be considered autonomous on 
Dubljevic’s view.  It is not clear that there are cases that would be considered free by 
Hume, but not autonomous by Dubljevic, or vice versa.  Furthermore, although Dubljevic 
draws on the Rawlsian conception of autonomy with its lack of a metaphysical component, 
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Dubljevic does not distinguish between rational and full autonomy.  Neither are adequately 
captured by the above definition.  A person’s acts could cohere with her will while she 
neither acted to realise her moral powers (as in rational autonomy), nor from the principles 
of justice (as in full autonomy).  Rawls’ two definitions of autonomy are more demanding 
than Dubljevic recognises: we need to be capable of doing more than ensuring our acts 
cohere with our will to be considered autonomous on Rawls’ view.     
 
It is Rawls’ notion of rational autonomy that is problematic when assessed against the 
metaphysics of free will.  If we are to be considered capable of formulating a conception of 
the good, taking responsibility for the ends arising from this conception (Rawls 2005, 
pp.72-77), we need to be considered as being able to freely choose these ends.  As I 
explain below, if we are assumed not to possess free will, Rawls’ conception of rational 
autonomy cannot hold.  On the other hand, full autonomy does not face such problems.  
Whether or not we possess free will, we may be able to act justly.  As Rawls recognises, 
the attainment of full autonomy is an epistemic problem (Rawls 2005, p.78),2 not a 
metaphysical one.  Providing we know what is just and, in turn, what is expected of us as 
citizens, then we can be fully autonomous citizens.  The capacity for making free choices 
is less problematic for full autonomy than it is for rational autonomy.   
 
Against Dubljevic, William Simkulet argues that political liberalism presupposes 
metaphysical libertarianism, as the current liberal democratic state as it exists is dependent 
on metaphysical libertarianism being true.  To illustrate this, Simkulet asks us to imagine 
that, in the original position, we are to suppose that hard determinism is true, and that 
humans have no free will (Simkulet 2013, p.72).  Under such conditions, parties would 
devise laws that would be radically different from the laws of most liberal democracies.  
Whether we are deemed to be wholly responsible for our actions matters under most legal 
systems. If we are deemed never to be entirely responsible, Simkulet argues that laws 
should be devised so as to reflect this.  That Rawls does not come to this conclusion 
represents, for Simkulet, the fact that political liberalism is dependent on metaphysical 
libertarianism.  For Rawlsian justice to be realised, citizens must be deemed capable of 
making free choices and taking responsibility for these choices.  However, though 
Simkulet posits this as a commitment to libertarianism, it is better characterised as a 
dependency on the truth of free will, however conceptualised.  Simkulet’s argument does 
 
2 It is only with the full publicity condition being met that we could expect a person to become fully 
autonomous (Rawls 2005, p.78).   
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not account for compatibilism; it is plausible to imagine determinism being thought of as 
true within the original position, but the parties agreeing to accept the truth, or plausibility, 
of compatibilism.    
 
As Simkulet states, for us to be deemed responsible for our rational plans of life as Rawls 
hopes, we must be thought to be free.  In a social world in which hard determinism was 
accepted as true, we would not attain this level of freedom on which we could be thought 
responsible.  Accepting the truth of hard determinism would not radically transform human 
life, according to Ted Honderich (1973, p.213).  Our views on individuality and 
responsibility, however, would have to be revised.  Honderich writes that way in which the 
majority of people think about individuality and responsibility is premised on a belief in 
free will (Honderich 1973, pp.208-209).  With the truth of hard determinism, this would 
need to be amended to account for the fact that we would now know that a person could 
never have done otherwise.  As the telos of political liberalism is not the realisation of 
individuality in the sense that it is in J.S. Mill’s On Liberty (1859), re-evaluating how we 
think about individuality would not pose a concern for political liberalism.  However, 
responsibility, while not the ultimate end of political liberalism, does play a significant role 
in Rawls’ account of autonomy.  If we cannot be deemed responsible for our plans of life, 
we cannot attain rational autonomy. 
 
How would responsibility, then, need to be reframed according to hard determinism?  For 
Derk Pereboom (arguing from the hard incompatibilist position, which, however, overlaps 
with the hard determinist view), wrongdoing should be considered in much the same way 
as a natural disaster; while it may be regrettable, the person guilty of wrongdoing could not 
have done otherwise, and so we should not seek retribution (Pereboom 2006, p.154).  A 
more pragmatic approach would need to be taken towards human wrongdoing, moral 
failures, and poor decision-making.  Violent criminals would still need to be imprisoned to 
protect the rest of society, yet this would be a matter of security rather than the punishing 
of a person.  We would also need to recognise that poor decisions were not the fault of the 
individual person.  Hence, the person who gambles away her life-savings cannot be 
deemed responsible for doing so, nor can the person who joins a racist political movement 
or endorses a violent, extremist religion.  Rather than put the onus on the individual person 
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to not perform such actions, it should instead be society’s duty to reduce the likelihood of 
such actions being committed.3    
 
That Rawls does not draw such conclusions suggests, as Simkulet argues, that he is reliant 
on the truth of free will.  As stated above, this is not necessarily a problem for Rawls’ 
conception of full autonomy.  Our ability to act from just principles may instead be 
enhanced by a lack of free will.  If a person had been indoctrinated to act from certain 
principles, the chances of her acting against these principles may be reduced if she does not 
have free will.  In a deterministic universe, it seems safe to assume that a person will be 
less likely to act against the doctrine under which she was raised.  Thus, the problem here 
is not for full autonomy.  Rather, it is rational autonomy that is undermined if we do not 
have free will.  There is an additional problem, however, in regard to how Rawls posits 
that we become fully autonomous.  We come to accept the principles of justice through 
realising the principles promote our conception of the good (Rawls 2005, pp.144-150).  To 
put this in terms of autonomy, we come to be fully autonomous partly through our rational 
autonomy.  Lack of free will holds implications for how we imagine a person formulates 
her conception of the good, and whether we can consider her responsible for this 
conception.  This is problematic as Rawls leaves it to the individual to determine her own 
good.        
 
As Joseph Raz explains, Rawls is not entirely indeterministic in how he imagines we come 
to hold our conceptions of the good, or the way of life we derive from this conception (Raz 
1986, p.131).  Instead, Rawls recognises that the sense of morality we hold, and the way of 
life we choose, will be largely socially determined.  We do not need to be capable of 
making radical choices in which we realise these aspects of ourselves independently of our 
social world.  Nevertheless, we still need to be capable of choosing reasonably and 
rationally from the choices available to us within this world.  A person incapable of doing 
this could not be considered rationally autonomous.   
 
If we expect a person to become fully autonomous, yet respect her ability to determine her 
own good, we place a greater demand on her than Rawls recognises.  In a society in which 
freedom of conscience is respected, it is likely that many of the doctrines existing within 
this society will be at odds with justice as fairness.  Some may be entirely illiberal – 
 
3 A complete explication of the necessary revisions is beyond the scope of this chapter.  This is further 
explored in Chapters 8 and 9.  
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fascistic or theocratic – while others may be broadly liberal but challenge Rawls’ 
liberalism – libertarianism or utilitarianism, for example.  If the principles of justice are to 
uphold the constitution, the majority of people must be fully autonomous citizens who are 
motivated to endorse these principles.  Respecting people’s freedom of conscience, it must 
be imagined that people are in control of their thoughts and acts and can ensure they 
maintain a commitment to justice as fairness.  This is to make large assumptions about a 
person’s moral psychology.   
 
As stated earlier, this is why self-respect is important for Rawls.  It is because people have 
self-respect that they are motivated to act in ways appropriate to Rawls’ well-ordered 
society.  There are two problems here.  First, this form of moral psychology, on which self-
respect is dependent, will only develop in particular societal contexts.  If hard determinism 
is considered true, we cannot rely on the individual to develop her own moral psychology; 
the moral psychology she comes to hold will be beyond her control.  Second, self-respect 
requires a world in which we are able to freely choose our actions.  In the absence of this 
world, we would have no justification for thinking that we can freely choose our own ends, 
and that we are in full control of the processes leading to our choosing these ends.  A view 
of the universe premised on hard determinism would entail the realisation that the physical 
laws of causation determined our life plans before our births (Van Inwagen and Griffiths 
1985), and their virtue and success, or lack thereof, were not due to our freely choosing to 
be virtuous characters.  It is due to events beyond our control that we either become a 
virtuous person who realises a successful plan of life, or a scoundrel whose way of life 
undermines society.  Neither pride nor shame are justified in response.  We could not, 
therefore, increase our sense of self-respect through imagining that these free choices had 
enabled us to become such persons.  The crucial aspect on which self-respect is founded 
would thus be lost, and with it, the primary motivation to endorse justice as fairness.  
          
To conclude, whereas full autonomy is not necessarily dependent on the truth of free will, 
if we are to be considered rationally autonomous, we must be thought of as morally 
responsibly agents possessing free will.  Rawls’ conception of moral psychology supports 
this view of citizens.  Without this being the case, we would need to revise how we 
imagine citizens can become fully autonomous.  As I argued in Chapter 3, without fully 
autonomous citizens, political liberalism would be unrealisable.  Rawls places a large 
demand on the psychological makeup of citizens.  Citizens must possess a large degree of 
control over their thoughts and actions, ensuring their conceptions of the good align with 
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the demands of justice of fairness, and that they are motivated to endorse justice as 
fairness.  If it is not through the motivation supplied by Rawls’ theory of moral psychology 
that people come to endorse justice as fairness, and thus to be fully autonomous, the way in 
which Rawls imagines we are to realise full autonomy must be reassessed.     
  
5.6 Conclusion  
 
Throughout his work on political liberalism, Rawls tried to avoid metaphysical 
commitments, attempting to formulate certain aspects of Kantian moral philosophy without 
their metaphysical components, within a “reasonable empiricist framework” (Rawls 2005, 
p.285).  However, in the original position, though we are supposed to discard all 
knowledge of ourselves, we retain a particular conception of the self.  This conception of 
the self is one that has been developed in a modern liberal democratic society.  It is built 
upon the acceptance of certain values as being inherently true.  We develop our self-
respect through the realisation that we are virtuous people who commit noble actions: 
actions that support the principles of justice and allow us to realise our rational plans of 
life.  Replacing the Kantian noumenal realm with the original position, Rawls still requires 
us to accept certain values as being true from the perspective of the original position, as 
Kant imagines universal moral laws can be understood from the perspective of the 
noumena.  One of these values is the truth of free will; without this truth, our virtuous 
characters and actions are not our own creations for which we can feel responsible.   
 
Without the acceptance of our free will in the original position, we cannot accept 
responsibility for our conception of the good.  In the universe of hard determinism, it 
would be realised that our conceptions of the good were not a result of our own free 
choices; as the way in which we conceived the good life was conditioned by factors prior 
to our births, we could not be viewed as being in full control of the conception of the good 
we came to hold.  Thus, Rawls’ conception of rational autonomy is undermined.  
Furthermore, though full autonomy faces no direct threat from this argument, we become 
fully autonomous through our capacity for rational autonomy.  That is, we become fully 
autonomous through realising that the principles of justice, and our acting in support of 
them, enhances our own good.  If rational autonomy is undermined, we would need to 
reconsider how people are expected to become fully autonomous.  Thus, if Rawls’ 
formulation of autonomy is to work in the way he intends, there must be an acceptance of 
the truth of free will.  If hard determinism is true, the development of a person’s moral 
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psychology is beyond her control.  This cannot be the case if we are to realise our rational 




Chapter 6 – How the Brain Works and what this means for Free Will 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Benjamin Libet’s work in the 1980s introduced a neural perspective into debate on free 
will.  His work appeared to show that our conscious awareness of our intentions to act 
followed behind our brain’s decision.  This suggested that conscious control of our actions 
is limited.  By the time we become aware of our intention to act, we can only decide to 
veto this action.  We can never consciously initiate an intention to act, according to Libet.  
Though Libet did not entirely discard the notion of free will, as he thought that some kind 
of conscious control over action was maintained through the veto function, his work 
nevertheless questioned how much conscious control we have over our actions.  
Furthermore, Libet precipitated debate within both neuroscience and philosophy on the 
empirical evidence for free will.  The supposed philosophical implications of Libet’s work 
have been questioned by philosophers of the mind, while others working in neuroscience 
have further explored the way in which our brain’s control over our thoughts and actions 
may bypass our conscious will.  
 
As previously discussed, Rawls gives priority to freedom in Political Liberalism, assuming 
that, with their freedom secured, citizens will be able to formulate a rational plan of life 
and live accordingly.  From the empirical evidence and philosophical implications of 
neuroscience, I question whether this assumption is plausible. The purpose of this chapter 
is to assess the empirical data, while the philosophical implications are assessed in Chapter 
7.  Commenting on the significance of their work, neuroscientists often make philosophical 
speculations.  These will be stated here though more expansive discussion of the 
philosophical implications of this work is found in the following chapter.  
 
There are two items of fundamental importance to which I wish to draw attention.  First, 
the lack of a centre of conscious control.  There is no part of the brain that acts as ‘control 
centre’.  Second, neural activity does not occur in linear progressions between the initial 
conscious cause and the resulting action.  Instead, neural activity occurs in deterministic 
cycles.  These two aspects are of philosophical relevance and are further assessed in 




In 6.2, I begin by explaining the basic workings of the brain, and how the various regions 
of the brain relate to our thoughts and actions.  This is followed in 6.3 with an explanation 
of Libet’s work and how his findings challenged conceptions of free will.  Contemporary 
research on the subject in neuroscience will then be explored in 6.4.  Finally, I look at 
findings in social neuroscience in 6.5, and consider how they may affect how we think 
about free will.  Rather than think about free will in relation to the individual agent, social 
neuroscience looks instead to the ways in which social factors influence neural activity.   
 
6.2 The Anatomy and Workings of the Brain  
 
Beginning with Benjamin Libet’s work, research in neuroscience has suggested that our 
conscious will has little control over our actions.  Before explaining how neuroscientists 
have examined the relationship between the brain and free will, it will be helpful to have a 
basic understanding of the workings of the brain.  The brain and the nervous system are 
vastly complex; to give a complete understanding of their workings would go beyond the 
purposes of this chapter.  Instead, I aim to provide an explanation of all the main regions of 
the brain, drawing particular attention to how they relate to the ways in which we think and 
act.  Beginning at the spinal cord, I map the brain between the brain stem and the 
cerebrum.  The function of neurones is then explained.  A glossary of key terms is 
provided at the end of the thesis.      
 
 




The spinal cord and the brain are connected by the brain stem (Thompson 2000, pp.14-15), 
as shown at the base of Figure A.  Consisting of the medulla and pons, the brain stem 
allows for the transfer of nerves between the spine and the brain.  The medulla follows 
from the spinal cord, and connects the brain with the spine, while the pons leads toward the 
cerebellum sitting at the back of the brain (Thompson 2000, pp.15-16), where motor 
control is regulated.  Information is received in the cerebellum from the spinal cord and 
brain stem, along with other sensory inputs, including the cerebral cortex (Longstaff 2005, 
pp.254-256).  Our conscious awareness of our bodily movements derives from this 
information conveyed to the cerebellum.  From the cerebellum, information is then relayed 
to other parts of the brain in order to guide movement.  
 
  
    Figure B: Location of the basal ganglia (Graybiel 2000) 
 
Above the cerebellum is the basal ganglia, the location of which is shown in Figure B, 
further parts of the brain concerned with bodily movement (Thompson 2000, pp.18-19).  
The basal ganglia consist of a large group of nuclei in the centre of the cerebral 
hemispheres.  There are two structures constituting the basal ganglia: the dorsal pallidum 
(globus pallidus), positioned below, and the caudate nucleus and putamen, located above.  
Together with the nucleus acumbens, the caudate nucleus and putamen combine to form 
the striatum, important for transmitting chemicals such as dopamine (Kingsley 2000, 
pp.285-289), along with allowing for communication between neurones (to be discussed 
shortly).  Dopamine’s release also involves the basal ganglia, via the substantia nigra that 
produces it (Kingsley 2000, pp.131-133).  The basal ganglia were also thought to 
contribute to the regulation of voluntary movements, and the inhibition of involuntary 
actions (Mink 2003).  However, the division of the brain into systems dealing with 
voluntary movements and others dealing with those that are involuntary had largely been 
rejected by the early twenty-first century (Roth 2003a).  As will be discussed, those such as 
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Gerhard Roth argue that there is interplay between the different systems, and that the basal 
ganglia are involved in more tasks than originally thought, both voluntary and involuntary.    
 
The thalamus is next to the basal ganglia.  It is another large group of nuclei, consisting of 
two ovoids, one within each hemisphere (Thompson 2000, p.16).  It is involved in the 
relaying of sensory information.  Connecting the thalamus to the brain stem and spinal 
cord is the midbrain.  At this junction between the thalamus and the midbrain sits the 
hypothalamus (Thompson 2000, pp.15-16).  The hypothalamus is a group of small nuclei.  
According to Richard F. Thompson (2000, pp.15-16.), it has a large amount of control over 
the body, due to the power it has over the pituitary gland.  The hypothalamus is the control 
centre for the endocrine system, the system concerned with the release of hormones 
throughout the body, which also encompasses the pituitary gland through a feedback 
mechanism (Musumeci et al 2015, pp.357-358).  This system controls human physiological 
processes such as growth, metabolism, and fertility.         
 
Another part of the brain is known as the limbic system, though this consists of various 
sections located across the brain.  The amygdala, hippocampus, limbic cortex, and septal 
area form the main parts of the limbic system (Thompson 2000, pp.17-18).  The limbic 
system performs various functions.  It is one of the earliest parts of the brain to have 
evolved, and its original role was to formulate an organism’s response to sensory stimuli, 
particularly in relation to smell, though as it has evolved, it has come to perform various 
other functions.  Recent work has uncovered the possibility of there being several limbic 
systems, with the main parts of the central limbic system forming different networks.  One 
such network involves the amygdala and is concerned with emotion, while the 
hippocampus is part of a network that relates to memory and learning (Rolls 2015).  Also 
involved with the limbic system is the cingulate cortex, which, along with the amygdala, 
regulates emotional responses (Bush et al 2000).         
 
All of the aforementioned regions are covered by the cerebrum, the largest part of the 
brain, located at the top and reaching from the front to the back.  As seen in Figure B, the 
cerebrum is divided into four lobes: frontal, parietal, occipital, and temporal (Graybiel 
2000; Salat 2004).  The grooves and folds on the surface of the lobes are named gyri 
(gyrus) and sulci (sulcus) (Kingsley 2000, p.7).  Contained in the cerebrum is the cerebral 
cortex.  Thompson writes that the cerebral cortex is “what makes human beings what they 
are” (Thompson 2000, p.19).  Our consciousness, ability to reason and imagine, capacity 
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for language, along with our senses and motor skills are thought to belong to the cerebral 
cortex (although, as will be discussed later, the importance with which the cerebral cortex 
is traditionally considered is now questioned).  An important part of the cerebral cortex is 
the prefrontal cortex positioned within the frontal lobe that is concerned with memory and 
learning.  Another part is Wernicke’s area, lying at the end of the Sylvian fissure that 
separates the frontal and temporal lobes (Thompson 2000, p.441).  Within Wernicke’s area 
are the posterior superior temporal gyrus and sulcus, which are important in regard to 
speech (Friederici et al 2009).  The cerebral cortex is also important in action and 
movement.  When we decide to act, it was traditionally thought that the initiation of the act 
is in the cerebral cortex (Eccles 1972, pp.108-109).  Cells are then fired into the motor 
cortex, found within the cerebral cortex (Eccles 1972, p.105), which prepares the body to 
perform the act.  However, as is discussed later in this chapter, this understanding of the 
brain, on which there are neural regions where events are initiated, is challenged by 
contemporary neuroscience.    
 
The motor cortex is divided into three further subsections: the primary motor cortex, 
premotor cortex, and the supplementary motor area (both the pre-supplementary motor 
area and supplementary area proper) (Roth 2003b, p.116; Ward 2015, pp.168-172).  
Voluntary movements are often understood to involve the primary motor cortex, which sits 
in the middle of the cerebral cortex, across both hemispheres.  The right hemisphere 
controls the left-hand side of the body, and the left hemisphere the right.  Modulation of 
actions is performed by the premotor cortex, while the supplementary motor area regulates 
well-learned actions that do not require monitoring of the environment, such as the playing 
of a musical instrument (Ward 2015, pp.168-172).  Sometimes considered as part of the 
motor cortex are the posterior parietal cortex (Roth 2003a, p.111) and the primary 
somatosensory cortex (Kingsley 2000, p.84), which relays sensory information to the 
thalamus. 
 
Within all of these regions and sections of the brain are cells called neurones.  Neurones 
are contained within the brain and nervous system, and there are estimated to be between 
300 and 500 billion neurones within the human body (Longstaff 2005, p.5).  From the 
neurone cell, nerve fibres called dendrites branch upwards and sideways, while axons grow 
down (Eccles 1972, pp.4-6).  It is through these nerve fibres that information is transferred 
between neurones.  The transferring of this information enables the activity in our brains 




Neurones communicate with each other via synapses.  When a neurone communicates with 
another neurone, it initiates what is called an action potential (Postle 2015, p.34).  A 
neurone is said to have an action potential when it is electrically stimulated; neurones not 
undergoing stimulation are said to have a resting potential (Longstaff 2005, p.33).  The 
action potential occurs when a neurone has been depolarised.  Depolarisation is the process 
whereby the voltage of a neurone has been sufficiently increased for the opening of the 
neurone’s channels, enabling an influx of sodium ions.  For the action potential to occur, 
the part of the neurone known as the axon hillock, the branch leading down to the axon, 
must be depolarised.  Further down the axon are more clusters of sodium ions.  
Experiencing the depolarisation that has occurred in the axon hillock, these clusters open 
the part of the channel they inhabit.  This process repeats itself continuing down to the 
dendrite of the next neurone, and the action potential is then transmitted between neurones.  
In the postsynaptic neurone, the neurone receiving the information encoded in the action 
potential, there can be many possible effects (Postle 2015, p.35).  There will be at least a 
little amount of depolarisation in this neurone; with a sufficient amount of depolarisation, a 
further action potential may be enabled in the postsynaptic neurone.   
 
Three types of motor acts are identified: autonomous motor functions, reflexes, and 
voluntary motor acts (Kingsley 2000, p.209).  Autonomous motor functions are acts such 
as the beating of the heart, which continue without conscious awareness or intervention, 
and are independent of external stimuli.  Reflexes happen automatically in response to 
stimuli, such as being startled by an unexpected loud noise.  Finally, voluntary motor acts 
are those in which we are understood to be consciously involved.  There are two motor 
systems within the brain concerned with regulating movement, the pyramidal system and 
the extrapyramidal motor system (Thompson 2000, p.19), though it should be noted that 
those such as Gerhard Roth no longer view there being a sharp distinction between the two 
(Roth 2003a, pp.111-112).  The pyramidal system descends down to the spine from the 
motor cortex and includes sections relating to various parts of the body (Eccles 1972, 
pp.105-107).  Traditionally, it was thought that the pyramidal system was concerned with 
voluntary actions.  The pyramidal system includes the whole of the aforementioned motor 
cortex along with the pre-frontal cortex (Roth 2003a, p.111).  Pyramidal cells are fired 
from the motor cortex down this chain towards the muscle attached to the body part we 
wish to move (Eccles 1972, pp.105-107).  The extrapyramidal motor system, though 
similarly originating in the motor cortex, bypasses other parts of the pyramidal system and 
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was thought to regulate involuntary actions (Thompson 2000, p.308; Whitty et al 2008, 
p.416).  It is largely comprised of the basal ganglia, brainstem, and motor centres in the 
spine (Roth 2003a, pp.111-112).  Despite Roth’s argument that there is not such a strong 
distinction between systems in the brain dealing with voluntary movements as opposed to 
those relating to involuntary movements, this terminology is still often used in the 
literature, and a familiarity with the distinction is useful.       
 
The above provides a basic illustration of the workings of the human brain.  From the spine 
up to the cerebrum, each part of the brain is involved in different functions in relation to 
our thoughts and actions.  The medulla and pons allow for the transmission of information 
between the brain and the spine.  Motor control is regulated by the cerebellum.  The basal 
ganglia allow for our body movements and are involved in the regulation of involuntary 
movements.  Sensory information is conveyed by the thalamus.  Though Roth contests its 
significance as a command centre (Roth 2003b, p.115), Thompson argues that the cerebral 
cortex allows for us to think as humans do: to reason and imagine, to learn languages and 
other forms of communication, and to interpret our environment (Thompson 2000, p.19).  
Within all these regions of the brain are neurones, working to transmit information across 
the brain and body and enabling us to function as we do.              
 
6.3 The Readiness Potential and Conscious Awareness   
 
In this section, I explain the readiness potential before moving on to Libet’s experiment, 
which examined the relationship between the readiness potential and our conscious 
awareness.  I then explore the ramifications of Libet’s experiments for the subject of free 
will.  The readiness potential was discovered in an experiment by Hans Helmut Kornhuber 
and Lüder Deecke in 1965 (Kornhuber & Deecke 1965; Libet 1999, p.49).  Before the 
performance of any action, electrical activity in the brain – the voltage increases that allow 
for depolarisation, which further leads to the communication of information between 
neurones – occurs in relation to the intention to act.  This electrical activity was named the 
readiness potential by Kornhuber and Deecke.  In his own experiments, Benjamin Libet 
further explored the implications the readiness potential held for how we commonly think 
about free will.   
 
Sixteen subjects were asked to lie in an electrically shielded room and to sometimes flex 
their right index fingers, and at other times to flex their right arms (Deecke et al 1969, 
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p.159).  They were asked to fix their gaze and refrain from making other movements.  
Electrodes were then placed on the subject’s skin across his or her brain.  By looking at 
electroencephalographic data obtained from the experiments through reverse computation, 
Kornhuber and Deecke discovered that the readiness potential almost always occurred 
prior to hand and foot movements (Kornhuber & Deecke 1965; Gomes 1999, pp.62-63).  
Though on average it begins at 850 milliseconds prior to the act (Deecke et al 1969, 
p.163), it can happen up to 1.5 seconds beforehand (Gomes 1999, p.62).  
 
The readiness potential is not to be confused with the action potential described above.  
While the action potential occurs within each neurone as it prepares to communicate with 
other neurones, the readiness potential refers to a larger group of activity involving many 
neurones.  Nevertheless, within the readiness potential, the transfer of information up to the 
point of the muscle moving the body occurs through action potentials (Keller & 
Heckhausen 1990, p.359).  There has been debate within neuroscience on what is 
happening during the readiness potential and where (Böcker et al 1994, pp.275-276).  From 
experiments on macaque monkeys, it was thought that activity in the pre-motor cortex, 
primary motor cortex, and the somatosensory cortex occurred in succession (Sasaki & 
Gemba 1991).  Others argued that the readiness potential activity can be solely attributed 
to the primary motor cortex (Neshige et al 1988).  Praamstra et al conclude that it is likely 
that the supplementary motor area plays a small role in the readiness potential (Praamstra 
et al 1996, p.476).  There is agreement, however, that the readiness potential is initiated in 
the motor cortex.  It is also understood that there are higher levels of the readiness potential 
in the performance of voluntary actions.  When actions are initiated involuntarily or 
through external stimuli, there are fewer signs of the readiness potential (Praamstra et al 
1996, p.468). 
 
Libet conducted his own experiments to determine the relationship between the readiness 
potential and our conscious will.  He had his subjects look at a clock face that had been 
altered so that the second hand moved 25 times faster than normal (Libet 1999, pp.49-51), 
in order to account for milliseconds.  Subjects were asked to flick their wrists at a time of 
their choosing.  When the subject first felt the urge to act, he or she was asked to note the 
position of the hand on the clock face.  The experiment revealed that while the readiness 
potential registered at 500 milliseconds prior to the act (Libet’s finding here contrasts with 
the 1.5 seconds to 850 milliseconds observed by Deecke et al), the conscious awareness of 
the urge to act was apparent at 200 milliseconds before the act.  This was evident, with 
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slight variations, across all of Libet’s results.  Thus, the readiness potential always 
precedes our conscious awareness of our desire to act.    
 
By the time we become aware of our intention to act, Libet thought that we could still veto 
this intention (Libet 1999, pp.51-52).  At times, Libet’s subjects noted an urge to act that 
they suppressed.  This was shown in the activity of the brain too.  Between 100 to 200 
milliseconds before an act, by which time the individual is aware of the urge to act, the act 
can be cancelled.  However, we have only a short time to exercise this veto.  The spinal 
nerve cells are activated by the motor cortex in the final 50 milliseconds before the act, 
preparing the body for action, at which point there is no longer an opportunity not to act.  It 
is quite possible, however, that the veto itself has unconscious origins (Velmans 1991; 
Libet 1999, pp.52-53).  While Max Velmans considered even an unconsciously originated 
veto to be a sufficient condition for free will, Libet thought that in order for actions to be 
considered the result of a person’s free will, the veto function had to restore some kind of 
role for conscious control.  Without this, even the acts of someone experiencing an 
epileptic seizure would have to be considered acts of free will (Libet 1999, p.52).  This was 
unacceptable for Libet, who thought that we must be able to distinguish voluntary 
movements from the type of involuntary motor actions that characterise seizures.    
 
For Libet, then, the veto had to salvage a role for the conscious will in the performance of 
our actions for acts of free will.  What was important for Libet was the idea of awareness 
(Libet 1999, p.53).  While we may not consciously initiate the process that occurs between 
the brain’s intention to act and the performance of the act itself, Libet thought it possible 
that we are aware of this whole process.  Libet argued that there was no logical imperative 
in any mind-brain theory that required our conscious control to be preceded by neural 
activity.  Hence the veto function, as Libet posited it, could exist independently of prior 
neural states.  Once we become aware of an intention to act, this awareness, in conjunction 
with the veto function, allows for the possibility of our free will.  Essentially, our 
conscious awareness is watching over the entirety of the process, and before the execution 
of an act, can intervene to halt the process.  
 
This was enough, for Libet, to argue that we do have free will, and a sufficient level of free 
will to uphold many ethical systems in religious and philosophical thought.  As Libet 
writes, “most of the Ten Commandments are ‘do not’ orders” (Libet 1999, p.54).  We have 
enough control over our actions to refrain from an action we know to be considered 
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ethically or morally wrong.  What we do not have, however, is control over our thoughts.  
Thus, while it would be acceptable to hold someone responsible for immoral actions, we 
could not hold people responsible for their thoughts.   
 
Though some have used Libet’s experiments to support a hard-deterministic stance on free 
will (Harris 2012), or to argue against any conscious control of action (Wegner 2002, 
pp.52-55), Libet himself argued that his findings did not rule out free will’s truth (Libet 
1999, pp.55-57).  Libet also thought that the truth of free will was essential for life to be 
worthwhile living.  While he thought determinism was useful when examining the natural 
world, Libet saw nothing to definitively conclude that the mind worked entirely 
deterministically.  Therefore, he argued against assuming a deterministic stance in relation 
to free will.  Instead, Libet thought that at the conscious level, we are continually aware of 
our actions, and through the veto function, we can consciously select the actions we decide 
upon to realise our ends.  On this view, conscious awareness is not a phenomenon that 
follows behind our actions, nor are the justificatory reasons we give for our actions decided 
on after the act itself.     
 
6.4 Understanding of Free Will in Contemporary Neuroscience  
 
Since Libet’s work, some philosophers and neuroscientists have disputed Libet’s 
interpretation of the data, while others looked to advance on his findings.  The 
philosophical responses to findings in neuroscience will be considered in the following 
chapter.  I now turn to the response from neuroscience, and the ways in which free will is 
considered within contemporary neuroscience.  Beginning with Patrick Haggard’s work, I 
then turn to that of Gerhard Roth, before finally examining alternative perspectives in 
neuroscience.     
 
One of the primary neuroscientists to have advanced the relationship between neuroscience 
and free will is Patrick Haggard.  Haggard has conducted further research into the neural 
activity behind actions that actors perceive as being voluntary.  Modern neuroscience, 
according to Haggard, rejects a dualistic conception in which the conscious mind, soul, or 
will dictates to the brain and body what it must do (Haggard 2008, p.944).  Rather, there 
are specific parts of the brain that relate to the performance of voluntary actions.  
Following Libet, Haggard does not suggest that our awareness merely follows neural and 
bodily activity, and our explanations for our behaviour are not constructed after we have 
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already acted (Haggard 2008, p.942).  This can be demonstrated through experiments in 
which electrodes artificially stimulate motor areas of the brain.  When the pre-
supplementary motor area is stimulated, subjects report feeling an urge to move, though as 
the body has not actually moved, there is no need justify our action.  Awareness was a key 
part of the whole process between intention and action for Libet; Haggard, similarly, finds 
that our awareness runs in tandem with the process.   
 
Thus, Haggard posits that specific areas of the brain are concerned with voluntary actions, 
and the feelings we experience in relation to voluntary actions are not only a construct to 
justify our behaviour.  Haggard has further identified the regions of the brain involved in 
the performance of actions.  Though the primary motor cortex is generally considered to be 
the area from which commands originate, there are several inputs feeding into the primary 
motor cortex (Haggard 2008, p.936).  What Haggard describes as a key input derives from 
both the basal ganglia and the prefrontal cortex, from where it travels to the pre-
supplementary motor area, before arriving at the primary motor cortex.  As previously 
mentioned, the pre-supplementary motor area has been identified as a possible location 
from which the readiness potential originates (Yazawa et al 2000; Shibasaki & Hallett 
2006; Haggard 2008, p.936).  Haggard finds this problematic for two reasons.  Firstly, the 
readiness potential is generally considered as being the electrical charge that occurs in the 
milliseconds prior to action, whereas Haggard states that there is research suggesting it 
begins at a much earlier stage (Soon et al 2008; Haggard 2008, p.936).  Secondly, activity 
in the pre-supplementary motor area must itself have a cause.  According to Haggard, 
neural activity works in loops rather than in a linearity of causes extending back to an 
“uncaused cause” such as the conscious will (Haggard 2008, p.936).      
 
Within this key input, Haggard views the basal ganglia as having an important role.  
People with Parkinson’s Disease perform uncontrollable, involuntary actions.  During 
these actions, activity in the loop between the basal ganglia and pre-supplementary motor 
area is reduced (Haggard 2008, p.936).  Furthermore, as the basal ganglia enable the 
release of dopamine, basal ganglia activity leads us to modify our behaviour in order to 
experience reward.  Haggard suggests that this is how organisms learn to interact with both 
their historical and current environment.  Voluntary action is a result of this process of 




Gerhard Roth has also conducted further research into the nature of voluntary actions.  
Central to Roth’s work is a rejection of the cerebral cortex as a command centre from 
which decisions flow (Roth 2003b, p.115).  Roth also views the basal ganglia as being 
important within the execution of voluntary movements.  There are two basic systems 
involved in these movements, according to Roth.  One includes the pre-motor cortex, the 
primary motor cortex, and the cerebellum (Roth 2003b, pp.120-121).  This system is 
behind actions that are learned and well-practised, such as playing a musical instrument, 
and the cerebellum ensures the sequencing and smooth running of these actions.  Little 
thought is required for their execution.  Actions that necessitate further deliberation are 
regulated by another system.  This system includes the basal ganglia (Roth 2003b, pp.121-
123).  When we have to make a decision, no matter how trivial, activity in the basal 
ganglia enables the decision to be made, whether we make that decision consciously or 
unconsciously. 
 
The basal ganglia are connected to the cerebral cortex via three loops (Roth 2003b, pp.123-
126).  The first loop regulates planning and preparation, the second loop relates to the 
execution of actions, and the third loop relays cognitive, emotional, and motivational 
information.  Within these loops are further pathways, some of which are excitatory and 
others inhibitory.  The striatum has an inhibitory function over the substantia nigra, which 
then inhibit the thalamus, which performs an excitatory function.  Due to the dopaminergic 
inputs from the basal ganglia, via the striatum and substantia nigra, the loops between the 
basal ganglia and the cerebral cortex can regulate behaviour in accordance with what is 
known to obtain reward.  When we make what we perceive to be a voluntary decision, the 
work of the basal ganglia has allowed for this decision to be made (Roth 2003b, pp.123-
126.).   
 
Roth also argues that the basal ganglia have an important role in the readiness potential.  
He writes that the readiness potential exists through two components (Roth 2003b, pp.126-
127).  One is the symmetrical component, involving both parts of the supplementary motor 
area, and beginning 1-2 seconds before the act.  The other is the lateralised component, 
which can be found in the cerebral hemisphere opposite to the body part to be moved (due 
to the right hemisphere controlling the left side of the body and vice versa).  This begins 
700-500 milliseconds before an action.  Roth argues that the symmetrical readiness 
potential – though involving the activity of neurones in the supplementary motor area, 
before moving to the pre-motor cortex and primary motor cortex – is directed by the basal 
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ganglia via the thalamic relay.  However, Roth is aware that the origination of the 
dopaminergic processes that allow for these functions does not lie with the basal ganglia 
itself.  Instead, the limbic system, with its storing of memories and emotions, is what 
triggers the release of dopamine, though it does so at a largely unconscious level (Roth 
2003b, pp.127-129). 
 
The basal ganglia, then, allow for the selection of the actions we make.  Roth states that 
when we decide what action to make, the basal ganglia – through their access to memory – 
reflect on whether it is an appropriate action, and whether, based on past experience, it is 
more suitable than other actions (Roth 2003b, pp.129-130).  All of this occurs, however, at 
a level that is, in the main, unconscious.  Roth’s work further diminishes the claim that we 
may, in some way, still have conscious control over our actions, a position that Libet 
maintained.  Rather, our feeling of freedom – in which we feel as though we are 
consciously and voluntarily choosing our own thoughts and actions – arises from our 
conscious intentions cohering with our unconscious plans, according to Roth (Roth 2003b, 
pp.129-130.).     
 
Neither Haggard nor Roth explicitly endorse hard determinism, though in both of their 
work, the activity of the brain is seen to occur deterministically, and without conscious 
intervention.  Though Haggard is concerned with what constitutes voluntary action from a 
neural perspective, what is voluntary in the neural sense is not necessarily free in the 
metaphysical sense.  Activity in certain regions of the brain may indicate that an action is 
perceived as being voluntary, yet this does not mean that it was freely and consciously 
chosen by the individual.  As Schopenhauer wrote, “you can do what you will, but in any 
given moment of your life you can will only one definite thing and absolutely nothing 
other than that one thing” (Schopenhauer 1839, p.24).  Our will may be able to guide our 
action, but the will cannot exert control over itself through freely choosing its own ends.  
Hence there is a difference between something perceived as being voluntary and something 
being free.  
 
While there is a range of opinion in neuroscience on the nature of free will, and not all 
neuroscientists find the inner workings of the brain to be deterministic (Brembs 2010),1 
 
1 It should be noted that this is not because some neuroscientists maintain that there are necessarily uncaused 
causes within the brain, and that the conscious will can trigger a chain of activity between such a cause and 
an action.  Instead, neuroscientists do not rule out indeterminism because of findings within quantum 
physics.   
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following Libet’s work, most neuroscientists commenting on the subject have looked at the 
deterministic ways in which the brain works, and how this occurs at an unconscious level.  
Though Haggard and Roth have not outright denied that was have free will, their work has 
further revealed how little influence the conscious will has over human action.  While 
Libet thought that the veto function could be consciously controlled, Haggard and Roth’s 
work suggests that much of the neural activity occurring temporally prior to an act is 
unconsciously performed.  Whether we decide to follow through with the initiation of an 
act or veto it, our conscious will has little involvement according to Haggard and Roth.      
 
To conclude, as stated in the Introduction, there are two important aspects found within the 
work of Haggard and Roth.  First, neural activity occurs circularly rather than linearly, and 
does not extend back to an “uncaused cause”.  Second, there is no centre from where all of 
this activity is controlled.  Different neural regions perform certain activities, without the 
need to be linked back to some kind of control centre.  Both of these findings have 
important philosophical implications which are explored in the following chapter.        
 
6.5 Free Will in Social Neuroscience  
 
Research in social neuroscience has further contributed to our understanding of the role of 
consciousness in decision-making.  Rather than examine the individual brain, the social 
neuroscientist thinks of brains as existing in networks.  As we are thought to be social 
animals, it is the social network in which we exist that exerts the most powerful influence 
over the brain’s development.  It is therefore inadequate to consider human brains in 
isolation, according to social neuroscience.  In this section, I examine how work in social 
neuroscience could affect the way in which we consider free will.     
 
The social neuroscientists John Cacioppo and Gary Berntson posit that consciousness 
would be epiphenomenal if it existed in isolation.  Their argument for this comes in two 
parts (Cacioppo & Berntson 2012, pp.41-42).  Firstly, consciousness is the result of 
temporally prior brain states.  A state of consciousness, according to Cacioppo and 
Berntson, is entirely predicted by previous activity in the brain.  Secondly, consciousness 
has no control over subsequent brain states.  If one brain state at a particular time causes 
another brain state, then consciousness cannot also be the cause of the second brain state; if 
there is sufficient causation at the physical level, there cannot also be causation elsewhere.  




Within the singular brain, consciousness would be functionless if it were epiphenomenal.  
However, according to Cacioppo and Berntson, this is not the case.  We are social animals, 
and our brains are thus designed to work in conjunction with the brains of others 
(Cacioppo & Berntson 2012, pp.44-47).  Our very survival – as both individuals and as a 
species – depends on us being able to cooperate with others, and we therefore learn how to 
communicate with others from a young age.  This prepares us to react to the behaviour of 
others.  Brain states are, then, not only the result of prior internal brain states, they are also 
the product of our interactions with others.  Interactions change our own brain states.  In 
this context, Cacioppo and Berntson posit that consciousness – rather than being 
epiphenomenal and functionless – has a social function.  Our conscious states, formed by 
our beliefs and intentions, influence the brain states of other people (Cacioppo & Berntson 
2012, pp.47-48).   
 
Cacioppo and Berntson recognise that this could be characterised as the brain states of 
some influencing the brain states of others, with no role for consciousness (Cacioppo & 
Berntson 2012, pp.47-48).  However, they counter this by comparing our conscious states 
to the output display on a computer screen.  Without a user, the display will remain static 
and will not affect the operations that first produced the output.  When someone uses the 
display to operate the computer, the display itself influences the actions of the user, in turn 
influencing the future states of the computer.  Our conscious states similarly influence the 
behaviour of others, and in turn, affect our own future brain states.  Because we cannot 
accurately predict the behaviour of others, the mechanistic operations of our own brain 
states are interrupted by the unexpected behaviours of those around us.  Consciousness, 
thus, through its social function, serves to disrupt the internal determinism of the brain.  
Social processes, therefore, play a large role in determining human behaviour.    
 
Our capacities for decision-making, then, depend on our socialisation.  When analysing 
human behaviour, rather than look to the individual agent, the social neuroscientist 
observes the social environment.  Thus, Yoder and Decety argue that morality, as a guide 
for human behaviour, is itself a product of the influence of social relations on the brain 
(Yoder & Decety 2018).  Two arguments support this theory.  Firstly, morality has social 
utility; when humans behave according to rules that lead to mutually beneficial outcomes, 
social stability can be better ensured (Yoder & Decety 2018, p.283).  Secondly, as Hume 
argued, our moral reasons follow our moral emotions (Hume 1738; Yoder & Decety, 2018, 
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p.284).  We construct arguments to justify our initial emotional reactions to events, a claim 
also supported by Haidt, as noted in Chapter 3 (Haidt 2007).  These emotions also serve a 
social function.  Empathy and shame, along with other emotions, encourage us to obey the 
rules of our groups, and to care for others, ensuring the group’s stability and survival.  
These emotions have a neural basis in the amygdala of the limbic system.  When we view 
actions which we perceive as having harmful consequences, the amygdala, in connection 
with other regions of the brain, modulates our response (Yoder & Decety 2018, pp.285-
286).  The posterior superior temporal sulcus, posterior cingulate cortex, and the medial 
prefrontal cortex are regions of the brain concerned with the interpretation of the beliefs 
and intentions of others (Yoder & Decety 2018).  If a harmful act is thought to be 
accidental, these regions regulate the response of the amygdala to the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex.  We are less likely to wish to punish someone guilty of accidental 
wrongdoing because of this communication between the amygdala and the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex.   
 
The neural bases that support these social and moral functions are thought by some in 
social psychology and neuroscience to be inherent aspects of the human brain.  While it 
was traditionally thought that empathy was a learned trait, psychologists now argue that the 
capacity for empathy is found in very young children (McDonald & Messinger 2011).  
Children show signs of distress when witnessing stress in others, and a desire to comfort 
those who are suffering.  One hypothesis for this is the existence of mirror neurones 
(McDonald & Messinger 2011.).  Mirror neurones have been observed within macaque 
monkeys, though their existence within humans is disputed.  The mirror neurone prepares 
the organism to relate to the experiences of other organisms and act in accordance.  Despite 
their existence within humans being questionable, some neuroscientists posit that it is the 
mirror neurone that prepares us to react to the behaviour of others (Ferrari & Coudé 2018, 
pp.68-70).  The activity of mirror neurones occurs during everyday actions and reflexes, 
such as yawning in response to seeing others yawning, a behaviour that has been observed 
in monkeys as well as humans.  Ferrari and Coudé argue that humans emulate the emotions 
of others due to the presence of mirror neurones.  Thus, when we see others smile, we 
smile in return, a phenomenon termed “emotional contagion” (Ferrari & Coudé 2018, 
p.73).  Whether or not it is the presence of mirror neurones that prepare humans for 
empathic behaviour, it is clear we are inherently predisposed to respond to the emotional 




Though there is a neural basis that prepares us for empathic behaviour, its development is 
dependent on how we are raised.  Those whose parents are more attentive are likely to 
have a stronger conscience later in life (McDonald & Messinger 2011).  Our brains may 
hold an intrinsic capacity for empathy, but this capacity will not develop uniformly from 
person to person.  Instead, development is conditional on environment.  The processes 
influencing this development occur outside of the individual agent’s conscious will, both at 
the neural level and at the familial and societal levels.  This is not only true of the 
development of empathy.  Our feelings of shame and guilt also develop in response to 
parenting styles (Parisette-Sparks et al 2017; Ruckstaetter et al 2017).  Emotions that 
motivate us to follow particular moral laws only develop under particular circumstances.  
Understandings of morality that hold in the individual’s family and community will, then, 
influence the brain from a very early age.  The brain has thus been formed and moulded by 
a myriad of external forces prior to adulthood.  While we may be inherently social animals, 
the precise quality of our sociability is dependent on our environment.     
 
While Libet retained some space for the conscious will to have control over action via the 
veto function, Cacioppo and Berntson also find consciousness to serve a function, though 
they offer a different formulation.  Instead of our awareness of the process between 
intention and action affording us the ability to decide on appropriate actions, under 
Cacioppo and Berntson’s formulation, we instead come to make decisions through our 
sociability.  There is, however, little sense in which this can be considered free.  Our 
decision-making processes are instead largely guided by our reactions to the behaviour of 
others, both in the immediate sense, and based on past experience.  In the work of Roth, we 
come to something of a black hole when we seek the origins of intentions.  Neural systems 
mainly work in loops, with one region of the brain influencing another, and with no root to 
the intention guiding activity.  Cacioppo and Berntson offer the possibility that the roots of 
intentions grow out of our social relations.  Furthermore, our senses of morality and 
emotions, such as shame and guilt, are also dependent on our social environment.  Specific 
parts of the brain are inherently equipped to deal with our emotions and social relations, 
yet the precise development of the brain will depend on the experiences to which it is 
exposed.  The decisions we make as adults are influenced by both our current social 







Examining the implications of the discovery of the readiness potential, Libet constructed 
experiments which appeared to show that the readiness potential preceded conscious 
awareness.  From this, Libet concluded that our ability to consciously control our actions is 
limited, though he did not entirely eschew the idea of free will.  Instead, Libet thought we 
retained the capacity for free will through the ability to veto an impulse to act.  We hold an 
awareness of the entire process between unconscious intention and action, and through this 
awareness, we are able to consciously veto our thoughts and impulses, maintaining a level 
of conscious control over actions.    
 
Following on from Libet, some neuroscientists have postulated an even smaller, perhaps 
non-existent, role for the conscious will.  Haggard argues that we do distinguish between 
voluntary and involuntary actions, with specific parts of the brain being involved in the 
performance of voluntary actions.  However, voluntary acts are not caused by the 
conscious will, according to Haggard.  Neural activity occurs within cycles, and there is no 
endpoint that can be assigned the ‘cause’.  Roth has explored the way in which our brains 
make decisions and found that much of this activity occurs at an unconscious level, with 
little involvement of the conscious will.   
 
Human behaviour does not spring from neural activity occurring entirely in internal cycles, 
however.  External information must be processed for us to understand our environment 
and act and respond appropriately.  Within social neuroscience, it is our interactions with 
others that provide the predominant influence on our behaviour.  From an early age, we 
learn to communicate with others, and this interaction shapes the development of our 
brains.  Our decision-making processes, then, rely on our interactions with others.  Rather 
than atomised, individual agents consciously initiating their own actions according to their 
free will, social neuroscientists find the process from intention to action as being 
influenced by sociability.   
 
Though there is disagreement within neuroscience itself, few neuroscientists find the 
libertarian perspective on free will plausible.  We could not hold “Ultimate Responsibility” 
for our ends and actions, as Kane desires us to (Kane 1996), as there is no neural ‘end’ 
from which our intentions are triggered.  Cacioppo and Berntson, in suggesting that if any 
‘end’ exists, it lies in our social environment, have uncovered a new perspective in our 
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understanding of how humans come to think and act.  Our thoughts and actions do not 
originate in a vacuum, they instead form through processes of social interaction.  Instead of 
looking for the roots of our intentions in the brain itself, as Libet did, social neuroscience 
suggests we should look to the way in which external events influence the brain.  Both at 
the neural and societal levels, however, there is little freedom for the conscious will of the 
individual to control events.       









The readiness potential, electrical activity in the brain indicating an intention to act, occurs 
temporally prior to conscious awareness of the urge to act, according to Benjamin Libet.  
For Libet, this meant that we should reconsider conceptions of free will.  This claim 
precipitated further research in neuroscience examining how the workings of the brain may 
undermine free will.  Neuroscientists such as Patrick Haggard and Gerhard Roth conclude 
that many functions of the brain that prepare us for action – along with our processes of 
deliberation –occur deterministically and beyond the limits of conscious thought.   
 
There have been a number of philosophical responses to Libet’s work.  Many of these 
responses question precisely how we formulate free will.  If we demand – as libertarians do 
– that if we have free will, determinism must be false, our conception of free will is 
challenged by the findings of Libet’s experiment, along with findings made in 
neuroscience since Libet’s work.  These findings show that the brain works largely 
deterministically; there is little reason to suppose that there is some kind of break within 
the determinism of neural activity that supports the libertarian conception of free will.  It is 
not immediately clear why compatibilist conceptions are similarly challenged.  In this 
chapter, I assess the different ways in which free will has been formulated in response to 
work in neuroscience, and the extent to which these formulations resolve the problems 
neuroscience identifies.  Through conducting this assessment, the aim is to establish claims 
that can be drawn from the empirical data and assessed against Rawls’ conception of 
autonomy.    
 
The fundamental claim I defend in this chapter is that we have little conscious control over 
our thoughts.  This is problematic regardless of our stance on free will.  While the 
libertarian position on free will is difficult to reconcile with the empirical data, 
compatibilism does not face the same problem.  If we imagine that, providing there is a 
clear lineage between a person’s intentions and her acts, then the acts are acts of free will, 
there is no reason to presume the empirical data challenges our conception of free will.  
However, this does not resolve all of the concerns raised within neuroscience.  If human 
beings have little conscious control over their thought processes, then the thoughts a person 
comes to accept or value is largely beyond her control too.  While the compatibilist 
140 
 
position resolves some of the issues raised by neuroscience, this remains problematic for 
the stability of the liberal order Rawls’ theorises.   
 
I begin in 7.2 by examining the way in which Libet himself formulated free will, assessing 
the veto function.  In 7.3, I look at alternative ways of interpreting the data.  Motivations 
and the reasons that move us to act are examined in 7.4.  The idea of the Cartesian theatre 
– or its non-existence – is examined in 7.5.  Following this, in 7.6, I look at the role of 
social influences and environmental factors in determining the will.  The argument across 
sections 7.2 to 7.5 is largely aimed at undermining the libertarian response to Libet’s work 
(including Libet’s own argument for free will).  However, in 7.6 and 7.7, I examine 
possible compatibilist responses to the data, and argue that compatibilism does not resolve 
some of the concerns raised by the neuroscientific data.       
 
7.2 Libet and the Veto Function  
 
While some such as Daniel Wegner have used Libet’s work to support the claim that the 
conscious will is an illusion (Wegner 2012), it was never Libet’s intention to argue against 
the truth of the conscious will or free will.  Instead, Libet, thought that the veto function 
allowed for our free will.  Here, I argue that Libet actually formulated a libertarian 
conception of free will; the veto function remains undetermined and enables conscious 
agential control.  Subsequent work in neuroscience, however, has shown that the neural 
processes involved in vetoing are themselves determined, ruling out the existence of an 
independent cause of action within the mind.  For this reason, I argue that Libet’s 
conception of free will is mistaken, providing reasons for endorsing the claim that the veto 
function is deterministic.  The main problem identified by Libet, that the origins of our 
intentions are beyond our conscious awareness, remains intact; this gives us reason to 
accept that the origins of our thoughts are prior to conscious awareness. 
 
Libet claims that conscious control over the veto function enables the conscious will to 
break free of the deterministic laws surrounding it.  Libet’s claim is, then, supportive of 
libertarianism.  It lends support to the claim that free will is true as determinism is false.  
We have conscious control over this break with deterministic laws, and this control is what 
constitutes free will.  Libet claimed that the veto function was subject to conscious control.  
Through this function, we can consciously control the selection of the actions we make, 
though the intention to act itself is formed unconsciously.  The determinism of physical 
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laws would produce the same result as theological determinism, in which our fates were 
decided by a God, according to Libet (Libet 1999, p.47).  If either were true, human beings 
would be nothing more than automata, and our consciousness only epiphenomena.  No sort 
of determinism is compatible with free will for Libet.  Thus, it was essential for Libet that 
the veto function allowed for conscious control of our actions through offering a break 
with other deterministic processes.     
 
It is important to note, however, that Libet’s findings, and those made since Libet, are not 
only posing the same problems found within the free will-determinism debate.  This is a 
problem of ordering rather than causation.  Whether we live in a deterministic or an 
indeterministic universe, those who argue for free will may want the conscious will – or 
our conscious awareness of our will – to precede or be simultaneous with brain activity, 
rather than follow on from it.  Rather than simply repeating the same arguments 
surrounding the free will and determinism debate, Libet introduces a new idea: the 
conscious will follows behind neural activity.  One could be a compatibilist and still see a 
problem with this.  Libet did not argue for compatibilism, however.  Instead, Libet argued 
as a libertarian; for the truth of free will, we must have independence from deterministic 
laws in the choices we make.   
 
This is why it was vital for Libet that the veto function allowed for conscious control over 
our actions.  Libet held that it was possible that the veto function had complete 
independence from other neural activity (Libet 1999, pp.52-53).  While the neural activity 
that occurs prior to the readiness potential is manifest only at an unconscious level, 
meaning we have no conscious control over the readiness potential’s formation, the veto 
function allows for a limited form of conscious control over our actions that is independent 
of other brain states.  Because we can consciously select the actions we choose to make via 
the veto function, we can be held responsible for our actions (Libet 1999, pp.54-55).  We 
cannot, however, be held responsible for our thoughts, as the formation of thoughts occurs 
at a stage temporally prior to conscious awareness, and outside of the possibility of 
conscious control.   
 
Rather than characterise Libet as endorsing hard determinism, it is better to think of his 
work as aiming to formulate a neural basis on which to support libertarianism, with this 
grounding his theory of responsibility.  For Libet, it remains the individual agent who is 
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ultimately responsible for her actions, as the veto function allows for a break within 
deterministic laws, with the conscious will having control over this break.   
 
This is not, however, compatible with the libertarianism of Kane (Kane 1996).  Agents 
must hold Ultimate Responsibility for at least some of their actions within Kane’s 
libertarianism.  This means that if an agent is responsible for an action, but there was 
another condition necessary for the action, the agent must also be responsible for that 
condition. It is in our character formation that Kane finds the origin of our free will.  If for 
us to perform a particular action, we need to possess a particular character, we must be 
responsible for the formation of this character if we are to be responsible for the action.  
The idea of the “self-forming action” – an event during which our acts determine our 
characters – is all that is necessary; we need not be responsible for events prior to this, such 
as our own births, or the formation of the universe, thus preventing an infinite regress 
(Kane 2007, p.15).  The conscious thoughts and unconscious brain states that lead to the 
actions we make are beyond our control, if we accept the truth of Libet’s findings.  Kane’s 
libertarianism is thus vulnerable to the empirical challenges posed by Libet, though Libet 
himself offers a more modest version of libertarianism.  In this way, Libet is working 
against the acceptance of hard determinism, rather than endorsing it.   
 
Libet also challenges the claims of compatibilism from a neural perspective.  As noted in 
Chapter 5, compatibilists claim that free will is not dependent on the falsity of 
determinism.  Hume claimed that so long as a person is not in chains, she is free to choose 
a course of action in accordance with her will (Hume 1748, p.125).  The truth of 
determinism would mean that she had no choice in the constitution of her will.  However, 
rather than undermining free will, determinism is a necessary condition for free will.  In an 
indeterministic world, Hume thought that all human action would be subject to chance 
rather than being controlled by the will (Hume 1748, pp.58-59).  Max Velmans claims that 
even if all neural activity prior to action is unconsciously determined, we can still be 
deemed as acting in accord with our will (Velmans 1991), a claim which coheres with 
Hume’s argument.  Against Velmans, Libet thought the veto function must be consciously 
controlled in order for us to have free will (Libet 1999, pp.52-53).  If all neural activity 
prior to action occurred unconsciously, then there could be no distinction between an 
action perceived as voluntary by an agent and an action which was the result of an epileptic 
seizure.  Both actions would not be subject to conscious control and the agent would have 




Stephen J. Morse argues that it is highly implausible to imagine that the brain works 
entirely deterministically, yet there is a function that is somehow independent and 
indeterministic (Morse 2008, pp.30-31).  Work in neuroscience following Libet has 
revealed the deterministic nature of neural activity, meaning it is unlikely such an 
indeterministic function exists within the brain or mind.  Patrick Haggard and Marcel Brass 
claim that the veto function is itself a deterministic process, existing within the dorsal 
fronto-median cortex (Brass & Haggard 2007, pp.9143-9144).  Activity within this region 
inhibits certain actions.  Thus, through a process of filtering in this region, we come to 
choose the actions we perform.  The filtering process, however, is not subject to conscious 
control, nor is its activity somehow indeterministic.  Brass and Haggard support Velmans’ 
argument against Libet; the function is itself determined and does not offer hope for 
libertarian agency.  Neither is the dorsal fronto-median cortex representative of 
consciousness.  Activity here does not equate some kind of seat of consciousness from 
where decisions are made.  The veto function is not, then, indeterministic or subject to 
conscious agential control, as Libet posited.      
 
To conclude, Libet thought that while the readiness potential preceding conscious 
awareness was troubling for free will, the veto function meant that the conscious will was 
still responsible for controlling action, and this function was indeterministic.  As Brass and 
Haggard have shown, however, it is highly unlikely that the neural processes equating the 
veto function are indeterministic.  Instead, the dorsal fronto-median cortex, the activity of 
which works to inhibit some actions and allow for others, operates as deterministically as 
the rest of the brain.  Libet’s solution to the problem of libertarian free will fails when 
considering subsequent understandings of neural mechanisms.   
 
7.3 Alternative Interpretations: Imaginings not Intentions  
 
There are other ways of interpreting the data revealed by Libet’s experiments.  If we alter 
how we interpret the data, perhaps free will as formulated by Libet is salvageable.  In this 
section, I examine alternative ways of thinking about the readiness potential and the veto 
function, and their relationships to the decision-making process.  Mele’s response to Libet 
is pertinent here.  Mele’s critique is within the bounds of Libet’s own perspective; Mele is 
not introducing another viewpoint from which to argue against Libet but arguing against 
the assumptions Libet makes in his attempt to reveal how the data challenges traditional 
144 
 
beliefs about free will.  Essentially, both Mele and Libet are arguing for the same 
conception of free will, on which our conscious awareness somehow has causal 
functionality, though Libet argues from a libertarian perspective, while Mele is a 
compatibilist (though, as I argue, his position often slips between libertarianism and 
compatibilism).  I argue that the alternative explanation offered by Mele fails to provide 
better grounds on which to argue for free will.  This is partly as they are based on a 
misinterpretation of Libet’s original claim, but also because these explanations do not 
show our conscious awareness to have some kind of independent causal function.  Whether 
we think of the readiness potential as an imagining or an intention, we should accept its 
causal functionality.   
 
If the readiness potential has causal functionality, then the origins of actions do not lie with 
the conscious will.  Whatever constitutes our conscious will has been determined prior to 
our awareness of its constitution.  If, following its formation, the conscious will does not 
have causal independence, then libertarianism is on shaky ground; there is no aspect of 
indeterminism within the neural activity behind human action.  The libertarian would be 
left arguing that determinism may not be true at some other level, outside of neural 
activity, and that this allowed for our free will, despite us not holding the capacity to 
control this aspect of indeterminism.   
 
Though Libet thought that the readiness potential revealed an intention to act that preceded 
conscious awareness of intention, it remains unclear why we should consider the readiness 
potential as representative of an ‘intention’.   There is no reason to assume that the brain 
activity constituting the readiness potential represents the decision itself (Morse 2008, 
p.30; Mele 2014, pp.12-13).  It is perfectly possible, according to Morse and Mele, that the 
brain activity represents the brain’s preparation to act, but that the decision itself is made 
later in the process.  In order to understand whether the readiness potential necessarily led 
to the performance of an action, we would need to know whether the same brain activity 
occurred without any corresponding action.  Libet did not consider this, and thus, for Mele, 
we cannot know at what point during the process we can consider the decision itself to 
have been made.  This undermines the notion that the decision is made by the brain and 
then vetoed by the conscious will; we cannot know when the decision itself was made.    
 
Mele also finds Libet’s understanding of the veto function problematic (Mele 2014, pp.16-
20).  Libet came to posit the existence of the veto function through repeating the same 
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experiment but asking subjects not to flex their wrists after deciding upon when to perform 
this action (Libet 1999, p.52).  This is, for Mele, a fruitless task.  Participants would never 
have intended to flex their wrists, as they knew they would never have to perform the 
action.  The electroencephalography data obtained could show that the brain is thinking 
about or imagining an action, rather than revealing an intention to act, according to Mele 
(Mele 2014, p.19).  In attempting to establish that agents can consciously veto an impulse 
to act, all Libet is revealing is that subjects will imagine a particular action without having 
any intention of ever performing the said action.     
 
For Mele, as for John R. Searle, a distinction should be made between general and 
proximal intentions (Searle 2000, pp.17-19; Mele 2004, pp.19-23).  General intentions are 
those in which a person understands that at some point they will probably perform an 
action, but do not know when this will occur.  Proximal intentions are those in which a 
person has decided to act now.  A subject in one of Libet’s experiments would have a 
general intention to act throughout the experiment.  However, the presence of proximal 
intentions in the experiment is more complex.  Mele writes that in go-signal reaction time 
tests – tests in which participants are given a go signal such as a tone sounding and must 
respond immediately by doing something such as pressing a button – the time between the 
signal and the muscle burst is less than 231 milliseconds (Haggard & Magno 1999; Mele 
2014, p.21).  For Mele, this means that time between a proximal intention and an action 
can be much shorter than Libet suggests, who saw the readiness potential occurring on 
average 550 milliseconds prior to action.  Furthermore, the process is not necessarily 
occurring at an unconscious level; subjects are consciously aware of the whole process in 
go-signal reaction time tests.   
 
Likewise, Dennett writes that “what Libet discovered was not that consciousness lags 
ominously behind unconscious decision, but that conscious decision-making takes time” 
(Dennett 2003, p.239).  Not all actions are the same, and the decision-making processes 
that characterise certain actions do not appertain to all other actions.  Dennett uses the 
example of a tennis player returning service.  A tennis ball being served by Venus 
Williams can cross from baseline to baseline in 450 milliseconds, 50 milliseconds less than 
the average time of the readiness potential’s initiation (Dennett 2003, p.238).  To return 
this service, Venus Williams’ opponent must be able to visually process the situation and 
then prepare her body for action in less than 450 milliseconds.  That this is possible is due 
to the way in which the conscious decisions have been made, according to Dennett.  The 
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tennis player consciously commits to a course of action beforehand, and then during the 
game of tennis, allows “reflexes” to follow through with this course of action (Dennett 
2003, p.238), in much the same way Searle and Mele describe proximal intentions (Searle 
2000, pp.17-19; Mele 2004, pp.19-23).  These are not the reflexes explained in the 
previous chapter, which are involuntary responses to stimuli, but reflexes that have been 
consciously predetermined.  The speed in which humans are capable of executing such 
actions allow for our capacity to play ensemble music or respond to others in conversation 
(Dennett 2003, p.239).  What Libet uncovered, Dennett posits, was that when actions are 
considered consciously, the whole process takes longer.  When we think about a specific 
movement our wrists are making, the process will take much longer than when we are 
attempting to return service while playing tennis.  In actions requiring us to respond 
quickly such as in a tennis game, it is unlikely we would be consciously considering the 
placement of our wrists at all.     
 
Mele thinks that there are two possibilities within Libet’s experiment regarding proximal 
intentions (Mele 2014, pp.22-23).  It could be that proximal intentions are not involved, 
and the subject uses the general intention to act in conjunction with the urge to act at a 
particular time, bypassing the conscious proximal intention.  In this case there is no 
unconscious intention, only a conscious general intention leading to an act at a certain 
time.  Alternatively, it is possible that proximal intentions are involved, and the 231 
milliseconds noted in go-signal reaction time tests is close to the point at which subjects in 
Libet’s experiments become consciously aware of the intention to act, 200 milliseconds 
prior to acting.  In either scenario, Mele claims that conscious decision-making would be 
actively involved in the process.  The conscious will would still be the cause of our actions.   
 
As Mele admits, his work is speculative (Mele 2014, p.23), as was Libet’s.  The claims he 
is making are based on what he considers to be a more reasonable interpretation of the 
empirical data.  Mele states that the evidence better supports his claims than it does 
Libet’s.  Mele attempts to show that the conclusions drawn by Libet are misguided.  We 
cannot know at what point during the process the decision is made, according to Mele.  
Brain activity prior to conscious awareness of action could represent imagining of the act, 
or just a preparation to act, rather than the decision itself.  There is, however, nothing in 
this that contradicts Libet’s position.  Libet thought that the decision itself was made at the 
point at which a person became consciously aware of her intention to act, and chose to 




A problem with Mele’s account is that he slightly mischaracterises Libet’s argument.  Mele 
writes that Libet’s challenge to free will rests on the claim that “we make all our decisions 
unconsciously” (Mele 2014 p.21).  Others have used Libet’s work to support this claim 
(Wegner 2002; Harris 2012), but Libet did not make it himself.  While the origin of an 
intention to act is indeed formed unconsciously, by the time a person comes to act, 
consciousness is involved in the process.  Libet thought that conscious awareness did allow 
for free will via the veto function.  Thus, we are able to consciously decide which actions 
we choose to make.  Moreover, the claim that the readiness potential represents a decision 
is also mistaken.  Libet never argued that the readiness potential was the point at which a 
decision is made; the decision itself is made when the individual becomes consciously 
aware of the urge.  Mele’s claim that the readiness potential is an imagining of the act 
rather than the decision to act is perfectly compatible with Libet’s picture of events.   
 
This alternative explanation of events does nothing to advance on Libet’s own reading of 
the data.  First, for the most part, Mele does not contradict any of Libet’s claims; Mele’s 
line of argument is congruent with Libet’s original argument.  Second, Mele’s 
interpretation of the data tells us little about free will.  The most significant finding of 
Libet’s experiments is that our intentions appear to form in our brains before we become 
consciously aware of our intentions.  Mele does not deny that this neural activity occurs 
prior to conscious awareness.  Arguing that the neural activity represents an imagining 
rather than an intention or decision, however, does not counter the basic premise of Libet’s 
argument.  If we are to argue that the readiness potential is only an imagining of an action, 
and that the decision itself is made separately, then we must show that the decision 
somehow has causal independence from the imagining.  The alternative picture of events 
drawn by Mele does not show this.  Rather, Mele shows that we have certain conscious 
desires leading to certain actions.  As work in neuroscience following Libet has shown, 
however, these conscious desires are determined by prior neural activity (Brass & Haggard 
2007; Roth 2010).  The conscious desire has no causal independence from this activity, 
whether we think of the activity as representative of an imagining or an intention.  Libet 
and Mele are on the same side of the argument here, though they may not realise this.  
Neither of their interpretations of the data, however, succeed in showing that our decision-




Elsewhere, Mele attempts to show how the conscious will is causally functional, as I 
discuss in 7.4.  Here, however, through arguing that the readiness potential can be 
considered as an imagining, Mele is not showing the will to be causally functional.  The 
original problematic finding from Libet’s experiment – that neural activity precedes and 
determines the conscious will, meaning the conscious will has no causal function – remains 
unresolved.  Mele’s alternative picture of events gives us no reason to think that 
consciousness’ functionality has been restored.  Moreover, there is no reason to suppose 
that this picture better supports an argument for free will, if we are to accept that conscious 
control is a necessary condition for free will.  Mele does nothing to show that the readiness 
potential is somehow consciously initiated.  Thus, neither Mele nor Libet, in their 
respective readings of events, offer us reasons to accept that the conscious will is causally 
functional, and that it is this function that enables us to have free will.  The conscious will 
does not have causal functionality, independent of other causal factors.   
 
In summary, there are alternative ways of interpreting the data obtained from Libet’s 
experiments.  It could be that the readiness potential is representative of an imagining of 
the act rather than an urge to act.  This picture of events is as realistic as Libet’s, according 
to Mele.  However, there are two flaws here.  The first is in arguing against the claim that 
the conscious will is functionless.  This was never Libet’s claim.  Libet thought that the 
veto function restored a functional role for the conscious will.  The second flaw is in 
arguing against Libet’s assertion that the readiness potential is the decision itself.  This was 
also not Libet’s argument.  The decision itself comes after the readiness potential, when the 
agent becomes consciously aware of her intention to act.  Beyond these inaccuracies in 
Mele’s response to Libet, however, there is little reason to think that the alternative 
interpretation allows for the truth of free will, as consciousness somehow has causal 
functionality.  For these reasons, the alternative explanations fail to provide a better 
interpretation of the data, and thus do not provide better grounds on which to argue for free 
will.   
 
7.4 Motivations and the Reasons for Action   
 
Another way of responding to Libet’s challenge to free will is to reconsider the internal 
motives of agents.  I examine here a different aspect of Mele’s argument, in which he 
further attempts to show how the conscious will is functional.  According to Mele, Libet’s 
work does not take into account the importance of motivation (Mele 2014, pp.13-15).  I 
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examine the various motivations that subjects in Libet’s experiments may or may not hold, 
and assess how these motivations may influence the results of the experiment.  Ultimately, 
I argue that there is no reason to assume that motivational factors are not also determined 
outside of conscious awareness, and that Mele fails to re-establish the conscious will as 
holding causal functionality.   
 
Subjects within Libet’s experiments can have little motivation to flex their wrists, they 
only do so in order to comply with the guidelines of the experiment.  This is problematic 
for the psychologists Julius Kuhl and Sander L. Koole who argue that the subjects are 
merely responding to the will of those in charge of the experiment, rather than revealing 
anything about their own wills (Kuhl & Koole 2004, pp.419-420).  At no point during the 
process would it be more appropriate to flex the wrist than at any other, meaning that the 
time at which the wrist is flexed will be chosen randomly.  Mele compares this to choosing 
a jar of nuts in a shop (Mele 2014, pp.12-13).  If all the jars are identical, there can be no 
reason to choose one over another.  The decision of which one to take will thus be made 
randomly, and at an unconscious level.  We would most likely tell someone who asked 
why we chose a particular jar that we did not know, due to the unconscious way in which it 
was chosen.  Some decisions may be made unconsciously, but Mele argues that it is wrong 
to infer that all decisions are made unconsciously.  If there are reasons for us to prefer to 
perform certain actions and not others, Mele thinks it likely that the decision-making 
process would involve a greater level of conscious deliberation.  Without a reason to 
perform an action, there is no need for conscious deliberation.  As there was no reason for 
subjects to flex their wrists in Libet’s experiment, the experiment only reveals the 
unconscious thought processes occurring behind actions requiring little conscious 
deliberation.  In neuroscience, Roth also asserts that Libet’s results are only pertinent in 
regard to “short-range and pre-programmed movements” (Roth 2010, p.239).  Deliberation 
over an action would likely affect the results, as conscious thoughts influence the rising of 
the readiness potential, as Mele argued.  
 
Through the introduction of motivating factors, Mele is attempting to show how the 
conscious will can hold a causal function.  Mele and Libet are arguing for the truth of free 
will on the same basis.  Both agree that in order for us to have free will, we have to be 
capable of consciously choosing our actions, and that if all of our actions are 
unconsciously determined, we cannot have free will.  Mele, however, is not a libertarian 
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but a compatibilist.  For Mele, the truth of free will is dependent only on our ability to 
make rationally, informed decisions about our courses of action (Mele 2014, p.78).    
 
Mele’s argument is extended through the example of selecting seats on an airline (Mele 
2014, p.52-53).  As he has a conscious preference for extra legroom, Mele posits that he 
then consciously chooses the exit row seat.  Consciousness is thus posited as a functional 
stage in the process of causation.   However, there is no reason to assume that this 
conscious preference was not also unconsciously formed.  Again, Mele attempts to argue 
with the incompatibilist position on incompatibilist grounds; rather than argue against 
Libet from a compatibilist position, Mele accepts Libet’s basic premise that consciousness 
must be independent of previous neural activity if we are to have free will.  A Humean 
argument could be introduced here (this is explored further in 7.7); determinism is a 
necessary condition for free will, as without it, our actions would be subject only to 
chance.  The deterministic and unconscious origins of the will do not therefore undermine 
free will, but rather reveal the deterministic relation between the will and human action.  
So long as there is coherence between the will – once it is made conscious – and action, the 
will can be considered free.  Mele, however, does not make any such argument, but 
attempts to show that the conscious will can be the cause of human action.    
 
There is a problem with attempting to re-establish consciousness as a cause of action.  
Though Mele argues the conscious will does not have to be some kind of magical entity 
(Mele 2014, pp.85-86), existing apart from the rest of the self, in positing consciousness as 
a cause of action, Mele is reverting back to the idea that consciousness is a causa sui, 
independent of other neural processes.  If this is not the case, then Mele must concede that 
the conscious will has been shaped by prior neural processes, and we are left with the 
original problem posed by Libet.  There is little evidence to suggest that any kind of 
conscious intention works independently of other neural activity and somehow influences 
subsequent neural processes.  Though Roth argues that results would change if we 
measured actions requiring more pre-planning than the movements in Libet’s experiments 
– as deliberation would affect the ordering between conscious awareness and the readiness 
potential, with there being interaction between the two rather than a linear process – he 
also argues that processes of deliberation are outside of conscious control (Roth 2010, 
p.239).  The conscious will has no choice over the desires and emotions – generated 
largely unconsciously – influencing the deliberative process.  In arguing that the conscious 
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will can be considered a cause, Mele is falling back on a libertarian conception of free will, 
rather than making the compatibilist case. 
 
To conclude, another way of interpreting Libet’s data is to look at the internal motivational 
states that influence human action.  Human action is influenced by the motivating reasons 
that undergird it; in the absence of motivation, actions would be performed more or less 
randomly.  This is the case in Libet’s experiments, according to Mele.  During Libet’s 
experiment, it is never more appropriate to flex your wrist at one moment rather than 
another.  Hence the decision of when to flex will be made at random.  If we consider 
human action within a context in which motivating reasons are at play, then action comes 
to look radically different.  In making this case, however, Mele is once again attempting to 
establish consciousness as a cause of action.  There is little reason to suspect that 
motivating reasons offer some kind of independent form of causation.  At the internal 
level, motivations will most likely have neural causes, and at the external level, the reasons 
that motivate an agent are independent of the agent.  Neither offers better ground on which 
to argue for free will.   
  
7.5 The Absence of the Cartesian Theatre  
 
As stated previously, Libet’s work only affects a certain conception of free will.  This 
conception is both dualistic and libertarian; dualistic as it distinguishes the mind from the 
body, imagining that the mind as a separate entity must control the body, and libertarian as 
this entity must be independent of causal determinism.  Daniel Dennett calls this entity the 
“Cartesian theatre”.  The Cartesian theatre – named as such due to Descartes’ dualistic 
understanding of the mind and body – is a seat of consciousness from where human action 
can be controlled.  Perhaps, however, the mind is not a separate entity and there is no 
external point from which the mind controls the body.  Some such as Dennett argue that 
there is no Cartesian theatre and, furthermore, that no such entity is necessary for us to 
have free will.  In this section, I assess arguments for free will that do not depend on the 
existence of a Cartesian theatre, and argue that while libertarianism requires the existence 
of such a centre of consciousness, compatibilism does not.   
 
For Dennett, there is no seat of consciousness from where commands are issued (Dennett 
2003, pp.232-236).  Whereas Libet thought that our conscious awareness represented a 
significant temporal stage in the process between intention and action, Dennett sees 
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consciousness as being spread out across the entirety of the process, not contained within 
specific temporal moments.  There is not some kind of self existing outside of the rest of 
the process, watching over it as though it were a spectator in a theatre, and who acts as the 
ultimate arbiter of decision-making.  The individual is rather included in each part of the 
process.  In the example of a subject in Libet’s experiment, the individual is composed of 
the eyes, wrist, and brain, along with all of the interconnecting parts. 
 
For Libet’s work to have any bearing on the question of free will, we must accept the 
premise that the actual ‘you’ exists in some part of the brain.  This ‘you’ is ultimately 
responsible for all decisions.  Dennett suggests three possible places for this ‘you’ to exist: 
the faculty of practical reasoning, the vision centre, and the Cartesian theatre (Dennett 
2003, pp.232-236).1  If ‘you’ are in any one of these places, there will be a delay in the 
activity of the other regions being processed and the information sent to ‘you’.  In the 
faculty of practical reasoning, ‘you’ would have to wait for the activity of the vision centre 
to be completed, and vice versa if ‘you’ are in the vision centre.  Alternatively, ‘you’ could 
be in the Cartesian theatre, watching over the whole process.   
 
Dennett argues, however, that this Cartesian theatre does not exist; there is no place within 
the brain or mind that represents such a command centre for conscious thought, either 
spatially or temporally.  Consciousness is instead “broken up and distributed in space and 
time in the brain” (Dennett 2003, p.238).  This formulation of consciousness is largely in 
agreement with Roth’s interpretation of the empirical data.  Roth argues that the traditional 
view of the cerebral cortex as a command centre from which all directives are issued is 
mistaken (Roth 2003b, p.115).  For Dennett, we are not outside of the loop, our being is 
constituted by each part of the loop, and both our free will and moral agency are spread 
across the entirety of the process (Dennett 2003, p.242).  Free will, then, cannot be 
measured in instants of time, as in Libet’s experiment; for Dennett, it needs to be 
understood as a phenomenon that exists and develops across time.    
 
These arguments are consistent with Dennett’s compatibilism, as explicated in Elbow 
Room (1984).  Freedom, for Dennett, has an evolutionary aspect; it is something that 
develops as we learn from experiences.  Whether or not determinism is true, a human 
 
1 It should be noted that Libet did not think of his theory of mind as being Cartesian (Libet 2006, p.324).  For 
Libet, all neural functions are material; he did not posit that the veto function was an immaterial object 
existing outside of the brain itself.    
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action has consequences that extend beyond the act itself.  Thus, determinism should not 
deter us from considering the importance of our actions or lead to fatalism; we should not 
resign ourselves to our fates if we consider determinism to be true (Dennett 1984, pp.102-
107).  An agent in a deterministic universe is still able to hold desires and to work to 
realise these desires.  Without acting on plans, the agent could not realise any desires.  
Dennett proceeds to endorse Frankfurt’s arguments for compatibilism, arguing that we do 
not need alternative possibilities for our actions to be a result of free will (Dennett 1984, 
p.132).  Providing that there is coherence between intentions and actions, a person is acting 
according to her free will.  In any one temporal instant, there need not be alternative 
possibilities.  However, we must learn from experience; from our failures we can learn 
methods for improving our behaviour (Dennett 1984, pp.142-143).  Though there need not 
be alternative possibilities in one given moment, the potential of future alternative 
possibilities means that we are free to act in preparation for these alternatives.  This allows 
for us to possess free will even if determinism is true.2   
 
We do not, as Libet tacitly implied, need a break within deterministic laws, which the 
conscious will has control over.  Such a break is not possible – as there is no Cartesian 
theatre from which the break could be controlled – nor is it necessary.  If an agent is able to 
act in accord with her will, and, learning from experience, to act differently in the future, 
this is all that is necessary for her free will.  A conscious will sitting apart from the process, 
yet also controlling it, is not what constitutes free will for Dennett.  Rather than our bodies 
being controlled by a conscious will located within some kind of command centre, our will 
is instead spread across the body.  This is an interpretation of the empirical data in 
agreement with Roth’s assertion that the cerebral cortex is not the command centre of the 
human brain (Roth 2003b, p.115), and that functions allowing for decision-making are 
distributed across various regions of the brain.   
 
What was described by Libet as the readiness potential is thought by Roth to be preceded 
by activity in various regions of the motor cortex (Roth 2010, p.234).  The basic process 
between the brain and action leads from the motor cortex to the spinal cord, and from the 
spinal cord to the muscle necessary to move the body part.  “Willed” actions, however, 
involve activity in further neural regions.  The basal ganglia are of importance here, as they 
store memories of previous successful actions (Roth 2010, pp.235-236).  Alternative 
 
2 However, as I argue later, this does not grant us the level of control over our thought processes that Rawls 
requires for us to be rationally autonomous.       
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courses of action are inhibited by the basal ganglia so that the course of action most likely 
to succeed is selected.  Inhibition of alternatives is enabled by the release of dopamine.  It 
is the limbic system that has control over the release of dopamine, particularly the 
amygdala with its storage of emotion (Roth 2010, p.236).  These emotional memories 
inform the striatum – part of the basal ganglia – which then releases dopamine to allow for 
inhibition of some options and the excitation of another.  Only after this does the readiness 
potential arise.  A system of final checks is made between all of the aforementioned neural 
regions before the signal to act is sent from the motor cortex to the spine (Roth 2010, 
pp.236-237).  Within this process, Roth does not identify a centre of consciousness either 
watching over all the events or waiting to select a course of action via the veto function.  
Whereas the cerebral cortex was once thought of as such a centre of conscious thought, 
Roth disputes this; instead, the processes occurring across the brain relate to our experience 
of conscious awareness (Roth 2003b, p.115).    
 
However, Dennett does not resolve the problem of the origins of our intentions being 
beyond our conscious awareness.  This is not to say that this necessarily poses a problem 
for Dennett’s compatibilist position, though it does challenge the libertarian perspective on 
free will.  Libet claimed that while we are responsible for our actions, we are not 
responsible for our thoughts.  Whether we consider this a problem though depends partly 
on the conception of free will we endorse.  Compatibilists may not view this as a problem.  
This will be explored further in 7.7.     
 
There is, for Dennett, no Cartesian theatre from where decisions are made independently of 
other neural processes.  This conception of the brain and its workings is consistent with the 
empirical evidence.  Dennett’s argument here is strengthened through its reliance on 
compatibilism, rather than slipping between libertarianism and compatibilism, as Mele 
does.  Arguments for libertarian free will are difficult to reconcile with the empirical 
evidence at the neural level.   
 
Helen Steward, however, has argued for a libertarian conception of agency in which no 
Cartesian theatre is involved.  Steward argues that a conscious decision does not need to 
precede an action on her libertarian view of agency (Steward 2012, pp.43-49).  Bodily 
movements are subsequent to actions; our body moves because we act, we do not act 
because our body moves.  For an action that occurs over a certain temporal period to be 
considered free, there needs to be alternative possibilities throughout the 
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process.  Removing alternative possibilities at any point during the process would mean 
that the action lost its freedom.  Framed in this way, the agent is “constantly settling what 
happens from one moment to the next” (Steward 2012, p.46).  Even if the power to do so is 
not utilised, it is important that the agent is constantly able to alter the 
action.  Libet’s findings do not challenge this conception of agency, Steward argues, 
because on her view, actions must be free from beginning to end, rather than being 
initiated by a conscious will that triggers a deterministic course of action (Steward 2012, 
pp.46-47).  Actions are, then, processes rather than events.  The whole process must be 
free, and the conscious will’s involvement is simply one part of the process.  For 
Steward, Libet’s work does not challenge libertarianism.   
 
The evidence within neuroscience, however, suggests that the process is 
deterministic.  Though Steward may be right to argue her conception of agency is 
compatible with Libet’s findings, it coheres less with the subsequent work of Haggard and 
Roth.  In these works, neural processes are understood as working deterministically, 
whether or not determinism at the universal level is true.  Upon the evidence offered by 
Haggard and Roth, it is not that agents are able to settle what happens from one moment to 
the next, and that this is somehow indeterministic.  The conscious will may not trigger a 
deterministic course of action, but this does nothing to support Steward’s view.  Rather, 
neural processes are occurring in deterministic circuits.  Within the empirical data, there is 
nothing suggesting that neural processes are indeterminate in the way that Steward 
requires.       
 
From examining the empirical data offered by Roth, it can be ascertained that there is no 
Cartesian theatre; the cerebral cortex is not the centre of conscious awareness, as once 
thought, but various neural regions are linked with our experience of consciousness.   
Whether free will can exist without the Cartesian theatre depends on our formulation of 
free will.  Certainly, the libertarianism of Kane and Libet is dependent on some kind of 
Cartesian theatre.  Steward’s formulation of libertarianism, however, does not require a 
Cartesian theatre.  While Steward’s libertarianism is unthreatened by Libet’s result, it is 
more vulnerable to subsequent findings in neuroscience.  There are deterministic physical 
processes occurring in the brain.  None of these processes are subject to the kind of 
indeterminism that Steward requires.  Dennett shows, however, that compatibilism is not 
dependent on the existence of a Cartesian theatre.  All that is necessary for free will, for 
Dennett, is that we act on our own volitions, and through learning about the effectiveness 
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of our actions, open up new possibilities in the future.  While I argue this conception of 
free will coheres with the empirical data, it does not resolve the central problem revealed 
through the data: we lack control over our thoughts.  This is explored later in this chapter.     
 
In summary, Dennett’s response to Libet’s work can be explained through two key 
arguments.  Firstly, human actions are not uniform and monolithic, there are vast variations 
between different actions, and certain actions require differing levels of conscious 
involvement.  All Libet discovered, according to Dennett, is that actions requiring a good 
degree of conscious thought require a longer process in which the decision to act can be 
made.  Secondly, there is no Cartesian theatre which we inhabit.  Our consciousness is 
spread out across the human brain, and so we cannot look to a particular part of the brain in 
order to assess whether or not we have free will.  Dennett’s claims are coherent with the 
empirical data; Roth postulates that there is no command centre within the human brain.  
Instead, there are networks concerned with voluntary actions, and others relating to 
involuntary actions, with each part of a network being equally involved in the process.  
Only under compatibilism can free will be considered independent of a Cartesian theatre. 
 
7.6 Social Influences on the Constitution of the Will 
 
One way of responding to the challenge posed to free will by neuroscience is to look at the 
ways in which social influences inform the will.  Some argue that awareness of 
environment, which develops across time through learning from experience, is what leads 
us to develop free will.  Mele and Dennett, along with Cacioppo and Berntson, have all 
made this argument though in different ways.  Learning from our experiences, we open up 
possibilities of acting differently in the future.  This is an important aspect of the 
compatibilism of Mele and Dennett.  Alternatively, it can be argued that the strength of 
social influences further undermines the ability of an agent to act according to her own 
will.  I begin by assessing claims made in psychology regarding social influences on our 
intentions, before assessing claims made by Mele and Dennett.  I claim that, from a neural 
perspective, social factors cannot be viewed as favourable to arguments for free will.   
 
In psychology, Julius Kuhl and Sander L. Koole have criticised the setup of Libet’s 
experiments (Kuhl & Koole 2004, pp.419-420).  The command given to the participants – 
to flick their wrists at a self-chosen time – is already a limit to their personal freedom.  
Some participants are liable to mistake external commands for the internal will.  Kuhl and 
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Koole cite other experiments in which Kuhl was involved to support this claim (Baumann 
& Kuhl 2003; Kazén et al 2003).  Some people, termed here as “state-oriented”, suppress 
their own will in response to authoritative commands.  As Libet’s experiments do not 
account for the personalities of participants, it is difficult to know to what extent 
participants saw the action performed as resulting from their own will; it may be that 
participants saw the action as deriving from the will of those issuing the command.  Here, 
the focus of the argument shifts from constraints on the will to the origins of the will.    
 
Libet himself thought that the will had mysterious origins (Libet 1999, p.54).  While we 
could be held responsible for our actions, due to our conscious involvement in our choice 
of actions due to the veto function, the origin of the neural processes from which the will 
derives is difficult to locate.  Social neuroscientists trace our intentions back to our social 
world.  Cacioppo and Berntson argue our will is dependent on our sociability (Cacioppo & 
Berntson 2012).  While consciousness in a singular brain is epiphenomenal, when brains 
are socialised, consciousness becomes functional.  Through interrupting the neural patterns 
of others, we come to change their behaviour.  The will, as expressed through our 
consciousness, has then a social function.  In isolation, we would therefore not have free 
will, but on entering a social world, our consciousness becomes functional, further 
enabling the development of free will.  This view, however, is entirely speculative.  There 
is no empirical evidence to support a thesis on the origins of the will.          
 
Mele also views social influences as not undermining arguments for free will.  
Experiments such as the Stanford prison experiment and Stanley Milgram’s studies suggest 
that humans will inflict cruelty on others merely because they are told to, or because the 
environmental conditions are such that they feel compelled to (Mele 2014, pp.52-76).  This 
does not deny the free will of the participants, according to Mele.  It is true that, for the 
majority of time, individuals behave according to the expectations of a situation.  Thus, 
Mele writes that during the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001, the passengers 
complied with the hijackers because compliance is expected of passengers on a flight 
(Mele 2014, pp.62-63).  However, Mele claims that these attacks could not be repeated.  
Once people are aware of possible outcomes, their behaviour will change.  With the 
knowledge of what happened during those attacks, passengers would no longer comply 
with the hijackers.  This is shown partly, Mele argues, by the behaviour of passengers on 
United Airlines flight 93, who heard about the prior attacks, and attempted to regain 
158 
 
control from the hijackers (Mele 2014, p.65).  Education and awareness of an environment 
allow for the modification of behaviour, and allow for our free will, rather than deny it.   
 
Mele tacitly concedes, however, that the environmental circumstances did dictate the wills 
of the victims on the planes during the World Trade Centre attacks.  They were 
accustomed to an environment in which they were expected to obey the orders of the flight 
crew, and in the absence of these orders, they instead obeyed the orders of the hijackers.  
Their individual wills were thus environmentally determined.  Future passengers will have 
an awareness of these events, and will therefore disobey hijackers, according to Mele.  
Even if we accept the premise of this argument – that the passengers did not rebel against 
the hijackers due to their being accustomed to obedience, rather than, for example, their 
extreme fear of the terrorists – there is no reason to assume the wills of the imagined future 
passengers overthrowing their hijackers are not also environmentally formed.  Their 
awareness of previous experiences has led to the decision made.  Without this awareness, 
they would not be able to reach this decision.  In both cases, the wills of the agents are 
subject to the environment, and their awareness of previous experience.  Mele’s argument 
here is congruent with those of Cacioppo and Berntson, yet although social relations can 
affect and alter human behaviour, it is not the individual will that is altering the social 
environment but the social environment changing the individual will.  Incorporating social 
influences does not, then, advance Mele’s argument for free will.   
 
Dennett also argues that social and environmental factors enhance rather than threaten free 
will.  Alternative possibilities in temporal instants are not necessary conditions for free will 
for Dennett.  Instead, what is necessary is our ability to learn from experiences, opening up 
alternative possibilities in the future (Dennett 1984, pp.142-143).  According to these 
arguments, however, the first person to experience an event has less freedom than the 
second.  If particular knowledge is required to survive both event A and the subsequent 
event B, but the only way for this knowledge to be gained is through the occurrence of the 
event, those involved in event A have no chance of survival.  While those in event B can 
exercise their free will through the knowledge obtained from event A, those in event A 
have no such free will.  On this formulation of free will, those existing temporally prior to 
others yet experiencing the same situation have no free will.  However, subsequent 
participants in events could never be sure that the rules of the game are the same.  Though 
they may have more options available to them due to knowledge obtained from past 
experiences, they could not be certain of their success.  It is then difficult to state at what 
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point people are acting according to their free will, and when they are acting under 
conditions through which their free will is negated.  
 
To sum up, emphasising social influences does not bolster arguments for free will. Dennett 
and Mele both argue that, for the truth of free will, alternative possibilities are not 
necessary in single moments.  Instead, because we can learn from our experiences, we can 
allow for alternative possibilities in the future.  However, there is no single point at which 
we can, then, say that a person is definitely acting according to her free will.  The situation 
may not be exactly the same as previous situations.  We can thus not know at one point we 
consider someone to be acting according to her free will. 
 
7.7 Two Compatibilist Defences   
 
As has been seen, the empirical evidence challenges the libertarian conception of free will.  
Kane’s libertarianism, which demands Ultimate Responsibility, is undermined by the 
empirical evidence, as there is no uncaused cause within the brain; there is no point at 
which an agent could be said to have performed a self-forming action, as her actions were 
determined by prior neural activity.  Less demanding conceptions of libertarianism, such as 
posited by Libet, are also challenged; subsequent research in neuroscience has found that 
the veto function itself is a deterministic process. Thus far, there have been few reasons 
presented for re-evaluating the claims of compatibilism in response to neuroscience, other 
than the rejection of arguments for the importance of social influences in 7.6 (though these 
arguments cohere with both libertarianism and compatibilism).  In this section, I examine 
two compatibilist positions, those of Hume and Frankfurt.  I argue that Hume’s position on 
free will tells us only whether an act can be considered free at the external level.  This 
position on freedom does not speak to the internal neural aspects of the will, and whether 
we can speak of this will as being free.  Regarding Frankfurt, I argue that while it is 
plausible to argue for responsibility on the basis of our first and second-order desires 
cohering, this position does not resolve the issue that the origins of our thoughts are prior 
to conscious awareness.  Voluntariness, rather than freedom, I argue, is ultimately what 
Hume and Frankfurt are arguing for.  Whether or not Frankfurt’s argument for 
responsibility holds, the implications of neuroscience remain problematic.  While our 




At first sight, it does not appear that the claims of compatibilism are threatened by neural 
evidence.  Providing that an agent’s intentions align with her actions, the compatibilist can 
argue that her actions are free.  Hume went further; not only was free will compatible with 
determinism, determinism was a necessary condition of our free will.  I begin by 
addressing this claim and argue that it tells us only about the level of freedom in an 
external situation.   
 
For Hume, an indeterministic world would be one in which the individual had no control 
over her actions, as everything would be subject to chance.  Because of this, there could be 
no necessary connection between a person’s moral character and her actions (Hume 1748, 
p.65).  Determinism means that there can be complete uniformity between cause and 
effect; if the conditions pertaining to one cause are precisely the same as another, the same 
effect will be produced in both cases.  Individuals could thus know the results of their 
behaviour, and there would be a necessary connection between a person’s character and 
her behaviour.  Without this connection between character and behaviour, human action 
would be subject to chance rather than the individual will.  A universe in which all human 
actions – along with all other physical events – were the result of randomness would not 
allow for free will.  Determinism is, then, a prerequisite for free will, as in a deterministic 
universe, humans can control their behaviour with a level of certainty.  In a deterministic 
universe, the will can determine the action.       
 
Hume goes on to say that all that is required for an individual to be free is her 
unconstrained power to choose (Hume 1748, p.69).  An individual may choose to rest or to 
move.  In a deterministic world, we can be sure that when we choose to move, our body 
will perform the movement chosen, as there is uniformity between cause and effect.  The 
only cases in which a person’s actions can be considered unfree, Hume says, are when a 
person is physically constrained, such as a prisoner in chains (Hume 1748, p.69).  A person 
not restricted by chains is able to determine her own actions through her ability to choose.  
The absence of constraints allows for a necessary connection between the will and action. 
This is what defines freedom of the will.  
 
Suppose Hume was to respond to the concerns raised by Libet’s experiment.  Hume might 
say that the flick of the wrist was free because nothing prevented the participant from 
performing this action.  The timing of action in relation to neural processes and conscious 
awareness is irrelevant.  When the participant flicks his or her wrist, the necessary 
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connection between the will and the action is revealed, and hence the action can be 
considered free.   
 
There is both an internal and an external aspect to Hume’s view of freedom.  The internal 
aspect is the relation between the will and the act.  Determination of the act by the will is 
needed for an act to be an act of free will.  The external aspect is the lack of impediments 
to an act’s performance.  If nothing is externally preventing an act being performed, then it 
is an act of free will.  If something external compels the act, then it is not an act of free 
will.  On Hume’s view, the formation of the intention is unimportant.  It is not in the 
formation of our will that its freedom lies, but in its realisation, if external conditions allow 
for this realisation.  Libet thought that if all intentions to act were formed unconsciously, 
however, there could be no way of distinguishing between actions performed as the result 
of an epileptic fit, and actions performed as a result of agential volition.  Both would need 
to be considered free.   
 
Consider the following three actions: 
 
A. An action I desired to perform. 
B. An action I desired to perform but would have preferred to perform another action. 
C. An action I did not desire to perform but was not compelled to perform due to 
external conditions (for instance, actions resulting from an epileptic seizure or 
delirium). 
 
Action A can clearly be considered free on Hume’s view.  Action C does meet Hume’s 
criteria.  For an act to be an act of free will, it should reveal the necessary connection 
between the will and the action.  Action C does not reveal this connection; we should, 
therefore, not consider it an act of free will. 
 
Action B proves more difficult, however.  Imagine a prisoner who desires to read a book 
on the other side of her cell but would much prefer to leave her cell and go home.  The 
prisoner in chains can do neither.  We can say, then, that she does not act of her free will.  
The unchained prisoner, however, can go and read the book.  On Hume’s view, we could 
say that the prisoner acts of her free will, as nothing was preventing her from reading the 
book.  However, the act does not reveal her overriding will to leave the prison.  The 
unchained prisoner’s everyday acts in her cell never reveal this will.  Perhaps, then, we 
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should not consider either prisoner as acting of her free will.  On this view, Action B is not 
an act of free will, as it does not reveal the necessary connection between the will and the 
act. 
 
This view leads to incoherence, however.  If we perform an action, but would have 
preferred to perform another action, it can be argued we did not act according to our free 
will.  This captures many actions across our daily lives.  Employees going to work who 
would prefer to spend the day at home would be seen to act against their will.  Such people 
may not be physically restricted from choosing the alternative course of action, but the 
consequences of performing the action may be so severe as to act as a physical restraint 
(being unable to feed or house their children, for instance).  Dropping the condition that 
there must be a necessary connection between the will and the action forces us to say that 
Action C is an act of free will, however.  If we drop this condition, we stretch the 
definition of freedom to be so broad that it becomes meaningless.  If we keep the 
condition, freedom becomes so narrow that it captures very few of the actions we make in 
life.        
 
Considering any externally unrestricted act as being free, we are left unable to respond to 
complexities relating to the constitution of the internal will.  This is not the case with 
Frankfurt’s compatibilism.  Here, inner motivational states are of more importance than on 
Hume’s view.  For Frankfurt, it is not the availability of alternate possibilities that allows 
for our free will, but the human capacity to hold “second-order desires” (Frankfurt 1971, 
pp.6-7).  Generally speaking, humans do not merely act on instinct; rather, they hold 
certain immediate desires (first-order desires) while simultaneously holding a desire to 
hold – or not to hold – this desire (second-order desires).  Someone may want to eat a slice 
of cake, whilst also acknowledging that this desire conflicts with dietary plans.  The agent 
would then hold a desire not to desire to eat the cake.  Our ability to hold such desires 
allows for our free will, according to Frankfurt, as it enables us to subject our decisions to 
rational deliberation (Frankfurt 1971, p.14).  An agent who did not hold second-order 
desires would not be capable of acting according to her free will.  Frankfurt describes such 
an agent as a “wanton”; an agent who acts only on first-order desires (1971, p.11).           
 
Alternate possibilities are therefore not a necessary condition for our free will, for 
Frankfurt.  Providing we hold both first-order and second-order desires, and these desires 
cohere, we are free.  In Frankfurt’s essay ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral 
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Responsibility’, he establishes why alternate possibilities are not needed through the use of 
four examples (Frankfurt 1969).  In the fourth example, Jones has decided on a course of 
action, which Black is determined Jones will perform (Frankfurt 1969, pp.835-839).  Black 
decides that, should Jones decide against performing the action, he will intervene to force 
Jones to commit to the action, by hypnosis or a magical spell.  Coming to the time of the 
event, Jones does not stray from the course of action, meaning Black need not intervene.  
Frankfurt’s argument here is that we can still hold Jones responsible for his action.  
Though Jones had no alternative to act other than he did, his moral responsibility is not 
negated.  It can be said, then, that alternative possibilities are not a necessary condition of 
moral responsibility.  This is due to Frankfurt’s belief that free will – on which moral 
responsibility depends – is based on this relationship between desires, rather than the 
undetermined will.  As there is consistency between the first-order and second-order 
desires, Jones is acting of his free will, and can therefore hold moral responsibility.    
 
Earlier in the essay, Frankfurt uses another three examples (1969, pp.831-833).  In these 
examples, Jones intends to perform a task, and is then threatened into performing said task, 
which he proceeds to do anyway.  Jones performs the task in the first example because he 
has an unreasonable character; once he has decided on a course of action, he will stick to it 
regardless.  Here, Frankfurt argues Jones still holds responsibility for the action, as his 
prior intention still holds.  In the second example, Jones has a timid character and is 
profoundly affected by the threat.  He therefore commits the action because of the threat; 
his earlier intention to commit the action is no longer the cause of his action.  Frankfurt 
argues, then, that Jones does not hold moral responsibility in this case.  In the third 
example, Jones has a reasonable character and, though he is affected by the threat, he 
continues to deliberate over whether to carry out the action.  Jones decides that he will on 
the basis of his original intention rather than the threat, and therefore holds a degree of 
responsibility, according to Frankfurt.   
 
In examples one, three, and four, Jones can be said to hold moral responsibility as his first-
order desires are in accord with his second-order desires.  His desire to perform the action 
is a desire he desires to hold.  In the second example, Jones does not hold moral 
responsibility, as he no longer holds a desire to perform the action; he performs it only out 
of fear of the threat.  Nothing is undermining the freedom of the will if both the desire and 
action are determined, meaning alternate desires and actions are unavailable.  Frankfurt 
acknowledges that freedom comes easier to some than it does to others, and that those 
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beings – whether human or another kind of being – incapable of forming second-order 
desires cannot be considered to have free will (Frankfurt 1971, pp.14-17).  In this sense, 
we have no choice over whether we are free: some possess free will, some do not, while 
others struggle to achieve it.   
 
While Frankfurt is correct to view the alignment of second-order and first-order desires as 
allowing for responsibility, it is not necessarily constitutive of freedom.  To argue that it is 
constitutive of freedom forces us to accept a particular formulation of freedom.  Rather 
than consider this as freedom, we should, I argue, think of it as voluntariness.  There are 
two reasons for making this argument.  First, Serena Olsaretti argues that freedom and 
voluntariness are two different concepts, and that one does not imply the other (Olsaretti 
1998, p.53).  Freedom refers to the choices with which we are faced, while voluntariness 
relates to the choices we make.  In what follows, I do not endorse Olsaretti’s understanding 
of voluntariness, but acknowledge the distinction between the two is important.  Second, 
John Martin Fischer argues for a position he calls “semicompatibilism”.  This is the view 
that while compatibilism – following Frankfurt’s line of argument – demonstrates how we 
can be considered morally responsible for our acts, it does not adequately resolve the issue 
of freedom (Fischer 2007, pp.71-77).  Our position on freedom could likely lead to what 
Fischer refers to as a “dialectical stalemate”, as it is dependent on which definition of 
freedom we follow.  Either we demand that freedom depends on being able to do 
otherwise, or we accept that freedom is based on consistency between motives and acts.  
The tension between these two positions is irresolvable, according to Fischer.   
 
To return to the example of the unchained prisoner, we can say that she chooses to read the 
book voluntarily, but that this act is not expressive of her free will.  This claim is supported 
by the neural evidence.  When we perform a task we perceive as being voluntary, neural 
regions associated with voluntariness will be activated.  If a prisoner walks to the other 
side of her cell to pick up and read a book, we would expect to find that these neural 
regions would be activated, and she could report her act as being voluntary.  At both the 
phenomenal and empirical level, then, we can judge the act as being voluntary.  This is not 
to say that she stays in her cell reading of her free will, but that this act is nevertheless 
voluntary.  Olsaretti, in arguing against the rights-based definition of voluntariness, claims 
that we cannot consider a prisoner as staying in a cell voluntarily (Olsaretti 1998, p.59).  
On Olsaretti’s view, voluntariness is more demanding.  However, at the neural level, to 
claim that an act is voluntary is not to say that it is expressive of an agent’s will, as 
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understood through her overarching desires and motivations in life.  An act is voluntary if 
the agent feels it was voluntary and neural networks associated with voluntary action are 
active in its performance.  Considering such acts as being voluntary, though, does not 
commit us to also claiming they are acts of free will, as they are not necessarily expressive 
of the agent’s will.          
 
In the case of Jones, however, his act does reveal his will.  Accepting that Jones acts of his 
free will, though, forces us to commit to the compatibilist definition of freedom, as Fischer 
argues.  If instead we argue that Jones committed the act voluntarily, but not necessarily of 
his free will, we can still hold Jones responsible, without committing to either definition of 
freedom.  While we might hold Jones responsible if his behaviour can be seen to be 
voluntary, the deeper problem of his character requires separate consideration.  As Roth 
states, we have no choice over the neural activity influencing our acts in everyday life.  
Even when we deliberate, the neural processes influencing deliberation occur largely 
unconsciously (Roth 2010, p.239).  Though we can act voluntarily, we cannot freely and 
consciously choose the desires and motivations that inform our characters.  We can accept 
Frankfurt’s arguments for moral responsibility while still considering this a problem.  
Though we may be able to hold a person responsible for her acts if we accept this view, we 
cannot say that she has much ability to control her own thought processes.         
 
To sum up, the neural evidence should force us to reconsider some of the claims of 
compatibilism.  Hume’s conception of freedom tells us about external conditions, but little 
about the constitution of the internal will.  Any agent who is free of chains can be 
considered to be acting of her free will.  This conception of free will does not account for 
the various inner motivations we may hold.  Thus, our everyday voluntary actions would 
be considered free, whether or not they are in accord with our internal motivations.  
Frankfurt’s account of free will does, however, account for these inner motivations.  For 
Frankfurt, it is our second-order desires that enable us to act according to our free will.  As 
I argued, however, though we may hold people responsible for their voluntary actions on 
Frankfurt’s view – providing their first-order desires are in accord with their second-order 
desires – a problem is left unresolved.  We cannot formulate our own second-order desires.  
The neural processes involved in deliberation over actions occur outside of conscious 
control.  There is no way in which an agent can consciously formulate her own character or 
her own second-order desires, or control the way in which these aspects of her character 
influence the actions she chooses to make.  Whether or not we accept Frankfurt’s 
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formulation of moral responsibility, we can still accept that this inability poses a problem.  
Whatever our stance on free will and moral responsibility, there is little sense in which a 
person can be said to be in control of her own thoughts.     
 
7.8 Conclusion  
 
Libet thought his discovery – that the readiness potential preceded conscious awareness of 
the intention to act – challenged traditional notions of free will.  Libet did not argue against 
the truth of free will, however.  Instead, Libet thought that the veto function allowed for 
our free will.  Because we can veto the impulses toward action encoded in the readiness 
potential, we have conscious control over our bodily movements.  This allows for a 
conception of free will that is libertarian and dualistic: independent of deterministic laws 
and founded on a distinction between the mind and body. 
 
In philosophy, both Libet’s conception of free will and the assumptions made based on his 
experiments have been challenged.  Throughout this chapter, I have assessed the merits of 
these challenges.  Some, such as Mele’s arguments for the importance of motivations, fail 
to establish a more cogent interpretation of the data, as the basic premise of Libet’s 
argument is retained.  Mele attempts to show how our conscious motivations can have 
causal functionality.  For this argument to work, we would need to accept that 
consciousness is somehow independent of other causal laws.  None of the later empirical 
evidence within neuroscience supports this view.  In the work of Roth, Haggard, and 
others, the brain is viewed as working deterministically.  Neural regions communicate with 
one another via the transmission of action potentials, with no single region representing our 
experience of consciousness, or operating as a command centre that is independent of 
causation, issuing orders to the rest of the body.  Libertarianism becomes incoherent when 
assessed against understandings of neural activity.   
 
Dennett provides a more convincing interpretation of the neuroscience.  Upon Dennett’s 
view, there is no Cartesian theatre, a seat of consciousness from where action is controlled.  
Consciousness exists instead in processes across time.  Roth’s work supports this view; the 
cerebral cortex is not the command centre it was once portrayed to be.  Other neural 
regions interact with each other to create what is felt as a conscious experience by 
individuals, with each region playing a significant role.  While Dennett’s interpretation of 
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the data provides a plausible conception of consciousness, it does not, however, tell us 
much about freedom.   
 
There are several possible compatibilist responses here.  None of them, however, are 
entirely satisfactory.  Dennett’s own view – that we learn from experience, enabling 
alternate possibilities in the future – does not tell us at what point we are exercising our 
free will.  If free will evolves in the way Dennett supposes, agents temporally prior to other 
agents will always have less free will, though we could never be sure when an agent begins 
to exercise her free will.  On Hume’s argument, we learn little about the internal states of 
agents or the realisation of desires.  On a Frankfurtian account, though we learn more 
about the internal motivational states of agents, a problem remains.  We do not consciously 
formulate our own characters and desires.  We could accept this compatibilist account of 
free will and moral responsibility, while still seeing why this is problematic.   
 
There are, then, problems left unresolved in relation to how our will is formed.  We do not 
form our own characters, or our responses to external phenomena in full conscious control 
of the formation.  The level of control we have over our own thought processes is small.  If 
one accepts the compatibilist position, she may maintain a commitment to the truth of free 
will and moral responsibility.  The problem that we hold little conscious control over our 




Chapter 8 – Rational and Full Autonomy: Considering the Implications of 
Neuroscience  
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I assess the implications of the claim made in Chapter 7: we hold little 
conscious control over our thought processes.  In light of these implications, I argue the 
way in which Rawls posits individuals as becoming autonomous should be revised.   Our 
thoughts are formed by neural processes over which we have little control.  Even if we 
endorse compatibilism – which is not undermined by the empirical evidence in the way in 
which libertarianism is undermined – we should consider the lack of conscious control 
over thoughts a problem.  In a society containing many unreasonable ideas, we could not 
expect people to remain uninfluenced by these ideas.  Such ideas would hinder the 
prospects for these people to realise their autonomy in the way Rawls formulates it.     
 
If we lack conscious control over our thought processes, the way in which individuals are 
thought to realise their autonomy should be revised.  There are two forms of Rawlsian 
autonomy: rational autonomy and full autonomy.  Rational autonomy relates to our ability 
to realise a conception of the good, ensuring our life plans deriving from this good fit with 
those of others in a socially cooperative world.  Full autonomy relates to our political lives; 
to be a fully autonomous citizen, an individual must refer back to the principles of justice 
when engaged in political decision-making.  As noted in Chapter 3, without fully 
autonomous citizens, there is no one to realise the values underpinning Rawls’ theory of 
justice.  If we cannot rely on citizens to develop their autonomy when left to their own 
devices, we must seek others means through which to enable the development of full 
autonomy.  This requires us to take a different approach to the way in which citizens 
develop both their rational and full autonomy from that proposed by Rawls.         
 
Political liberalism is dependent on the existence of fully autonomous citizens who 
recognise the importance of the values embedded within liberalism.  Whether or not such 
citizens come into being is dependent on the ways in which their moral psychologies are 
developed.  Considering the implications of neuroscience should lead us to think about 
these processes of development.  Through such consideration, it should be recognised that 
the conditions that enable the development of full autonomy should be prioritised, rather 
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than prioritising certain legal rights and liberties.  The defence of such rights and liberties 
is dependent on citizens who are motivated to defend them.   
 
I return to the claim that we hold little control over our thoughts in 8.2, spelling out the 
implications.  We have, I argue, little control over our conception of the good if the claim 
is true.  Rational autonomy is assessed in 8.3.  I explore how the considerations following 
from the implications of neuroscience may alter the process of reflective equilibrium in the 
original position, forcing us to slightly revise how we consider rational autonomy.  
Following this, full autonomy is assessed against the data in neuroscience in 8.4.  Without 
fully autonomous citizens motivated to defend basic rights and liberties, political liberalism 
is left unstable.  Rather than leaving citizens to determine their own good, I argue we 
should ensure the development of full autonomy across society.  This has implications for 
the philosophical and religious doctrines existing within a society; many such doctrines 
may disagree with the implications drawn from the empirical data.  In 8.5, I note that the 
implications of neuroscience may conflict with certain philosophical and religious 
doctrines.  However, as I argued in Chapter 4, if people object to political conclusions 
reached in light of science, it must be their responsibility to offer a better explanation of 
the science.    
 
8.2 The Lack of Conscious Control   
 
If we hold little conscious control over our thoughts then, I argue, the way in which we 
form a conception of the good will largely be beyond our control.  In this section, I argue 
why this is the case: if we hold little conscious control over our thoughts, we also hold 
little control over our character development or the conception of the good we come to 
hold.   
   
According to Libet, we cannot be held responsible for our thoughts (1999).  It may be 
thought that, according to common-sense, we do not hold people responsible for their 
thoughts anyway.  Though we might be shocked to hear that a friend had thought about 
murder, providing this person did not act on her thoughts, we may not think much of it.  
Unwelcome thoughts often slip unbidden into our minds.  We do, however, hold people 
responsible for what derives from their thoughts.  If a person seems only to think of 
herself, we may consider this person selfish or egoistic, and seek to avoid her.  According 
to the implications of neuroscience, however, the selfish person had little control over the 
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formation of her character.  We may hold her responsible if her selfish acts overstep the 
bounds of what is considered reasonable behaviour – that is, we may alter our behaviour in 
response – but we cannot consider her as possessing the ability to alter the thought 
processes involved in the formation of her character.  There will be, then, implications that 
follow from a person’s acts and behaviour, as such acts and behaviour provide us with 
reasons for responding in certain ways.  However, we should not imagine that a person 
holds the capacity to alter her thoughts and character.  For the Rawlsian, we could not hold 
that the unreasonable person consciously determined her unreasonable character. 
 
As I argued in Chapter 7, while Frankfurtian moral responsibility holds at the level of 
action, it is not applicable at the level of thought.  At the level of thought, whether such 
consistency holds is essentially a matter of luck; that is, it is outside of human control.  
Whether one thought remains unchanged from moment to moment is due to the activity of 
different regions of the brain, with no ‘command centre’ from where this is controlled.  We 
can imagine a scenario in which a thought enters our conscious awareness due to the 
habitual workings of the basal ganglia, yet is altered by the triggering of a memory within 
the amygdala (see 6.2 for an explanation of these nuclei).  That this alteration took place is 
not due to agential control, but a matter of luck within neural activity, over which we have 
little control.  Frankfurtian moral responsibility requires more than this.  Within action, 
there are two clear aspects: the character and the act.  Within the relationship between the 
character and the act, there is a centre of agential control.  Central agential control can be 
attributed if there is consistency between both the character and the act, and the act can be 
said to be voluntary.  No such central agential control exists within thought processes.  The 
relationship between two neural processes is a matter of luck, given that there is nothing to 
control this relationship.       
 
Character primarily belongs, I argue, to the domain of thought.  If we hold little capacity to 
control our thought processes, it cannot be imagined that we have much control over the 
characters we come to hold.  Our characters are mentioned here only in relation to what is 
relevant to moral and political matters; I do not offer a full account of character formation 
or what it means to have a sense of self.  The sorts of thoughts we think and the ideals we 
hold are constitutive of our moral character.  From a neural perspective, we have little 
conscious control over how these thoughts and ideals influence our character formation.  
Though we may alter our initial ideals in response to external events, or the formation of 
new thoughts within the brain, we do not consciously formulate our responses to events or 
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the new thoughts that lead us to reject our original thoughts.  As we do not consciously 
initiate our own thought processes, we must assume that our thoughts develop through 
processes external to conscious awareness, and so the external environment and our 
internal genetics will have played a role in their formation.  The ideals and values that are 
dominant in a society will, therefore, influence the thoughts, and thus also the characters, 
of people living in that society in ways beyond the control of those people.   
 
Though I argue against this contention, it could be claimed that both thought and action 
influence character development, and that, therefore, we should view character 
development as being an equal product of each.1  For instance, a person who previously 
hated tennis may come to love tennis due to taking part in a game.  In this way, the act of 
playing tennis has played a part in this person’s character development.  While this is true, 
thought and emotion are crucial in this development.  Thought is always a necessary 
component in character development, whereas action is only supplementary.  Without a 
positive emotional reaction to the act, followed by a conscious awareness of this reaction, 
there could be no development: the act detached from thought could not lead to character 
development.  Whether we respond positively or negatively to an act is due to neural 
processes.  We cannot dictate such processes, and though someone with a particular strong 
aversion to tennis may still claim to hate the game, she could not have prevented herself 
from enjoying playing the game if her enjoyment resulted, for instance, from a sudden 
release of dopamine.  Or perhaps someone with a previous dislike of tennis wished she 
could change her opinion, and so, through what seems to her as an effort of will, begins to 
enjoy tennis.  Whether or not the effort of will succeeds is subject to the occurrences of 
future neural activity, something over which she has little control.  A sudden recollection 
of her previous dislike triggered by activity in the limbic system may cause her to abandon 
her efforts to change her opinion.  Our characters, consisting of our likes, dislikes, desires, 
fears, and many other aspects, are formed through our thoughts, and our reflections on 
experiences.  We have little conscious ability to shape these thoughts and reflections.  
Thus, while action may play a role in character development, it is supplementary to 
thought.  For this reason, I argue we should consider character as belonging primarily to 
the domain of thought, rather than action.         
 
 
1 This is why many argue for a moral education based on performing certain activities; it is the type of 
activities a child takes part in that enable her to develop the character she develops (see Nucci, Narvaez, 
and Krettenauer 2014).   
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What Rawls describes as our conceptions of the good can, I argue, be thought of as 
connected to our characters.  A person whose deep sense of Christian faith leads her to live 
a life devoted to charity will likely possess a character of which faith and altruism are 
important components.  We could imagine a person living a similar life, but rather than out 
of a sincere belief in the importance of faith and charity, she leads such a life to receive 
public acclaim.  Despite the insincerity involved in the second scenario, however, in both 
cases, the conception of the good follows from the person’s character.  Both accept 
conceptions of the good that are in keeping with their characters, whether sincere or not.  
The conception of the good, and the acts that follow from it, work to uphold the person’s 
sense of character.  While the first person’s conception of the good is living the life of a 
good Christian as she sees it, the second person’s conception of the good is living a life to 
receive public praise.  In the former case, acts of charity strengthen the person’s faith, 
while in the latter case, such acts work to enhance her chances of receiving acclaim.  The 
notion of a person living with a conception of the good entirely at odds with her character 
is incoherent.  Whatever the nature of the connection between these two concepts, it is an 
essential component in the development of a conception of the good.    
 
If we have little control over our thoughts, along with our characters, which we possess 
largely as a result of our thoughts, then neither can we be said to consciously control the 
way we formulate our conceptions of the good, which are intimately tied to our characters.  
The person with a deep sense of Christian faith will likely have lived a life in which she 
was moved by learning certain aspects of Christianity, or by some religious experiences.  
Her reaction to such experiences is not within her control, as was argued earlier.  
Alternatively, she may have never questioned the faith with which she was raised.  Again, 
she holds little control over this.  The fact that certain thought processes were never 
triggered is not something we can expect someone to alter.  Perhaps the world in which she 
lived never offered her experiences which challenged her beliefs, or perhaps her beliefs 
were so strongly embedded that no experiences would have altered her beliefs.  Either way, 
there is little control exercised over the conception of the good a person comes to hold.   
 
To conclude, there is no part of the brain that is detached from other parts, or that allows 
for decision-making that is independent of other neural events.  The path between our 
thoughts, intentions, and desires that leads towards action is deterministic.  The thoughts 
themselves are not subject to much conscious control as there is no regulative centre over 
the neural processes that form our thoughts.  The connections that persist between our 
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thoughts is largely due to luck – where luck is understood as what is beyond human 
agential control – as there is no centre of conscious control over these relationships.  Thus, 
the extent to which we are in control of the characters we become is limited.  As the 
conceptions of the good we hold will be, to a large degree, dependent on these characters, 
we also hold little control over the way in which we choose our conception of the good. 
 
8.3 Rational Autonomy and The Original Position   
 
In light of what was argued in the previous section – that we hold little conscious control to 
formulate a conception of the good – I argue here that we should revise how an individual 
becomes rationally autonomous.  Rational autonomy plays a specific role within the 
original position in relation to how we are to settle questions regarding human nature, 
conceptions of the good, and the plans of life people live in accordance with.  If parties 
consider the implications of neuroscience, the decisions reached in the original position 
would be altered.  Rather than assume the moral powers and self-respect to be an innate 
component of human psychology, parties would instead realise that the rational autonomy 
of those they represent is dependent on the conditions in which they live.  In particular 
historical moments – such as ones involving intense opposition between religious 
movements – the commitments entailed by Rawlsian moral psychology would be absurd.  
Looking instead to the empirical data offers a better basis on which to comment on human 
nature.  It should not be assumed that the individual possesses two moral powers.  Instead, 
if individuals are to develop the type of moral psychology necessary to support the values 
of political liberalism, this development needs to be fostered by society.   
 
Rawls admits that in certain historical periods, attaining an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable doctrines would be an impossible task (Rawls 2005, p.126).  This was true 
during the religious wars between Protestants and Catholics in the sixteenth century, to 
refer to Rawls’ example (2005, pp.148-149).  In such a time, it would be absurd to imagine 
that there could be common agreement on what is just, or that all parties would wish to 
seek fair terms of cooperation with one another.  What Rawls does not acknowledge, 
however, is that it would also be absurd to imagine that people in such a time would 
possess the necessary moral psychology that underpins political liberalism.  It could not be 
supposed that Catholics would wish to form a conception of the good that cohered with 
those of Protestants, or vice versa.  Neither would people possess any motivation to 




From the perspective of the original position, given that the veil of ignorance removes our 
knowledge of the way in which historical circumstances have affected the social world in 
which we live, parties could not be sure whether the citizens they represent live in such a 
time.  The realisation of justice as fairness, and with it, the securing of citizens’ interests, is 
dependent on people possessing the appropriate moral psychology.  Therefore, parties in 
the original position have an interest in securing the conditions necessary to allow for the 
development of this psychology.   
 
In part, Rawls’ conception of rational autonomy relates to the parties’ ability to achieve 
this.  Rational autonomy is, in essence, the ability to develop the moral powers, living a life 
in accordance with these powers.  Both citizens and their representatives are considered 
rationally autonomous (Rawls 2005, pp.72-77).  Parties are rationally autonomous on two 
conditions: first, they are able to decide on fair terms of cooperation, with no principles of 
justice previously determined to guide these decisions, and, second, they recognise that the 
citizens they represent have higher-order interests in realising their moral powers.  There 
are also two conditions for citizens to be considered rationally autonomous: they are able 
to pursue a conception of the good within the limits of political justice, and they desire to 
realise their moral powers.   
 
As the original position is a hypothetical situation, we can suppose that deliberations 
within are not subject to the limits of physical laws.  We should not, however, apply the 
same standard to citizens.  Thus, we can apply the implications of neuroscience when 
considering how citizens determine their rational autonomy, but not to parties in the 
original position.  Recognising, then, that the citizens they represent will be constrained by 
the implications of neuroscience, I now turn to examine how this might affect 
deliberations.   
 
William Simkulet (2013) argues that if hard determinism was considered to be true within 
the original position, we would come to radically different conclusions from those drawn 
by Rawls.  Here, I am not supposing the truth of hard determinism, but attempting to 
establish the implications of neuroscience.  We will consider these implications here as 
background theories within reflective equilibrium.  In trying to reach reflective equilibrium 
– a state in which, as explained in Chapter 4, principles cohere with judgements when 
assessed against one another (Rawls 1971, pp.48-51) – we will assess whether the 
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principles of justice, and the sorts of judgements we make in light of these principles, fit 
with the implications of neuroscience.   
 
As Richard Arneson notes, Rawls attempts not to establish distributive principles on the 
basis of desert, but without removing individual agency entirely from his account of justice 
(Arneson 2008, p.85).  Saul Smilansky has similarly noted that Rawls begins a hard 
determinist, but reaches compatibilist conclusions (Smilansky 2003, p.132).  That is, 
though we are not to distribute primary goods according to desert initially, Smilansky 
argues that after this is established, Rawls assumes people are morally responsible for what 
they do with their share of these goods.  Thus, citizens hold duties in relation to what they 
choose to do with their share of the primary goods.  As Rawls assumes that citizens 
possess a certain moral psychology, he imagines that citizens will be motivated to act in 
accordance with this conception of duty.  This is why self-respect is important for Rawls 
(1971, pp.440-446).  We increase our sense of self-respect through realising successful life 
plans that cohere with the type of cooperative society in which we live.  Someone who had 
no interest in realising such a plan of life, who thus had no desire to realise her moral 
powers, would not be a “full person”, according to Rawls (2005, pp.76-77).  Hence there is 
a motivational force behind self-respect.  It is because we possess this type of moral 
psychology that we desire to act responsibly.        
 
Given parties in the original position do not know what sort of historical circumstances 
citizens will live in, they could have no certainty that citizens possess this form of moral 
psychology.  They could not suppose that Protestants in the sixteenth century would 
increase their sense of self-respect through finding that their plans of life cohered with 
those of Catholics.  Parties in the original position would, then, need to be wary of the 
assumptions they made regarding moral psychology.  For this reason, rather than base our 
understanding of autonomy on assumptions regarding the type of moral psychology people 
possess, we should instead base any such understanding on empirical data.   
 
From the perspective of the original position, if parties are to secure the interests of those 
they represent, they have an interest in society being devised so as to inculcate the 
appropriate dispositions in citizens.  There are two reasons for this.  First, without these 
dispositions forming the basis of Rawlsian moral psychology, political liberalism is 
unrealisable.  Second, it is in the interests of citizens to possess such dispositions if they 
live in the type of society imagined by Rawls.  If they fail to develop such a moral 
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psychology, they will be at a significant disadvantage; others would not wish to cooperate 
with them, and their way of life would face constant obstacles.  However, it can neither be 
assumed that citizens naturally possess this form of moral psychology nor that they will be 
motivated to act responsibly.  If the implications of neuroscience are true, we hold little 
control over the development of our tastes.  Rawls expects us to keep our tastes within the 
confines of what we can reasonably expect our share of the primary goods to be (Rawls 
1982b).  The person who develops an unreasonable taste for expensive goods could do 
little to alter the development of this taste.  Rather than leave citizens to determine a 
conception of the good through their own capacity for reason, it should be recognised that 
a citizen left to her own devices cannot be guaranteed to develop her thoughts, character, 
tastes, and values in accord with the values of political liberalism.  Her conception of the 
good could, then, be at odds with the values of political liberalism.  Thus, parties would 
ensure that the basic structure of society was devised so as to motivate a person to develop 
a reasonable conception of the good, rather than assume citizens will be motivated to do so 
due to their innate moral psychology.  It cannot be assumed that a person will develop her 
rational autonomy in accordance with the values of political liberalism if left to her own 
devices.     
 
Rawls recognises that without the publicity condition being met, we could not expect 
citizens to act as fully autonomous citizens.  That is, without knowing what justice is, and 
what requirements it places on citizens, we could not assume citizens would act to realise 
justice (Rawls 2005, p.78).  However, citizens are expected to realise their rational 
autonomy under different conditions.  As citizens are to determine their own conceptions 
of the good, the structure of society could not influence the development of a person’s 
rational autonomy in the same way.  A particular conception of the good being embedded 
in the basic structure of society would undermine this task.  Thus, no one way of life could 
be encouraged at the expense of another.  Thus, though Rawls assumes that in a just 
society, citizens would be motivated to act as fully autonomous citizens, the life of a fully 
autonomous citizen – a politically engaged person who acts in accord with the principles of 
justice across her life – could not be promoted at the expense of other ways of life.  
However, if it is recognised that citizens hold little conscious control over their thoughts, it 
would also be understood that leaving a citizen to determine her own good entails great 
risk.  In a society containing many ideas that contradict the values of political liberalism, 




As argued in Chapter 3, justice as fairness requires fully autonomous citizens.  However, if 
people are to become fully autonomous citizens, their rational autonomy needs to develop 
in accordance with the demands of full autonomy.  Before realising their conception of the 
good, citizens must have developed a particular form of moral psychology.  If people hold 
little control over their thought processes, then we cannot expect people to necessarily 
develop their moral psychologies in the appropriate way.  When a doctrine is deeply 
embedded within a person’s sense of history, such as many religious doctrines, or when a 
doctrine appeals to certain aspects of a person’s self-interest, the doctrine may possess a 
strong motivational force.  For the realisation of justice as fairness, the motivational 
strength to endorse the principles of justice needs to outweigh that of other comprehensive 
doctrines.  If parties cannot rely on the innate moral psychology of citizens to fulfil this 
role, they will need to look for others means.  Rather than make assumptions about the 
state of moral psychology existing within a society, we should instead think about the way 
in which society affects how citizens develop their autonomy.  Thus, the appropriate mode 
of psychological development must be encouraged through the structure of society.  It 
cannot be assumed that citizens are rationally autonomous and will develop the necessary 
psychological commitments of their own accord.  These commitments must be fostered.       
 
To conclude, considering the implications of neuroscience within the original position 
leads to revised conclusions.  Rather than imagine citizens possess a moral psychology that 
enables them to become rationally autonomous, and that self-respect ensures that citizens 
are motivated to do so, parties in the original position will instead recognise that citizens 
have little control over the ways in which doctrines influence their thoughts.  We cannot 
depend on citizens possessing the form of moral psychology Rawls assumes them to 
possess.  Instead, the way in which society influences the development of a person’s 
autonomy should be reconsidered.  These influences should be structured in such a way to 
enable a person to become autonomous.     
 
8.4 The Realisation of Full Autonomy  
 
In this section, I provide a brief recapitulation of full autonomy, before examining how the 
implications of neuroscience should lead us to recognise how integral full autonomy is to 
political liberalism, yet how easily it is undermined.  Considering neuroscience within the 
original position forces us to think about how the development of our autonomy is 
influenced by society.  If citizens hold little conscious control over their thoughts, their 
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autonomy will be largely determined by external forces.  This being the case, society must 
be devised so as to ensure the development of fully autonomous citizens, without whom, 
political liberalism is unrealisable.  We cannot rely on citizens becoming autonomous 
through exercising their right to freedom of conscience.  If society is to be inhabited by 
fully autonomous citizens who uphold the principles of justice, the development of the 
necessary moral commitments must be the focus of the basic structure of society.  As 
Rawls recognises, it is only with the publicity condition being met – citizens recognising 
that the principles of justice are reflected in institutions across society – that a person could 
be considered fully autonomous.  This, I argue, is not enough to ensure a person becomes 
fully autonomous.  To ensure the development of full autonomy, the value of autonomy 
must be promoted across society; more is required than recognition and understanding.   
 
When a citizen is fully autonomous, she recognises that the principles of justice are just, 
complies with the principles, and acts from them (Rawls 2005, pp.77-81).  Rawls stresses 
that this is not autonomy as an ethical conception, as in Kant or Mill, where the promotion 
of autonomy determines other aspects of moral theory.  Instead, it is only applicable to the 
political realm.  When deciding matters in the political realm, the fully autonomous citizen 
looks to the principles of justice to determine what should be done.  Though full autonomy 
is grounded in our rational autonomy – our ability to form a conception of the good and 
realise our moral powers – whereas rational autonomy is applied to the original position, 
full autonomy is only realised outside of the original position.  It is not applicable to parties 
but to citizens.  To satisfy the conditions of full autonomy, the publicity condition must be 
met (Rawls 2005, p.78).  This means that justice as fairness and the obligations that derive 
from it are well-known.  They are embedded in public institutions and citizens are made 
aware of what justice as fairness demands of them.  From this level of awareness, citizens 
are able to act to realise full autonomy in their political lives.      
 
If the implications of neuroscience are considered, it will be recognised that full autonomy 
is more vulnerable than Rawls imagines.  There are two problems here.  First, as noted in 
8.3, Rawls assumes citizens possess a certain moral psychology.  It is because they possess 
such a moral psychology that they are motivated to act as fully autonomous citizens.  
Second, Rawls imagines citizens have intellectual powers that enable them to exercise their 
right to freedom of conscience.  Though Rawls does not state this explicitly, as citizens are 
motivated to act as fully autonomous citizens (Rawls 2005, p.78), we can rely on citizens 
to overcome the influence of ideas that contradict justice as fairness.  When doctrines are 
179 
 
presented within the public culture – political libertarianism, religious fundamentalism, or 
racist ideas that reject the basis of moral equality, for example – the fully autonomous 
citizen rejects these doctrines, as with the publicity condition being met, she recognises 
that it is in her interest to do so.  Thus, though Rawls does not put it in these terms, if a 
citizen is motivated to act in accordance with the principles of justice, she will reject 
doctrines that do not cohere with the principles.     
 
As I have argued, we should not make these assumptions.  Instead, if citizens are to behave 
in this way – acting to support the principles of justice and uphold the constitution – the 
structure of society needs to be devised to motivate people to do so.  Rawls appears to 
assume that recognition and understanding of the principles of justice is sufficient to 
ensure a commitment to them.  However, if citizens have little control over their thought 
processes, a deeper commitment to the principles is needed; that is, an internal motivation 
to endorse the principles of justice, not just an acceptance of the rules stemming from a 
understanding of the benefits they produce.  Without such a commitment, citizens may be 
influenced to act against the principles of justice by alternative doctrines.  If citizens were 
in full conscious control of their thoughts, then it could be imagined that citizens would 
possess the intellectual capacities to reject opposing ideas.  Even without a deep 
commitment to the principles of justice, recognising that they advance our own interests 
may be enough for us to remain supportive of the principles.   
 
However, in light of the implications of neuroscience, it cannot be assumed that citizens 
will commit to the principles of justice only through recognition and understanding.  
People lack the ability to consciously control their thought processes, and we cannot 
assume that the majority of citizens will not be persuaded by doctrines at odds with 
political liberalism.  Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 3, reason is secondary to emotion 
in determining our sense of morality.  This being the case, if we are to ensure citizens are 
committed to the principles of justice and act as fully autonomous citizens, it should be 
ensured that a person’s emotional commitments cohere with the Rawlsian sense of justice.   
 
In this way, considering the implications of neuroscience leads to a better means through 
which to realise full autonomy than does Rawls’ conception of publicity.  Instead of 
assuming the possession of a particular conception of moral psychology, through instilling 
the appropriate moral sentiments in people through the basic structure of society, we 
increase the likelihood of people becoming fully autonomous.  Neural activity being 
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deterministic, a person with a prior deep commitment to the principles of justice is unlikely 
to be persuaded otherwise.   
 
However, it could be argued that ensuring the development of fully autonomous citizens 
undermines freedom of conscience.2  The basic liberties are granted lexical priority 
throughout Rawls’ work.  However, there is a tension here between this protection of the 
basic liberties, and the type of person Rawls wishes to inhabit the well-ordered society he 
envisages.  As Frankfurt thought that a person who had no second-order desires could be 
described as a “wanton” (Frankfurt 1971, p.11), as such a person would act only on first-
order instincts, possessing no secondary desires regarding the desirability of these instincts, 
Rawls similarly argues that a person without a wish to develop her moral powers would 
not be a “full person” (Rawls 2005, p.77).  In order to realise our full human potential, for 
Rawls, as for Frankfurt, we must be motivated not only to act on instinct, but to possess a 
certain moral psychology, which we desire to develop in order to understand and act from 
principles which we consider to be right and good.  People who do not desire to use the 
freedom granted to them by the rights and liberties in their possession are, for Rawls, not 
developing their true human nature.  Once we possess legal rights and liberties, we must, 
Rawls posits, think and act in certain ways relative to our moral psychology if we are to 
become “full persons”.  The rights and liberties alone are not, however, sufficient to 
guarantee people will wish to become such persons.    
 
The basic liberties are, then, primarily of importance insofar as they allow for the 
realisation of full autonomy; outside of this relatively narrow scope, the basic liberties can 
be a threat rather than a benefit to the realisation of a well-ordered society.  Rather than 
prioritise the basic liberties, which do not necessarily guarantee the development of full 
autonomy, we should instead prioritise the means that allow for autonomy’s realisation: 
moral education, publicity, and the material resources that enable a person to become fully 
autonomous.  This is not to say that such citizens will not care about basic liberties.  
Instead, it is to say that if we are to live in a society in which people care about liberal 
values, we must ensure society is structured so as to enable people to become fully 
autonomous.   
 
 
2 See Andrew Murphy’s article ‘Rawls and a Shrinking Liberty of Conscience’ (1998).  Murphy argues that 
while Rawls considered political liberalism to be an extension of liberty of conscience, it is instead a retreat 
from this liberty.   
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This leads us to reassess the importance of freedom.  Rawls claimed that, among people 
living in modern societies, there was a general preference for freedom over other values 
(Rawls 1971, p.28).  People would not be willing to trade their freedom to live in a more 
egalitarian society, according to Rawls.  However, none of the values Rawls considers 
important would be realisable without individuals motivated to realise them.  Under a 
scheme of legal rights and liberties which protected the negative liberty of the individual, 
but did not necessarily motivate the individual to accept liberal values, we could not expect 
to find such motivations in individuals.  If people have little conscious control over their 
thoughts, we should question the priority of Rawls’ first principle of justice.  The scheme 
of liberties this principle offers would lead to a society of rationally and fully autonomous 
individuals only under certain other conditions.  It is these conditions we should prioritise.   
 
8.5 Neuroscience and the Plurality of Doctrines  
 
Opening up the scheme of political liberalism to the consideration of science and 
metaphysics leads us to the risk of conflict between competing doctrines.  If we demand 
that constitutional matters be subject to the limits of scientific knowledge, some may worry 
that such knowledge conflicts with how they perceive the good, or their account of truth.  
Perspectives on the question of free will found within religious doctrines may not cohere 
with the empirical evidence.  People of faith may worry that the implications of 
neuroscience are supportive of other doctrines over their own.  However, neuroscience and 
its implications do not necessarily conflict with differing reasonable doctrines.  It is 
possible that most comprehensive doctrines could accommodate these implications without 
having to revaluate other aspects of the doctrine. Nevertheless, those whose faith is 
premised on metaphysical libertarianism may be concerned by the implications of 
neuroscience, as their faith does not accommodate certain empirical accounts of human 
nature.  Such people may object to the political conclusions premised on the empirical 
data, or wish to propose alternative conclusions.  I argue that if such conflicts arise, it is for 
those whose doctrines conflict with scientific knowledge to show either that the scientific 
knowledge is wrong, or that their interpretation of the knowledge is the more accurate 
account.  Following this, I explore a problem I claim is more troubling: ensuring the 
development of full autonomy reduces a person’s motivation to accept other doctrines.  If a 
society was structured so as to ensure the development of fully autonomous citizens, those 
with religious faith may worry that there is nothing within the basic structure of society to 




While it seems unlikely a modern society could be deeply divided by the perspectives 
people took on the question of free will – the doctrinal conflicts in modern societies tend 
not to be premised directly on the metaphysics of free will – there are positions on free will 
within religious doctrines.  Christian theologians such as Saint Augustine recognised a 
similar problem in Christianity to that of the tension between free will and determinism; 
how to reconcile free will and moral responsibility with divine omniscience and 
predestination (Augustine 1950, pp.152-156).  Only beings before the fall from grace, for 
Augustine, possessed the capacity for unhindered free choice, Adam and Satan both freely 
choosing to sin (Augustine 1887; Rist 1969, p.433).  Freedom consists only in the freedom 
to sin; when we act in accordance with the good, we do so due to divine intervention.  It is, 
then, through God that we are able to act from the good.  From the perspective of 
metaphysical libertarianism, Augustine grants us little room for free will, as our ability to 
do otherwise is dependent on God’s will.   
 
Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, is an incompatibilist, according to Robert Kane, 
influenced here by Eleonore Stump (Stump 1996, p.75; Kane 2000).  The will, for 
Aquinas, is the primary mover, according to Stump (Aquinas 1947; Stump 1997, pp.578-
579).  Though the will receives advice from the intellect, the intellect, while it can 
influence the will, does not perform the executive role during decision-making.  The will, 
receiving information on the external environment, and advice as to the best course of 
action given the conditions, is responsible for determining its own constitution.  Though 
the intellect is influential in this process, the will is also in control of the intellect.  The will 
wills toward certain objects and not others; it can also will itself.  In this sense, the will, 
acting as the primary mover of all other aspects of the human body and psyche, is free.  
Against Aquinas, Martin Luther held that the will was not free (Luther 1525).  Luther’s 
view is closer to Augustine’s, though while Augustine still regarded the will as necessarily 
being free, Luther considers predestination and free will incompatible.  For Luther, 
salvation came through Christ, not through the individual’s capacity to choose salvation for 
herself.   
 
Perspectives on free will are similarly divided in other religions.  William Watt (1946) 
writes that it has been commonly believed that Christianity allows for free will while Islam 
insists on predestination, but that this view underplays the complexity of the issue within 
each religion.  As there are stark differences between the Augustinian, Thomist, and 
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Lutheran accounts of free will, there are similar differences between different schools of 
Islam on the matter of free will.  Other scholars of Islam, such as Radwan A. Masmoudi 
(2003), stress the importance of free choice within Islam.  Masmoudi posits that, according 
to the Qur’an, religion cannot be forced upon a person; a person must come to believe 
through their own free choice.3  
 
While this is not an exhaustive account of the perspectives on free will within religious 
thought, it does demonstrate the diversity of beliefs on the matter.  As metaphysicians are 
divided between various accounts of libertarianism, compatibilism, and hard determinism, 
theologians are divided between belief in predestination, and belief in individual 
responsibility and the freedom of the will.   
 
A concern here could be that consideration of the implications of neuroscience within 
political liberalism could be viewed as favouring aspects of certain doctrines over others; 
those of a religious faith may object to the political conclusions reached.  For instance, a 
Thomist may claim that the implications of neuroscience lead us to reject Aquinas’ 
formulation of the will and favour instead the Lutheran account, as the latter is premised on 
determinism, while the former is libertarian.  Likewise, a liberal Muslim may view the 
implications of neuroscience as opposing liberal Islam and being more accommodating of 
the fatalistic teachings of some Islamic scholars.  Interestingly, the danger here is of liberal 
Islam being incompatible with the scientific knowledge considered within political 
liberalism.  It would appear to be unlikely, however, that those theologians who object to 
such liberal perspectives on religious matters would view the implications of neuroscience 
as favourable to their own doctrines in a politically liberal state.  I now explain how 
consideration of the implications of neuroscience should not necessarily lead to further 
conflict between religious doctrines, and a solution for where conflict does arise.     
 
This problem is most pronounced for a position such as the Thomist position, which is 
dependent on libertarianism; we are free, according to Aquinas, as the will determines 
itself, and is not formed by prior causes.   If we are to demand that public reason be subject 
to the limits of scientific knowledge, however, the burden of proof is on those of religious 
faith to show how their doctrines are scientifically plausible, if they wish constitutional 
matters to be decided through appeal to the tenets of their doctrines.  A Thomist who 
 
3 Amartya Sen also notes the importance of freedom for Buddhism (Sen 1999, p.234).   
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wished constitutional matters to be premised on the truth of metaphysical libertarianism 
would need to prove why it is reasonable to assume determinism is false.  In the face of the 
evidence within neuroscience, this seems an arduous task.  Though if we are to accept that 
constitutional matters are to be subject to our most accurate accounts of scientific 
knowledge, this is the only way in which the issue can be resolved.  This is not to say that 
we must reject such doctrines, however.  We need not use the power of the state to censor 
the views of metaphysical libertarians, for instance, or to prevent people from promoting 
libertarianism.  
 
Those religious doctrines that reject the truth of free will, such as Lutheranism, certain 
readings of Augustine, or those in Islam who reject free will in favour of predestination, 
may be led to one of two positions on political matters.  They may, as those Watt describes 
who shunned medicine (Watt 1946), wish to avoid all human intervention, in which case 
whether or not someone accepts the faith is a matter for God, not humans.  On this view, 
there is, then, no need for political action to enforce faith as it is not for humans to do so.  
There is no reason why such a position cannot be accommodated within political 
liberalism, providing that a person who follows such a faith is willing to support and obey 
the principles of justice.  This sort of doctrine does not attempt to use state power to 
prevent the acceptance of alternative doctrines, and could therefore be described as 
reasonable.  On the other hand, a believer in predestination may believe in the necessity of 
the state enforcing a religious doctrine, as do those whom Masmoudi argues against.  As 
acceptance of faith cannot be reached through a person’s capacity for choice, faith must be 
forced upon a person.  This, however, is an unreasonable doctrine.  Such a doctrine is 
premised on the use of state power to enforce a comprehensive doctrine across society; 
reasonable people are thus not able to follow their own reasonable doctrines, as the 
acceptance of this unreasonable doctrine is forced upon them.  The position on free will 
within such a doctrine is thus irrelevant, and its promotion should be discouraged within a 
politically liberal state.  Therefore, the positions taken on free will within religious 
doctrines do not necessarily conflict with the implications of neuroscience, and where they 
do, it must be the responsibility of those whose doctrines conflict with our understanding 
of scientific knowledge to show that either such knowledge is mistaken, or that theirs is the 
better interpretation.      
                     
A worry of those with religious faith, however, may be that promoting autonomy may 
reduce motivation to accept faith.  As the basic structure of society is to be formulated so 
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as to promote full autonomy, there is, then, nothing within the structure of society to 
motivate a person to endorse another doctrine.  An education system, devised so as to 
ensure future citizens leave it with an understanding of what autonomy is and how to 
realise it, would not allow for a child to be motivated towards accepting any one doctrine, 
other than that of justice as fairness.  Rawls thought that this problem was regrettable, but 
that the importance of endorsing justice as fairness must outweigh that of support for other 
doctrines (Rawls 2005, p.200).  As Andrew Murphy notes, while Rawls claimed political 
liberalism would allow for the completion and extension of liberty of conscience (Rawls 
2005, p.154), political liberalism actually represents a retreat from liberty of conscience 
(Murphy 1998).  The use of public reason means that the religious fundamentalist must 
either reject or revise her own beliefs to engage in political deliberation.  If we demand a 
commitment to the development of full autonomy, there is a further retreat from liberty of 
conscience.  The influence of alternative doctrines on a person’s psychological 
development must be restricted is she is to become fully autonomous.   
  
Accepting the implications of neuroscience exacerbates the problem.  If we are to accept 
that a person’s thoughts are shaped by her environment, that she lacks control over them, 
and that we must therefore ensure her environment inculcates a motivation in her to 
endorse justice as fairness, we must also recognise that she is unlikely to be motivated to 
endorse other doctrines unless she comes to be influenced by them.  While she may be 
influenced by her family’s belief in such a doctrine, if all of the institutions of society are 
designed to promote full autonomy, and to ensure the publicity condition is met, her only 
encounters with such doctrines will be through her family and within the private sphere.  
Over time, it seems unlikely that people will continue to endorse doctrines that are not 
encouraged within the public sphere.  There will be fewer opportunities for people to come 
encounter alternative doctrines if society is devised to promote full autonomy, and fully 
autonomous citizens will have less reason to seek out alternative doctrines.  If a person 
realises that over time, her children may become less likely to accept her own faith, as they 
accept justice as fairness as the primary moral doctrine, she may be less inclined to endorse 
justice as fairness herself.  This problem seems to be intractable; while Rawls saw it as a 
likely but regrettable outcome (Rawls 2005, p.200), if the implications of neuroscience are 





To conclude, where conflicts arise between science and faith in matters relating to 
constitutional essentials, and those of faith wish to appeal to their doctrines in support of 
their political proposals, it must be the responsibility of those with faith to show how their 
doctrines can either accommodate scientific knowledge or provide a better interpretation of 
this knowledge.  What may be of more concern to the person of religious faith – if they 
accept the implications of neuroscience – is society being structured so as to allow for the 
realisation of full autonomy.  This could undermine the motivation of a person to endorse 
alternative doctrines.  As has been discussed, Rawls recognised this problem and saw it as 
regrettable.  With the structure of society devised towards the end of autonomy rather than 
freedom – where freedom is concerned only with the protection of rights and liberties – 
this problem is heightened.  Accepting that we hold little conscious control over our 
thoughts, and, therefore, the necessity of ensuring the development of full autonomy, our 
hopes of preserving a plurality of reasonable doctrines within modern society may be 
dashed.  In the following chapters, I argue why this should not necessarily be viewed as an 
undesirable approach to liberalism.   
 
8.6 Conclusion  
 
Rational and full autonomy are not necessarily undermined by the implications of 
neuroscience.  However, the consideration of neuroscience within political liberalism does 
lead us to revise how we think about autonomy.  According to the data within 
neuroscience, we lack the ability to consciously control our own thought processes.  It 
cannot be assumed that a person left to her own devices will necessarily develop to be fully 
autonomous, or reject unreasonable ideas, without a prior commitment to justice as 
fairness.  Rather than placing the onus on the person to regulate her own thoughts in accord 
with the principles of justice, it will be recognised that there is a responsibility on us all to 
ensure a society contains reasonable ideas, and that our characters develop under the 
influence of what is just.  
 
Allowing parties in the original position to consider the implications of neuroscience 
should lead them to revise how they conceive of the autonomy of those they represent.  
This autonomy, and the self-respect on which it is based, are dependent on certain 
historical conditions.  As parties cannot be sure that these historical conditions exist for 
citizens, they replace their understanding of self-respect with an assessment of the 
neuroscientific data.  According to the implications of this data, it is recognised that 
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autonomy will only develop if society is devised so as to allow for its development.  
Moreover, without rationally and fully autonomous citizens, the implementation of 
political liberalism is impossible.  If the stability of a well-ordered society is to be 
maintained, there must be citizens who are motivated to uphold the values undergirding 
such a society.  Devising society so as to prioritise the development of autonomy would 





Chapter 9 – What this Means for Political Liberalism  
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
In Chapter 7, I argued that we have little control over our thoughts.  Our thought processes 
and the values we hold are largely the result of processes beyond our control.  Then, in 
Chapter 8, I argued that this should lead us to revise how we think about autonomy within 
political liberalism.  We cannot assume that citizens left to their own capacity for free 
choice will necessarily become fully autonomous.  Their conceptions of the good likely 
being influenced by the environment in which they live, and there being no undetermined 
space from where they can assess and revise such a conception, means their capacity for 
rational autonomy – the ability to formulate a conception of the good and live a life in 
accordance – may undermine the development of their full autonomy – the ability to act in 
accordance with the principles of justice.  Their determining of their good may conflict 
with their ability to realise their sense of justice.  The person who does not realise the 
appropriate sense of justice cannot be considered fully autonomous.  Rather than assume 
that citizens will act as rationally and fully autonomous agents, we should instead devise 
the basic structure of society to ensure the development of full autonomy.  Without 
autonomous citizens – people who are motivated to uphold and act in accordance with the 
principles of justice – political liberalism would not be possible.  Thus, from the 
perspective of the original position, parties, knowing that citizens have little control over 
their own thought processes, would be compelled to grant priority to the development of 
autonomy; our thoughts should be guided towards the realisation of autonomy.    
 
In this chapter, I assess what this means for the wider scheme of political liberalism.  The 
basic tenets of Rawls’ political liberalism – a well-ordered society regulated by the 
principles of justice – are not necessarily undermined by the argument.  Instead, I argue 
that the opposition between political liberalism and perfectionism should be reconsidered.  
For the existence of any well-ordered society, a degree of perfectionism is necessary.  As 
we cannot assume that citizens left to their own devices will necessarily become fully 
autonomous, and the stability of the well-ordered society is dependent on fully autonomous 
citizens, society should be devised so as to prioritise the development of autonomy.  This 
means that, in certain cases, perfectionism will be justified.  I assess where perfectionism is 
justified here, arguing in favour of a perfectionist approach to moral education.  As I 
argued in Chapters 7 and 8, we hold little conscious control over our thoughts.  Due to this, 
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a perfectionist approach is sometimes necessitated if we are to develop the just society 
Rawls imagines.      
   
To begin, the problem of unreasonableness is addressed.  In 9.2, I argue that proponents of 
political liberalism, such as Jonathan Quong, underestimate the problem of unreasonable 
citizens.  Quong argues that political liberalism defends the individual against a 
paternalistic state, which would be the necessary consequence of liberal perfectionism.  
Against this, in 9.3, I argue that concerns about paternalism are exaggerated.  Without any 
aspects of paternalism within society, we could not guarantee the existence of autonomous 
citizens, without whom any kind of liberalism is impossible.  In 9.4, I assess the problems 
of this within education.  I argue against traditional interpretations of how political 
liberalism should approach education, on which all that is required is the publicity 
condition; that children should recognise what the requirements of their role as a citizen.  
Instead, a deeper moral commitment to fairness is needed.  There is a need, then, to inspire 
a motivation in citizens to act in accord with the principles of justice.  To this end, rather 
than act paternalistically against an adult population, I argue in 9.5 that the moral education 
of children should be premised on perfectionism.  Thus, when a child reaches adulthood, 
she should be motivated to develop into a fully autonomous citizen.     
 
9.2 Unreasonableness  
 
Defending political liberalism, Jonathan Quong argues that the unreasonable citizen does 
not pose a threat to the stability of political liberalism.  Arguing that Quong is mistaken, I 
claim that unreasonableness is pervasive in modern societies.  Rather than being confined 
to a small minority of citizens, the problem of unreasonableness applies to many citizens.  
If, as I argued in Chapters 7 and 8, people hold little conscious control over their thought 
processes, which are largely determined by the environments in which they live, unless we 
focus on establishing the appropriate moral sentiments in people, they may come to hold 
unreasonable beliefs.  The citizen who is fully autonomous – who acts from the principles 
of justice, being motivated to do so – however, is not likely to be influenced by such 
unreasonable ideas.  Thus, there is further reason to prioritise the development of 
autonomy over other values.   
 
To begin, I offer a brief recapitulation of what Rawls means by reasonableness.  There are 
two basic aspects of reasonableness: proposing fair terms of cooperation and a willingness 
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to recognise the burdens of judgement, the problem that people will often disagree on 
matters of the truth and the good (Rawls 2005, p.54).  A reasonable citizen is, then, a 
person who other reasonable people would agree to cooperate with as she does not propose 
terms of cooperation that would harm their interests, nor does she demand others consider 
her judgements as correct.  One important part of being reasonable is that the reasonable 
person would not wish to use state power to impose their doctrine on the rest of society, 
suppressing other reasonable doctrines (Rawls 2005, pp.60-61).  Thus, the reasonable 
Hindu respects the reasonable doctrines of others, and while she disagrees with people who 
are not Hindus, she does not desire a Hindu state.  A Nazi is therefore unreasonable as the 
Nazi desires to impose an unreasonable doctrine – a doctrine that is unfair and one parties 
in the original position would not agree on as a basis for cooperation – on the rest of 
society, suppressing reasonable doctrines.  
 
In what follows, I argue that this latter part of reasonableness – the lack of a want to 
impose an unreasonable doctrine on the rest of society – has been overstated by advocates 
of political liberalism, while the former aspect of unreasonableness – a willingness to 
propose fair terms of cooperation – has been overlooked.  Many people live their lives on 
terms that many others would not agree as a fair basis of cooperation.  In their descriptions 
of unreasonableness, political liberals focus on whether the aim of a person is to capture 
the power of the state, but fail to look at whether a person lives according to fair terms of 
cooperation.  Not all unreasonable people are Nazis, or adherents of other such extreme 
beliefs.  A person may be generally reasonable but engage in activities or endorse beliefs 
that erode the sense of fair cooperation existing within a society, and, in doing so, 
undermine the rational or full autonomy of others (examples of this are provided below).        
 
Adherents of political liberalism often downplay the problem of unreasonableness, arguing 
that there is no need to justify political liberalism to the unreasonable.  Following Burton 
Dreben, Quong argues that the problem of justifying political liberalism to illiberal people 
is not a philosophical problem.  Quong quotes Dreben: “sometimes I am asked, when I go 
around speaking for Rawls, What do you say to an Adolf Hitler? The answer is [nothing].  
You shoot him” (Dreben 2003, p.329; Quong 2011, p.8).  For Quong and Dreben, a person 
such as Adolf Hitler is beyond the scope of political justification.  Justifying a political 
doctrine to such a person is, then, not a philosophical task, nor one that is necessary in 
devising political principles.  Not all unreasonable people are the moral equivalent of 
Adolf Hitler, however.  Many people say, do, and think things that would be at odds with 
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the values of justice as fairness, making them to some extent unreasonable, but not 
necessarily so unreasonable to be illiberal and beyond hope of convincing.  While I agree 
with Quong that the Ku Klux Klan member and the Jihadist are not likely to be persuaded 
by Rawlsian ideals, many other citizens, whose beliefs are not so extreme nor entrenched, 
are to some extent unreasonable, yet justifying justice as fairness to them is essential to the 
task of political liberalism.  If the majority of citizens – who might be unreasonable to a 
minor degree – cannot be persuaded to fully endorse the principles of justice, then political 
liberalism is left highly unstable.   
 
To offer a brief sketch of the problem here, I identify several sorts of people who could be 
deemed unreasonable but who should not be outside the scope of justification.  The cases 
that follow should be considered from the perspective of parties in the original position 
who recognise the implications of neural determinism. 
 
David is a successful journalist who writes on economics.  The paper he works for 
endorses the monetarist approach to economics, and Jonathan writes in support of positions 
based on such an approach.  Believing inflation as being more of a problem than 
unemployment and economic inequality, he writes in defence of policies that reduce the 
risk of inflation while increasing the likelihood of inequality.  Such policies are at odds 
with the difference principle, as the inequalities arising from the implementation of these 
policies are not to the advantage of the worst off.  Otherwise, David holds liberal views, 
and his conception of the good can be termed liberal.  He believes in the basic moral 
equality of all people, abhors racism, and supports religious freedom though being an 
atheist.   
 
Syeda runs a social media website.  While she supports the principles of justice, and will 
vote and campaign for policies that uphold the principles, users of her social media site can 
use it to promote whatever political views they wish.  Some choose to promote racist, 
sexist, and homophobic ideas.  Nothing is censored on the site.  Thus, many people are 
exposed to these ideas.   
 
Abdul works in marketing for a successful fast food company.  His beliefs can be 
characterised as reasonable.  He believes in charity, donating his time and money to 
charitable causes for which he feels strongly.  The conception of the good he holds is 
centred on this belief, guiding his rational plan of life.   Like David, he believes strongly in 
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protecting the basic liberties of all people, and though he is of religious faith, does not wish 
to impose his faith on others through the use of state power.  In elections, Abdul will vote 
for candidates who recognise justice as fairness.  His work in marketing leads to his 
influence over many other people.  As a result of this influence, many people eat unhealthy 
food from this fast food company and, in doing so, develop eating disorders.  Some of 
these people are children.  As adults, their ability to become rationally autonomous – to 
develop a plan of life in accordance with a reasonable conception of the good – is 
undermined by eating disorders they developed as children.   
 
Let us now consider these three cases from the perspective of the original position.  On 
considering the implications of neural determinism, parties would not consider these three 
people entirely reasonable.  Reading David’s journalism, a citizen may be persuaded to 
reject the principles of justice in favour of alternative economic principles.  After spending 
time on Syeda’s social media website, a person may find herself endorsing views at odds 
with the ideal of moral equality.  Under the influence of Abdul’s marketing techniques, a 
person may have developed an eating disorder that impedes her ability to become 
rationally and full autonomous.  If we lack the ability to effectively control our own 
thought processes, ideas we find in the public domain may convince us to think or act in 
ways at odds with the principles of justice.  We lack the ability to persuade ourselves of 
why we should continue to endorse these principles.  Without a strong prior commitment 
to justice as fairness, a citizen may be persuaded to endorse economic principles that do 
not cohere with the principles of justice, reject the basis of moral equality between all 
people, or fail to realise a satisfactory life altogether due to the influence of ideas in the 
public domain.  Citizens left to their own devices cannot be expected to overcome such 
influences and maintain a commitment to the principles of justice if the implications of 
neural determinism are true.      
 
Parties in the original position recognising this would not view people allowing the 
promotion of such ideas as being reasonable, as they realise two negative implications.  
First, these activities could not be viewed as premised on fair terms of cooperation; as the 
citizens’ interests may be harmed through the influences of these activities, parties would 
not agree to the terms proposed.  This is particularly true in the case of the citizen harmed 
by the influence of Abdul’s marketing.  Nevertheless, it is also true in the case of citizens 
influenced by the work of David and Syeda.  A person influenced by David’s journalism 
may be persuaded to vote against her own economic interests, thus rendering her worse off.  
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Someone influenced by racist ideas found on Syeda’s website – quite apart from the threat 
she now poses to the rest of society – undermines her own moral psychology.  In the case 
that society is regulated by an effective sense of justice, such a person may find herself 
ostracised and unable to live a satisfactory life.  It is, then, against a person’s own interests 
to express such ideas in a just society.  Second, the stability of society is threatened in the 
event of the widespread influence of these influences, the sense of fairness being eroded.  
If David’s journalism became influential, with politicians persuaded to adopt monetarist 
policies as a result, justice as fairness would be undermined.  The influence of fascistic 
ideas spread on Syeda’s website could similarly affect justice as fairness.       
 
There may be two objections to this.  First, it might be argued that this assumes that a 
society should be perfectly just, an ideal which is impossible.  Second, this appears to be a 
matter of luck.  In the event of the work of David, Syeda, or Abdul having no influence, we 
would deem them reasonable.  I now respond to each objection in turn. 
 
First, while parties should recognise that no society could be perfectly just, seeking to 
advance the interests of those they represent, parties would recognise the need to reduce 
the risk of harms citizens face.  If the determinism of neural activity was considered to be 
false, then we could imagine that citizens would be able to guide their thoughts away from 
negative influences.  In the event of a society containing many ideas at odds with the 
principles of justice, citizens would be able to reject such ideas and continue to endorse 
justice as fairness.  If the determinism of neural activity is considered to be true, citizens 
are guaranteed no such ability.  Rather than attempting to devise a society which is 
perfectly just in all cases, parties are instead attempting to minimise risks to citizens.  Thus, 
parties would consider the ways in which society could be devised as to promote the 
development of the citizens’ moral powers – the abilities to formulate a conception of the 
good and a sense of justice.  In this case, the activities of people such as David, Syeda, and 
Abdul would be discouraged.   
 
Second, if neural determinism is true, the thoughts a person endorses are, to a large degree, 
a matter of luck.  What is meant by luck here is not a matter of chance or subject to 
randomness – if the determinism of neural activity is true, our thoughts are not the result of 
chance or random occurrences – but outside of human control.  Whether or not a person 
successfully influences another person’s thoughts, if the aim of this influence is an 
unreasonable one – the consequences of its success would undermine the terms of fair 
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cooperation – then that person is acting unreasonably.  The aim here is to reduce the risk of 
unreasonableness while accepting that luck plays a role in determining the beliefs people 
hold.  Whether a person is born into a society that largely conforms to Rawls’ conception 
of justice, or one entirely at odds with such an ideal, is a matter of luck.  Furthermore, the 
way in which a person’s thoughts are influenced by the ideas and acts that are 
commonplace in a society is due to luck.  In devising society, parties would seek to 
minimise the chances of ways of life coming into existence that are entirely at odds with 
justice as fairness.  Luck determines whether an act or an idea influences behaviour across 
society to such an extent that the stability of this society is brought into question.  
Nevertheless, parties in the original position would seek to minimise the chances of such 
acts and ideas having negative consequences.  Thus, if the consequence of an act could 
undermine the sense of fairness within a society, this act would be deemed unreasonable, 
regardless of its success.       
     
Thus, to a degree, David, Syeda, and Abdul are all unreasonable.  Their actions undermine 
the terms of fair cooperation.  From the perspective of the original position, we would not 
agree to any of their terms.  None of them is morally comparable with members of the Ku 
Klux Klan or Jihadists, however.  It is likely that they would find the arguments of justice 
as fairness convincing, but to realise the kind of society necessary for political liberalism, 
they would need to make adjustments to their ways of life.  David has to be convinced that 
the economic positions that would support justice as fairness are stronger than the 
monetarist position he currently adopts, and to write articles in favour of such positions.  
Syeda would need to think about the types of ideas that are promoted on her website.  
Abdul would either need to switch careers, or persuade his employers that their produce, 
and the marketing strategies used to promote it, are not conducive to a socially cooperative 
society in which people are all capable of realising their rational autonomy.   
 
In what follows, I argue that the prioritising of the development of full autonomy offers an 
effective response to this problem.  Fully autonomous citizens will be less likely to act in 
the ways in which David, Syeda, and Abdul do.  If some citizens do act in these ways, 
other citizens, who are also fully autonomous, will be less likely to be negatively 
influenced by their acts.     
 
Nevertheless, if the proponent of political liberalism rejects the claim that David, Syeda, 
and Abdul are acting unreasonably, more extreme views still pose a problem.  Someone 
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may hold racist, sexist, or homophobic views without being a committed Nazi or Ku Klux 
Klan member.  Such a person may even be unaware that her views are racist, sexist, or 
homophobic, yet these views may influence her vote in elections or the policies she 
prefers.  Many people across a society may hold such views.  In the case that such views 
affect their behaviour in the political realm, the sense of fairness within a society will begin 
to erode, along with the sense of moral equality between people, as political support for 
such ideals is lost.  This problem is exacerbated if the implications of neural determinism 
are accepted.  It cannot be assumed that people will necessarily reject the influence of such 
views.  People may not be aware of the way in which their own views have been 
influenced by ideas existing within the public culture.       
 
While Quong claimed justifying political liberalism to Nazis was not a philosophical task, 
and that it should therefore not trouble the political theorist, the same cannot be said of the 
sort of person described above.  Though such people hold views entirely at odds with 
justice as fairness, their beliefs are not entrenched in the same way that a Nazi’s beliefs are 
entrenched.  We cannot say that justifying a political conception of justice to them is not a 
philosophical task, thus rejecting the need to do so from political theory, as such people 
may constitute a large minority, or even a majority, of citizens in modern societies.  If the 
political conception of justice is to attain stability, these people must be convinced by 
justice as fairness.  Furthermore, on endorsing justice as fairness, such people must reject 
their unreasonable views.  It must be realised that racist, sexist, or homophobic ideas are 
incompatible with a commitment to justice as fairness, and that the expression of such 
ideas within the public culture can influence other people in ways beyond their control.  As 
the influence of such ideas grows, the stability of a just society is undermined, while – due 
to the implications of the determinism of neural activity – there is little individual people 
can do to prevent themselves from being persuaded by ideas existing within their culture.  
Thus, unreasonable people, to whatever extent they are unreasonable, must be considered 
within the ambit of justificatory reasons.  The consequence of claiming otherwise is to 
accept that as unreasonable ideas spread within a society, a process beyond the control of 
individual people, we need do nothing to prevent their influence.  Thus, stability would be 
lost.     
 
To conclude, it is not only people who endorse extreme ideologies such as Nazism or 
Islamism who are unreasonable.  Many people believe ideas, or act in ways, that 
undermine the idea of society as a socially cooperative union.  Justifying political 
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liberalism to unreasonable people is not a matter of attempting to convince Nazis of the 
virtues of liberalism, but of persuading many people who do not hold extreme beliefs that 
certain things that they do, say, and think are incompatible with the ideals of political 
liberalism.  To realise political liberalism, such people would not only need to be 
persuaded of this, but also motivated to change their ways of life.   
 
9.3 Perfectionism and Paternalism  
 
A worry of those sympathetic to political liberalism may be that this is paternalistic: that 
we are determining the good for others as we judge them incapable of doing so for 
themselves.  Rather than demanding people who are to some degree unreasonable to 
change their ways of life, we should accept that people have to be responsible for their own 
ends.  This means that people persuaded by the arguments of a journalist to endorse 
economic principles at odds with justice as fairness must be responsible for this.  People 
who developed eating disorders as children due to fast food must be responsible for 
overcoming such disorders as adults.  On the grounds of the determinism of neural activity 
being true, I argue that this is mistaken.  People have little ability to exercise control over 
their thoughts.  Instead of leaving people to their own resources to overcome negative 
influences and realise their autonomy, society should be structured as to allow people the 
opportunities to become autonomous.  In this section, I argue that concerns regarding 
paternalism are sometimes exaggerated.  A certain measure of paternalism is necessary in 
the development of the just society Rawls imagines.  Quong’s argument against 
paternalism rests on the individual’s innate possession of the second moral power.  If this 
moral power is not innate – which, if the truth of neural determinism is assumed, it could 
not be – then this argument against paternalism fails.       
 
I have argued that if priority is given to the development of full autonomy, the stability of 
political liberalism will be better ensured, as fully autonomous citizens are motivated to 
support the principles of justice, and to act reasonably.  To allow for the development of 
autonomy, however, the state must be justified in encouraging some ways of life and 
discouraging others.  The argument here for the priority of autonomy is grounded on the 
claim that we have little control over our thoughts.  If we cannot control our thought 
processes, nor the ways in which societal and environmental factors have influenced our 
thoughts, then if we are to become autonomous citizens, the state must ensure the basic 
structure of society is devised so as to encourage thoughts conducive to the development of 
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autonomy.  This means that the state is justified in discouraging some ways of life if those 
ways of life undermine the ability of other people to develop autonomy. 
 
Before proceeding, I define perfectionism and paternalism, considering how they relate to 
one another.  Martha Nussbaum identifies Charles Larmore as the philosopher who began 
debate between the ‘perfectionist’ and ‘political’ approaches to liberalism (Larmore 1996, 
p.122; Nussbaum 2011b, p.5).  Following Larmore, Nussbaum views the perfectionist 
approach as a type of liberalism that is comprehensive, as it incorporates a perspective on 
the nature of the good life that stretches across the entirety of human life, amounting to a 
comprehensive doctrine.  Whereas the political liberal is concerned only with political 
factors all reasonable people can agree on, the perfectionist liberal’s concern is not 
confined to the political realm.  The perfectionist liberal claims that there is a conception of 
the good life that it is the role of the state to promote.  There is an ideal which makes 
human life valuable – such as autonomy, for Joseph Raz (1986) – and there should be 
common agreement on its importance within a liberal society (Nussbaum 2011b, p.11).  
Politics, then, for perfectionist liberals, becomes a matter of promoting values within the 
state and society that are considered to be true, not one of attempting to identify 
specifically political values that all reasonable people can agree on.   
 
Paternalism, on the other hand, is an act in regard to another person arising out of a 
concern for that person.  Such an act limits the liberty of the person who the act is made 
against, according to Gerald Dworkin.  As Dworkin notes, this concern could be that 
person’s “welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values” (Dworkin 1972, p.65).  
These acts must be motivated by a concern for some such aspect of a person for it to be 
counted as a paternalistic act.  Interference with a person’s liberty that stems from the want 
of the person interfering to promote her own self-interest does not qualify as paternalism.  
Quong disagrees with Dworkin in his explanation of paternalism, as he argues that not all 
paternalistic acts threaten liberty.  Offering someone a reward to persuade that person to 
perform a particular act can be considered a paternalistic act, on Quong’s view (Quong 
2011, p.75).  Instead, Quong argues that paternalism is an act aiming to improve another 
person’s “welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values” that is “motivated by a 
negative judgement” about the other person’s capacities to manage these affairs (Quong 
2011, pp.80-81).  This could be a capacity for reason, willpower, or emotional 
management.  If I prevent you from acting as you wish because I think you are incapable 
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of determining your own good or realising happiness due to your lack of ability to manage 
your emotions, then I act paternalistically.     
 
In Liberalism Without Perfectionism (2011), Quong argues against both perfectionism and 
paternalism.  My intention here is not to dispute Quong’s definition of paternalism, but to 
show that paternalism is not necessarily unjustified.  Quong argues against perfectionism, 
in part, because he argues perfectionism is necessarily paternalistic (Quong 2011, p.73).  
On Rawlsian grounds, paternalism is incompatible with the view that all people have the 
second moral power – the ability to form a conception of the good – as someone acting 
paternalistically assumes that a person is not capable of determining her own good (Quong 
2011, pp.100-107).  Acting in this way, we are denying the conception of the person lying 
at the heart of political liberalism.  People are free and equal due to their possession of the 
moral powers.  If we deny this by virtue of acting paternalistically, then we deny the very 
basis of moral equality on which political liberalism is founded.   
 
Explaining his definition of paternalism, Quong uses the example of a drunk driver (Quong 
2011, p.83).  If I was drunk and went to reach for my car keys intent on driving myself 
home, but you took them from me, your action would count as paternalistic.  Alternatively, 
if we had agreed beforehand that if I became drunk and decided to drive myself home, you 
were to prevent me from doing so, then your action would not count as paternalistic.  The 
difference between the two cases is that, in the former, you reject my capacity to determine 
the good for myself, whereas in the second, I have already conceded that in the case of my 
being drunk, I cannot determine this for myself, and wish you to do so.  Of key importance 
is who determines what is my good.  If someone else decides for me, that person’s act is 
paternalistic.  On the aforementioned grounds that this is incompatible with respect for the 
second moral power – the ability to form a conception of the good – Quong argues that 
paternalism is wrong. 
 
However, suppose I was to attempt to pick up my car keys while drunk, intent on driving 
myself home.  You may think that this is the wrong thing for me to do as I may, in the least 
worst-case scenarios, injure myself or get myself arrested, and in the worst-case scenario, 
kill myself.  Nevertheless, it is for me to determine my good, so you let me drive.  
However, you may also know that between where we currently are and my home there is a 
busy road, on which I am likely to injure or kill pedestrians or other road users.  In letting 
me drive home, you are letting me determine that my choice to drive myself home is more 
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important than the right of these people to choose the good for themselves – in this case, 
the good of not being killed by a drunk driver.  Choices are rarely made in vacuums in 
which the consequences of the choice are born only by the maker of that choice; this is 
particularly true in the making of political choices.  
 
A problem here is that Quong’s example leads us to consider possible arguments for 
intervention that are justified.  My choosing to drive while drunk is not a case of 
determining my own good but of determining what is right.  I am unjustified in choosing to 
drive while drunk as such an act violates what is right rather than what is good.  Though it 
is left to me to determine the good, I cannot determine for myself the right, or what is just.  
Other examples of paternalism offered by Quong avoid the blurring of this distinction.  If I 
lie to you about the death of your pet as I think you are incapable of emotionally dealing 
with death, or I think you lack willpower so omit to tell you about a film showing at the 
cinema so that you can continue working on a novel, then I act paternalistically (Quong 
2011, pp.81-82).  I determine what is good for you, as I judge you incapable of doing so 
for yourself.  Neither act here blurs the distinction between the right and the good, and the 
consequences of either choice would be born only by those involved.  If we think that 
paternalism is unjustified due to its undermining of the second moral power, we will see 
these acts as being unjustified.   
 
Imagining that individuals’ possession of the two moral powers is innate, Quong can then 
argue against paternalism and state what is a just use of state power on this conception of 
human nature.  This, however, assumes that certain aspects of the individual exist prior to 
the state.  If this is reversed – we assume instead that the state is prior to the individual – 
then this cannot hold.  As Feinberg and Narveson posit (1970), in a society in which rights 
were not guaranteed, people would not develop the sense of morality and self-respect 
appropriate for life in a liberal democracy.  Thus, if this direction of causation is assumed, 
the possession of the second moral power is not an innate characteristic of the individual, 
but a result of a certain political arrangement. 
 
If the truth of neural determinism is accepted, then it will be recognised that this latter 
scenario is the more appropriate assumption.  As I have argued, we should not assume that 
people have such moral powers.  Only in certain conditions will a person have developed 
her second moral power.  As we have little conscious ability to consciously control our 
thoughts, we will only develop our moral powers if we exist in circumstances that enable 
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us to do so.  If we are to live in such circumstances, paternalism will, at times, be both 
justified and necessary.  We cannot rely on there being an innate sense of morality within 
people.  If neural determinism is true, a person’s sense of morality will largely be the result 
of external influences beyond her control.  An argument against paternalism depending on 
people holding an innate sense of morality cannot, then, hold.  This is not to say, however, 
that paternalism is justified against a person who does hold such a sense of morality.  If a 
person has developed to act as a rationally and fully autonomous agent, paternalism against 
such a person would neither be necessary nor justified.  Instead, it is to say that paternalism 
cannot be thought of as inherently unjust based on a conception of human nature.  If we are 
to arrive at a situation in which this conception of human nature holds, then society must 
be devised as to enable its development.  As part of this process, paternalism will 
sometimes be justified.  Paternalistic acts against David, Syeda, or Abdul would, therefore, 
not be unjustified.               
 
Of course, the problem here is one of implementation.  Even if you agreed that 
paternalistic acts are sometimes necessary, you may find the illiberal idea of the state 
censoring journalists, social media sites, or interfering with the nature of a person’s work 
disturbing.  I focus on the problem of implementation later in this chapter.  I turn now back 
to the relationship between paternalism and perfectionism.  As Quong’s argument against 
perfectionism is based on its paternalistic implications, it will not hold if the argument 
against paternalism fails.         
 
Under Quong’s definition of paternalism, the state is paternalistic if it decides it 
understands an individual’s good better than the individual herself.  For Quong, the state is 
not justified in this, as it undermines the second moral power.  This is a necessary 
implication of perfectionism.  However, in accordance with the values of political 
liberalism, I claim that in certain cases the state should be able to claim it has a better 
understanding of the individual’s good.  An individual who succeeds in becoming 
rationally and fully autonomous is living a better life than one who fails.  Someone with no 
interest in realising a reasonable conception of the good – and thus who failed to become 
rationally and fully autonomous – would not be a “full person”, according to Rawls (2005, 




Even if political liberalism can be seen as neutral in procedure and in aim, it is 
important to emphasize that it may still affirm the superiority of certain forms 
of moral character and encourage certain moral virtues (Rawls 1988, p.263). 
 
Rawls is perhaps more relaxed than Quong about certain forms of perfectionism within 
political liberalism.  In A Theory of Justice, Rawls writes that particular traits must be 
encouraged, particularly in regard to the sense of justice the citizen holds (Rawls 1971, 
p.327).  He goes on to say that his contractarian doctrine shares similarities with 
perfectionism, in that each does not primarily focus on the distribution of welfare, and, in 
this sense, contractarianism is an intermediate position between perfectionism and 
utilitarianism.  Earlier in A Theory of Justice, Rawls also appears to be sanguine regarding 
paternalism in certain circumstances (Rawls 1971, pp.248-250).  Rawls claims that parties 
in the original position would argue that paternalism is necessary to protect citizens from 
the “weaknesses and infirmities of their reason and will” (Rawls 1971, p. 249).  According 
to Rawls, where a person is threatened by her own irrationality, paternalism is justified, 
providing paternalism is guided by the principles of justice.  Education must also “honor 
these constraints” (Rawls 1971, p.250).   
 
There is, then, some overlap between the doctrines of liberal perfectionism and justice as 
fairness.  As Rawls recognises, particularly in work prior to Political Liberalism, it is 
necessary to develop certain traits in individuals if justice as fairness is to be realised.  
Though less is said regarding the development of traits in Political Liberalism, I argue that 
this still holds, particularly if we assume the truth of neural determinism.  If we cannot 
guarantee the individual’s possession of the two moral powers, society must be organised 
in such a way that the development of the appropriate moral sentiments is encouraged.  In 
cases where individuals act in ways that are at odds with such sentiments, we are justified 
in claiming these people do not have an adequate understanding of their own good.         
 
Thus, the state would be justified in claiming it understands the individual’s good better 
than the individual in certain circumstances.  Where a person’s good is entirely at odds 
with rationality and reasonableness in the Rawlsian sense, the advocate of political 
liberalism is justified in claiming that the state understands the person’s good better than 
she does herself.  An individual whose actions impede her ability to develop her two moral 
powers is not capable of adequately knowing her own good; the state is therefore justified, 
to some extent, to overrule her in her decision-making.  Quong is, then, not justified in 
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claiming that political liberalism requires the state not to intervene in matters pertaining to 
the good.  The thin theory of the good offered in goodness of rationality offers us a 
standard against which political liberalism can judge an individual’s good.   
 
To conclude, if we are to realise the sort of society imagined by Rawls in Political 
Liberalism – a well-ordered society based on terms of fair cooperation, regulated by the 
principles of justice – we must prioritise the development of autonomy.  If any of the 
values of political liberalism are to be realised, there must be a society inhabited by people 
motivated to realise them.  Those who advocate political liberalism may be concerned that 
this is paternalistic.  As I have argued, our concern for the development of fully 
autonomous citizens must be greater than worries over paternalism.  This does not mean 
that we should abandon all concerns regarding paternalism.  A state that interferes with 
journalistic freedom will always be a cause of concern to liberals.  However, the charge 
that a particular course of action is paternalistic is not sufficient to discredit the act.  
Furthermore, it is wrong to imagine the politically liberal state would remain entirely 
neutral in matters regarding an individual’s good.  In certain cases, the state would be 
justified in claiming it understood the individual’s good better than did the individual 
herself.      
 
9.4 The Problem of Education  
 
In this section, I argue that if autonomy is prioritised within the basic structure of society, 
then this should be encouraged from childhood, rather than attempting to censor or control 
the acts of citizens.  There are three problems I identify here for education within political 
liberalism.  First, people need to be motivated to endorse justice as fairness.  Second, 
people have little conscious control over their thoughts, which are largely a result of 
external influences.  Third, there is the problem of conflicting moral motivations.  I explain 
Rawls’ stance on education, before considering these problems for political liberalism.  
Because, as I argue, we cannot necessarily be assumed to develop the necessary moral 
sentiments to endorse justice as fairness, something similar to Cohen’s egalitarian ethos 
needs to be the focus of moral education.  However, this focus on a certain ethos comes at 
the expense of the diversity of beliefs within a society.  Nevertheless, I argue that if we are 
to allow for the development of full autonomy, we must ensure that people are committed 
to the value of fairness.  Fairness should be the central focus of moral education.  The 
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problems with education are identified here, before the scheme of education I argue in 
favour of is explicated in 9.5.      
 
There is little said about education or moral development in Political Liberalism.  Though 
we are assumed to have two moral powers, little is said about their origin.  Though our 
capacity for both theoretical and practical reason is claimed to be self-originating and self-
authenticating, Rawls, following Kant, argues that the moral powers are to be modelled by 
the constructivist procedure (Rawls 2005 pp.100-104).  Thus, we have an innate capacity 
for reason, and from this capacity, we can construct political principles which would be 
acceptable to other reasonable people.  Through this process, we can understand that 
people can be regarded as having two moral powers.  While Rawls is not explicit – he is 
attempting not to endorse Kantian transcendental idealism here, as this would be to commit 
to comprehensive liberalism – this suggests that our sense of morality, and our ability to 
regard others as having a similar sense of morality, is rooted in an innate capacity for 
reason.  
 
As noted in Chapter 3, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls offers a sketch of the process of moral 
development that is more fleshed out.  Our sense that we are autonomous moral beings is 
rooted not in authority but in our capacity for reason (Rawls 1971, p.514).  If we realised 
that our sense of morality was rooted only in what had been commanded of us, we would 
reject or revise this sense of morality.  Rawls here appears to slightly contradict his earlier 
position that we should be neutral between the empiricist and the rationalist approach to 
moral education (Rawls 1971, pp.458-461).  Whereas the empiricist argues that we need to 
be motivated to do what is right, and that, therefore, the role of education is to supply these 
motives, the rationalist argues that these motives are not necessarily missing, and that 
education should allow for the free development of a person’s innate emotional and 
intellectual capacities.  While Rawls claims that each approach has its merits (Rawls 1971, 
p.461), and that he need not choose between the two, in what follows, Rawls aligns himself 
more with the rationalist approach.  Thus, he argues that it is through the love between 
parents and their child that the child learns to understand the morality of authority (Rawls 
1971, pp.462-467), and it is through entering into the social world that the child begins to 
learn about the importance of cooperation and the morality of association (Rawls 1971, 
pp.467-472).  Finally, while for a time the child’s sense of morality is premised only on an 
understanding of what others approve and disapprove, as the child matures, she comes to 
understand and attach herself to moral principles for their own sake (Rawls 1971, pp.472-
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479).  A person does not act in accordance with moral principles merely because her social 
group approves of her doing so, but because of her own commitment to these principles.  It 
is here that Rawls’ view of moral education echoes those of Piaget and Kohlberg, which, 
as Rawls himself notes (1971, p.459-461), belong to the rationalist tradition.  There is an 
innate sense of morality within the person that ought to be developed through education.  
Eventually, the person will develop to understand and act from moral principles due to an 
internal motivation to do so.  There is, then, no need to supply these missing motives, as 
the empiricist would claim.     
 
As Rawls omits an explanation of the process of moral development from Political 
Liberalism, it is unclear whether the doctrine of political liberalism accepts the process 
sketched in A Theory of Justice.  However, as Rawls continues to state that we can locate 
the origin of reason within the individual’s moral consciousness (Rawls 2005, p.100), it 
would appear that the rationalism of A Theory of Justice is not entirely abandoned.  In what 
follows, I assess the problems of this for a process of moral development within political 
liberalism, if the end is to be a well-ordered society inhabited by rationally and fully 
autonomous citizens.    
 
As I have argued, a consideration of neuroscience within political liberalism should force 
us to reconsider the place of autonomy in political liberalism.  We exercise little conscious 
control over our thoughts; what we come to think and value is largely determined by 
processes outside of our control.  Thus, we will only develop autonomy in particular 
contexts.  Autonomy is of vital importance for political liberalism, however.  If we are to 
realise a well-ordered society based on terms of fair cooperation, there must be 
autonomous citizens motivated to realise this society.  Further empirical problems are 
revealed in Kohlberg’s research, as noted in Chapter 3, along with some of the research 
done on moral development following Kohlberg (Gibbs 2013).  The fifth and sixth stages 
of moral development – in which the individual considers the importance of the social 
contract, and what has been decided to be right by the whole of society, following which 
human behaviour can be guided by an understanding of abstract universal principles 
(Kohlberg & Hersh 1977) – are rarely reached by individuals.  This was further 
demonstrated in subsequent studies (Harkness et al 1981; Colby et al 1983; Mason & 
Gibbs 1993; Gibbs et al 2007).  As Bill Puka puts it, there is no “empirical basis” for stage 
six (Puka 1990, p.182).  Even those sympathetic to Kohlberg’s approach concede that stage 
six is a theoretical aim rather than an empirical fact (Habermas 1990; Gibbs et al 2007).  
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Instead, most individuals remain at the conventional level of morality, in which individual 
behaviour conforms to the norms of the given social order the individual lives within 
(Gibbs 2013).  Furthermore, Haidt’s research appears to show that it is emotion rather than 
reason that guides the individual’s understanding of morality (Haidt 2007).  If reason plays 
any role, it is largely to justify the initial emotional reaction.  Thus, we should not consider 
individuals as attaining rational and full autonomy with ease.  The development of the two 
moral powers, following which the individual will be guided by an abstract understanding 
of the right and the good, is not something we witness in those without an understanding of 
moral philosophy.   
 
This is not to say that Rawls necessarily requires citizens to understand and act from 
abstract moral principles.  Providing a citizen does not act against the principles of justice, 
and is motivated to support the institutions upholding the principles, then she is acting in 
ways consistent with political liberalism (Rawls 2005, pp.77-78). The source of her 
motivation to act in the way in which she does, whether it lies in an abstract understanding 
of the principles, conformity to the group, or an emotional commitment, is inconsequential.  
Rawls assumes that people will desire to be cooperative citizens, but he does not address 
the source of this desire (Rawls 2005, pp.81-88).      
 
Nevertheless, a problem remains unresolved.  Individuals being left to their own resources 
to develop a sense of morality may be motivated by influences at odds with justice as 
fairness.  For instance, an individual’s early experiences may have highlighted the 
importance of hard work and the individual will overcoming obstacles.  This person may 
then come to hold a highly individualistic, politically libertarian understanding of fairness.  
On this understanding, it is fair if a person owns something if she worked for it, and it is 
unfair if any of this is taken away from her, even if it is taken to satisfy the basic needs of 
those less fortunate.  People and communities existing within modern societies may hold 
such an understanding of fairness, which sits in tension with that of the Rawlsian 
understanding.  While we might consider such people rationally autonomous, it is doubtful 
that they would act as fully autonomous citizens are expected to act.  They would not be 
motivated to act from the principles of justice when making political decisions.  
Developing arguments presented in Chapter 3, I argue that if there is to be any hope of 
considering individuals as fully autonomous in the way that Rawls imagines, the 




In Chapter 3, I argued against the position of James Scott Johnston (2005).  Johnston 
argues that if education is to play any role within political liberalism, it should only to be to 
establish publicity; to make children understand the importance of their future role as 
citizens.  However, given that empirical studies have shown that most people do not 
develop a sense of morality from which they act on abstract principles, but from emotional 
responses to what is perceived to be wrong or right (Haidt 2007), we cannot assume that 
people will become fully autonomous, or act from a common understanding of fairness, 
only from an understanding of their role.  That is to say most people will not act from the 
principles of justice due to their being internally motivated to do so.  Rather, people will 
accept the given rules of a society but without any deeper internal commitment to these 
rules.  In the case that neural determinism is true, this would not be sufficient.  Without an 
internal commitment to justice as fairness, citizens are vulnerable to the influence of 
unreasonable doctrines.  To ensure the stability of political liberalism, fully autonomous 
citizens who are motivated to uphold the principles of justice are necessary.  If education is 
aimed only at ensuring children understand the importance of citizenship, we cannot 
guarantee that citizens will develop the necessary capacities to be considered fully 
autonomous.  Neither will their emotional commitments necessarily converge with the 
ideals of political liberalism.  Without any commitment to the value of fairness within 
moral education, a person could develop either to disregard the importance of fairness, or 
think of fairness in a way entirely at odds with the Rawlsian conception.    
 
Instead, if political liberalism is to work in the way that Johnston imagines, it would need 
to be a ‘Government House’ approach to liberalism (Williams 1985, pp.108-100).  We 
cannot assume that the condition of publicity alone will lead to citizens being motivated to 
realise their full autonomy.  In the case that many citizens do not, an elite of citizens who 
had developed to the final stage of moral development, acting in accord with abstract 
moral principles, could be considered fully autonomous, and create the rules by which the 
rest of the citizens, who are not necessarily fully autonomous, abide.  As most people 
develop to the conventional level of moral development, obeying the rules established 
within the social order, this would be possible.  Most citizens would only obey the 
principles of justice, however, there would be no deeper commitment to the principles.  
This ‘Government House’ approach to political liberalism reveals a flaw in Johnston’s 
position.  Such a system seems inherently unstable; as there is no motivation to endorse the 
principles of justice on the part of most citizens, ideas that threaten the stability of political 
liberalism could potentially gain support.  Furthermore, there can be no guarantee the elites 
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themselves would develop and maintain the appropriate sense of justice across time.  
Should politicians begin to question the ideals of political liberalism, citizens would have 
no internal motivation to continue supporting such ideals.   
 
Rather than devise such a ‘Government House’ approach, I argue that the two moral 
powers should be developed through a system of moral education for all citizens, a system 
that is substantive and interventionist, ensuring children come to understand fairness in the 
Rawlsian sense.  Children should understand both the principles of justice, and what it 
means to hold a reasonable conception of the good.  Such an education system must be 
premised on an appreciation of the empirical data, however.  Rather than assume all 
citizens will develop to understand and act from abstract principles, we should instead 
consider the emotional commitments people develop in childhood.  If neural determinism 
is true, and we have little conscious control over our thoughts, then it cannot be guaranteed 
that citizens will develop full autonomy through their own capacities for independent 
thought.  Fairness is of key importance here.  We cannot assume that people will develop 
an understanding of the importance of fairness, or that there is a common understanding of 
what is fair.  Thus, it should be ensured that people are encouraged to develop an 
emotional commitment to the value of fairness in the Rawlsian sense.  From this 
commitment, we could better ensure that people come to recognise justice as fairness.  This 
commitment is central to the development of fully autonomous citizens.  Without such an 
approach to education within political liberalism, due to the implications of neural 
determinism, we could not guarantee that citizens would become fully autonomous.       
 
As M. Victoria Costa notes (2004), however, teaching the importance of fairness would 
lead to the diversity of beliefs held in modern societies being lost.  People educated to 
recognise the emotional significance of one moral value would be less inclined to endorse 
alternative doctrines.  To establish the necessary sentiments to support justice as fairness, 
something akin to Cohen’s “egalitarian ethos” would be necessary (Cohen 1992).  The cost 
of establishing such an ethos would be the loss of diversity of beliefs held within a society, 
as Costa notes.  I consider Cohen’s explication of the egalitarian ethos, before moving to 
consider Titelbaum’s rejoinder to Cohen (Titelbaum 2008).  For the stability of a well-
ordered society, I argue that something closer to Cohen’s ethos is necessary.  Full 
autonomy provides the telos for such an ethos.  As Titelbaum recognises, however, 
establishing such an ethos will reduce the diversity of beliefs people hold.      
208 
 
Cohen argues that the egalitarian ethos is a prerequisite of a just society (Cohen 1992, 
pp.315-316).  That is, people need to be motivated to act justly in order for a principle of 
justice to be upheld.  In regard to the difference principle, Cohen views this as self-
defeating.  A society of just people who endorsed the difference principle due to their sense 
of justice would not be motivated by their self-interest to pursue high salaries.  Thus, the 
inequalities the difference principle allows for would not obtain.   
 
In his explanation of the “Rawlsian ethos of justice”, Michael Titelbaum concedes that 
though something akin to G.A. Cohen’s “egalitarian ethos” is not impossible to incorporate 
within the scheme of political liberalism, to allow for this would be to lose diversity at the 
expense of stability (Titelbaum 2008, pp.319-320).  Titelbaum argues for what he calls the 
“full ethos” rather than the “egalitarian ethos” (Titelbaum 2008, p.306)  The full ethos 
demands that people act from the principles of justice in their everyday lives, but does not 
go so far as to demand a commitment to egalitarianism across a person’s life.  Fostering 
this ethos would, however, reduce diversity of beliefs within a society.  While the 
principles of justice place a certain limit on what is a permissible belief, by demanding that 
citizens act from the principles of justice in their everyday lives, the full ethos places 
further limits on what is permissible, though not to the same extent as the egalitarian ethos 
(Titelbaum 2008, pp.319-320).  On the egalitarian ethos, a person is never justified in 
pursuing a higher salary, while on the full ethos, a person is justified in pursuing a higher 
salary if the reason for doing so is in accord with the principles of justice.  Contra 
Titelbaum, I argue that a scheme of moral education that requires us to become fully 
autonomous would move us much closer to Cohen’s egalitarian ethos.  As Titelbaum 
notes, however, such an ethos comes at the price of diversity.       
 
A person who had been educated to recognise the emotional significance of justice as 
fairness would have no motivation to develop a conception of the good in accordance with 
a reasonable doctrine – a doctrine that is reasonable on the grounds that it is compatible 
with other reasonable doctrines, and does not attempt to use state power to suppress such 
doctrines – that was at odds with justice as fairness in certain ways.  This is particularly of 
concern for the diversity of political beliefs.  For instance, it seems unlikely a person who 
had been raised to appreciate fairness in the Rawlsian sense would develop a commitment 
to political libertarianism.  As Samuel Scheffler notes (1994), there is a contradiction 
between the way in which political liberalism seeks to protect diversity of reasonable 
beliefs while also promoting a certain conception of justice.  While this is a concern for the 
209 
 
diversity of political beliefs held in a society, the motivation to endorse non-political 
doctrines will also be reduced.  A person who had been educated in the Rawlsian value of 
fairness, and who lived a life in accord with this value, would have little need of the moral 
teachings found in religious doctrines.       
 
Furthermore, if people have little conscious control over their thoughts, which are 
determined beyond their control, and it is our emotional commitments which determine our 
sense of morality, rather than our capacity for reason, if a person did develop a conception 
of the good drawn from libertarianism, she may not be able to ensure her sense of justice 
stayed in accord with justice as fairness.  Hence, there are two problems here.  First, the 
problem of motivation, and second, the problem of lack of control.  We must ensure that 
people are motivated to endorse the principles of justice, as this supports the stability of 
political liberalism.  As people have little conscious control over their thoughts, we should 
also ensure that people are raised in environments where their experiences enable such a 
motivation.  By taking such steps, however, we reduce the likelihood of diversity within 
the senses of morality which people hold.       
 
Divergence between the right and the good is what protects the diversity of beliefs.  While 
a person under political liberalism must develop their first moral power so as to recognise 
justice as fairness, she is free to develop her second moral power, her ability to form a 
conception of the good, as she wishes, providing the way in which she conceives of the 
good is within the bounds of reasonableness.  Whereas Rawls argues that the right and the 
good are congruent in A Theory of Justice – that it is to be considered good to act justly 
(Rawls 1971, pp.567-572), and that we come to our conception of the good within the 
limits of what is right (Rawls 1971, pp.563-564) – in Political Liberalism, arguments for 
congruence are dropped.  As Samuel Freeman puts it, though Rawls never rejected his own 
belief in the truth of justice as fairness, that a doctrine is “philosophically justifiable” is not 
to say that it is “publicly justifiable” to the members of a democratic society (Freeman 
2003, p.325).  Jon Mandle agrees with Freeman here, adding that the task of political 
liberalism is to make justice as fairness justifiable to reasonable people, with the answer 
being found in the idea of an overlapping consensus (Mandle 2009, pp.22-23).  However, 
these reasonable people may not necessarily view acting from the principles of justice as a 




This, I argue, presents a third problem.  If, empirically speaking, most people struggle to 
realise a sense of morality from which they can understand and act from abstract moral 
principles, it would appear to be unlikely that a person could differentiate between the right 
and the good, understanding the moral doctrines that lead to the formulation of either.  As 
Kohlberg eventually recognised, not everyone can be a moral philosopher (Gibbs 2013, 
p.90).  A person raised with a strong religious faith is unlikely to understand how her sense 
of the good diverges from her sense of the right, unless she has philosophical training.  
Should the two come into conflict, it could be assumed that she would not understand the 
source of the conflict.  If Haidt’s theory of moral development is correct (2007), and we do 
come to conclusions as to what is moral based on feeling rather than reason, then we 
should ensure that the scheme of moral education a person develops through focuses on 
fairness, and that the individual is emotionally committed to the importance of the 
Rawlsian understanding of fairness.  Of course, this is conditional on the truth of these 
psychological claims in regard to both the work of Kohlberg and Haidt.  Nevertheless, 
even in the absence of such claims, if most citizens are assumed not to be moral 
philosophers, it would be appropriate to expect citizens to live according to unified moral 
motivations.  The conflict of moral motivations should thus be reduced if we are to 
prioritise the development of fully autonomous citizens.       
 
To conclude, there are three problems with education for political liberalism.  First, 
citizens will not necessarily be motivated to endorse justice as fairness.  Citizens whose 
experiences have led them to hold a sense of morality that does not cohere with justice as 
fairness are unlikely to become fully autonomous.  Second, citizens have little ability to 
consciously control their thoughts.  We cannot assume that where such conflicts arise, a 
citizen will be able to regulate her thoughts in accord with the values of justice as fairness.  
Third, political liberalism allows for the conflict of moral motivations.  A person’s sense of 
the good may be drawn from a different moral tradition than her sense of the right.  Unless 
a society consists entirely of moral philosophers, most people will not understand the 
conflict between competing moral motivations.  The source of this conflict should, then, be 
reduced through moral education.  If a well-ordered society is to be devised, citizens must 
be encouraged to become fully autonomous through their system of education.  The focus 
of this scheme of education must be perfectionist.  Full autonomy provides the standard of 
the good life which it is then the aim of the state to promote.  It is in this way that political 
liberalism can incorporate certain perfectionist measures.  Through employing such 




9.5 Perfectionist Education  
 
As I have argued, the focus of moral education should be perfectionist in character.  In this 
section, I further explain this scheme of education.  Returning to the examples of David, 
Syeda, and Abdul, I argue that such people would be less likely to act in unreasonable 
ways if the focus of moral education was perfectionist.  The aim of this perfectionist moral 
education should be to foster an ethos from which citizens come to realise the importance 
of full autonomy.  Acting from such an ethos, citizens would not act in ways that erode the 
sense of fairness within society.  A perfectionist scheme of education would instil a 
motivation in individuals to become fully autonomous, reducing the need for paternalistic 
acts against adults.   
 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that all of what follows is considered within the 
context of non-ideal theory.  It is not supposed that a state could be reached in which every 
single inhabitant of a society develops to be a fully autonomous citizen.  Nor is it thought 
that all beliefs contrary to justice as fairness would necessarily disappear from society.  
Complete uniformity of belief would be neither possible nor desirable.  The aim of this 
section is rather to establish the conditions necessary under which we can consider 
individuals as being able to develop to be fully autonomous citizens.     
 
To return to the example of David, we can imagine that David’s adherence to monetarism 
was derived from his conception of the good, which is drawn from the doctrine of political 
libertarianism.  Thus, David’s conception of the good is expressed through the importance 
of negative freedom, individualism, and independence, while his sense of justice should be 
characterised by the importance of fairness.  Perhaps if David is one of the few people who 
develops to the final stage of moral development, and acts from an understanding of 
abstract moral principles, then such conflicting moral motivations will not pose a problem.  
However, as we cannot assume that all people are capable of such an understanding of 
morality, the sense of morality encouraged within a society should be simplified.  Rather 
than expecting a person to develop a complex moral psychology, through which she could 
follow one system of thought in regard to her understanding of the right, and another in her 
understanding of the good, through moral education, her moral motivations should become 
unified.  This is not to say that all understandings of the good across society need 
necessarily to be unified; it is perfectly possible that some people will develop different 
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understandings of the good that are entirely reasonable, and in no way hinder the 
development of their full autonomy.  Instead, it is to say that if we are to allow for the 
development of rationally and fully autonomous citizens, divergence should be 
discouraged, particularly in regard to education for children.  The importance of fairness 
must be the primary moral motivation, guiding the development of both moral powers.      
 
From considering the implications of neural determinism, we could not imagine that David 
would consciously control his thoughts in order to ensure his conception of the good did 
not influence his journalistic writings.  A person committed to a doctrine is likely to be 
influenced by that doctrine across her life, and given the emotional commitments people 
have towards the doctrines which they endorse, people are unlikely to compartmentalise 
these commitments.  Rather than attempt to censor David’s writings, we should instead 
aim for a system of education under which it would be less likely that someone would 
emerge convinced by libertarianism.  To avoid paternalistic acts against David as an adult, 
we should inculcate a desire to act in ways that will uphold the idea of a well-ordered 
society when David is a child.  Thus, David’s motivation to endorse libertarianism – or 
other doctrines that, though reasonable, could act against the principles of justice – as an 
adult should be reduced.  To avoid paternalism against adults, a scheme of perfectionist 
education for children is necessary, where the aim is the development of full autonomy.   
 
Ben Colburn has argued that education that aims to develop autonomy cannot be 
considered perfectionist (Colburn 2008, pp.623-624).  This is because promoting 
autonomy does not necessarily mean people have to be committed to the value of 
autonomy.  It could be that people live autonomous lives without considering autonomy as 
an important value.  An education system that promotes autonomy does not, then, have to 
instil a sense of the importance of autonomy, as people do not have to be aware of 
autonomy’s importance to live autonomous lives.  There is a difference, however, between 
the type of autonomy Colburn aims to promote and that which is under discussion here.  
As Colburn notes, the second moral power as defined by Rawls is synonymous with the 
type of autonomy Colburn wishes to promote (Colburn 2010, p.66).  A person who has the 
capacity to choose the good for herself and live a life in accordance possesses the second 
moral power, on Rawls’ view, and is autonomous, on Colburn’s view.  As noted in Chapter 
3, while rational autonomy is similar to the type of autonomy promoted by Raz and 
Colburn, full autonomy is closer to the Kantian conception of autonomy.  An education 
system that aims to promote full autonomy would necessarily be perfectionist.  The fully 
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autonomous citizen is not one who chooses the good for herself, living a life in accord, but 
one who lives her life justly.  Promoting such a way of life necessarily presupposes a prior 
standard of the good, meaning an education system premised on promoting full autonomy 
could not be considered non-perfectionist.  The aim of this type of education is to 
encourage people to act justly so as to reduce the need to act paternalistically against 
adults.     
 
The assumption here is that what would be considered a paternalistic act against an adult is 
not paternalistic, or at least not unjustifiably paternalistic, if committed against a child.  
John Stuart Mill argued that this was the case (Mill 1859), while liberals since Mill have 
generally agreed.  Dworkin agrees with Mill that arguments against paternalistic 
restrictions of freedom only apply to “mature individuals” (Dworkin 1972).  Quong only 
applies his argument against paternalism to “sane adult citizens” (Quong 2011, p.86).  
Amy Gutmann notes a problem with acting paternalistically against children: as 
justificatory arguments for paternalism often rest on consent, which children as non-
rational agents cannot give, paternalism against children cannot be justified (Gutmann 
1980, pp.339-340).  Nevertheless, Gutmann concludes that paternalism can be justified 
against children on the Rawlsian grounds of the need for primary goods.  As there are 
certain goods rational adults would have wanted to have as children – nutrition, healthcare, 
housing, education – then paternalistic acts which aim to provide such goods to children 
are justified.  If a child was to reject such goods, paternalism against the child would not be 
unjustified.  Rawls, as aforementioned, is also not concerned with paternalism in regard to 
irrational agents, where their irrationality leads them to reject primary goods or their more 
specific aims in life (Rawls 1971, pp.248-250).  Education is bound to respect such 
constraints on freedom, too.  Though Rawls does not explicitly offer an explanation as to 
why this is the case, it can be assumed that it is because we cannot assume the rationality 
of children.  Where children are liable to act in irrational ways, paternalism is justified 
against them.   
 
I agree that the arguments of Gutmann and Rawls are correct.  Overlooked in these 
arguments, however, are the moral powers.  It is not only that paternalism can be justified 
in regard to children on the grounds of ensuring access to primary goods, but also to 
develop a child’s sense of morality.  This, for Mill, was part of the purpose of education 
(1859).  Because of the implications of neural determinism, it cannot be assumed that 
people left to their own devices will become fully autonomous.  Thus, we cannot assume 
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that an individual has a sense of morality that is inherently bound to that necessary for 
justice as fairness.  Therefore, an individual’s sense of morality must be the focus of 
education.  As the child’s sense of morality is yet to fully develop, however, paternalistic 
acts against her cannot be considered unjustified, at least on Quong’s argument against 
paternalism.  If a child does not possess the second moral power, acts against her cannot 
contravene her ability to determine her own good, as she has no such ability.  Thus, 
whether or not such acts against children are considered to be paternalistic, they are not 
unjustified. 
 
Perfectionist education is therefore justified; it cannot be considered unjust due to its being 
paternalistic.  The aim of such a scheme is to inculcate a disposition in the individual 
towards full autonomy.  It does so through establishing an emotional commitment to the 
importance of fairness in the Rawlsian sense.  With such a scheme established, individuals 
are motivated to act as fully autonomous citizens due to their shared understanding of the 
importance of fairness.  An ethos not unlike that of Cohen’s egalitarian ethos is thus 
secured, with citizens being guided by such an ethos in their acts.  As Cohen, following 
Marx, notes, in the case of the appropriate ethos being established, the “state can wither 
away” (Marx 1843, p.241; Cohen 2008, pp.1-2).  Whether or not we follow Marx in 
imagining that the state would necessarily begin to dissolve in the case of citizens 
following the appropriate ethos, with citizens being motivated to act in accord with the 
principles of justice, there will be less need for the use of state power.  We are, then, 
perfectionistic and paternalistic towards children so as not to be paternalistic against adults.    
 
Following such a perfectionist scheme of education, David, Abdul, and Syeda would be 
motivated to develop their full autonomy.  David’s journalism would argue in favour of 
economic principles that support justice as fairness.  Syeda would think more about the 
way in which people may be influenced by ideas expressed on her social media website.  
Furthermore, users of her website would be less inclined to express unreasonable ideas 
with a perfectionist scheme of education in place.  Abdul would not market a product that 
led children to develop eating disorders, nor would his employers wish him to do so.  
Though paternalism would not necessarily be unjustified against David, Syeda, or Abdul if 
they developed their moral powers in ways inconsistent with justice as fairness, rather than 
act paternalistically against an adult, a perfectionist scheme of education would lead 
individuals to develop their moral powers in the appropriate way.  The result of this would 
be a reduction in the diversity of beliefs within a society – someone such as David would 
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be less likely to endorse libertarianism, for instance – but the stability of society would be 
enhanced.   
 
To conclude, if we are to ensure the development of rationally and fully autonomous 
citizens, we must ensure a system of perfectionist education.  Citizens as adults must be 
motivated to endorse and act from the principles of justice.  Therefore, we cannot assume 
this motivation is inherent in the individual; instead, we should ensure it exists in children 
through the system of education.  Through education, children should become motivated to 
endorse justice as fairness.  Reasonable doctrines that are nevertheless in some ways at 
odds with justice as fairness should be discouraged.  The effect of this is likely to reduce 
the diversity of beliefs within a society, yet to also ensure citizens are motivated to uphold 
the idea of a well-ordered society based on terms of fair cooperation.   
      
9.6 Conclusion     
  
A consideration of the data within neuroscience should lead us to recognise the 
vulnerability of autonomy.  Without the existence of the autonomous citizen, the stability 
of political liberalism is lost.  Thus, the development of autonomy should be prioritised.  In 
this chapter, I have explored the consequences of such a move.  The central problem is the 
unreasonable person.  Against Quong, I have claimed that not all unreasonable people are 
Nazis, or similar extremists.  Many people act in ways which undermine the terms of fair 
cooperation and limit the development of autonomy for other people.  If our task is to 
develop a society in which autonomy can flourish, then we need to consider the acts of 
people who impede the development of autonomy for others.  The task of persuading 
unreasonable people to endorse political liberalism is not one of persuading a minority of 
citizens who hold extreme views, but of changing the behaviour of many people across 
society.   
 
To endorse such a move is to be left open to the accusation of paternalism.  While I argue 
we should not be unconcerned about this criticism, I claim that concerns regarding 
paternalism are exaggerated.  Paternalism is sometimes necessary, and it is not the case 
that the political liberal has no standard of the good to measure against.  Where acts 
undermine the sense of fairness, and erode the ability of people to become rationally and 
fully autonomous, as such acts are unreasonable or irrational, we are justified in acting 
paternalistically to prevent such acts.  This is not to say we should desire a paternalistic 
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state.  However, if we are to maintain a society of autonomous citizens, then certain 
paternalistic acts will be necessary.  Rather than act paternalistically towards adults, it is 
preferable to ensure the development of autonomy through the education of children.  On 
this view, the aim of education is to promote the value of full autonomy, reducing the 
motivation of people to think unreasonable ideas, or to act in unreasonable ways.  Thus, 
our scheme of moral education should be perfectionist.  With such a scheme in place, the 





Chapter 10 – Conclusion  
 
10.1 Perfectionism and Full Autonomy  
 
If we are to realise the well-ordered society Rawls imagines, and we take the problem of 
neural determinism seriously, perfectionist measures are needed within political liberalism.  
People cannot be relied on to become fully autonomous – acting from principles of justice 
– drawing only on their own capacities to choose for themselves.  The way in which they 
are influenced by ideas is beyond their control.  In a society containing many unreasonable 
ideas, citizens cannot be expected to become fully autonomous if they come to endorse 
such unreasonable ideas.  Instead, full autonomy must be viewed as a perfectionist ideal 
that citizens are expected to live in accord with.  Thus, there is a standard of the good 
within political liberalism against which we can judge.  A citizen who is fully autonomous 
and committed to acting justly would not be influenced by unreasonable doctrines, nor 
would she seek to influence others through such doctrines.  No sense of justice within a 
society could thrive without people concerned to uphold it.  Thus, if the Rawlsian theory of 
justice is to be maintained within a society, there must be a scheme of moral education that 
motivates people to endorse justice as fairness.   
 
I begin by restating my basic argument.  Following this, I assess the desirability of this 
approach to political theory.  The liberal who views liberalism as founded on the 
importance of individual freedom may be repelled by the idea of imposing a moral doctrine 
on children.  Against this, I argue that if we are to protect liberal values such as freedom of 
choice, we need citizens who are motivated to uphold these values.  In a society of fully 
autonomous citizens, it would be unnecessary to act paternalistically.  Thus, this revision 
of political liberalism is not authoritarian or illiberal.  Finally, I examine some of the 
practical ramifications of this approach.  I argue that approaching political liberalism in 
this way would alter the policy preferences citizens hold.  
       
10.2 The Perfectionism Necessary within Political Liberalism  
 
As Rawls recognises that citizens will often disagree with one another in a democracy, the 
task of his political theory is to identify a constitutional form that will allow for the 
reconciliation of these disagreements (Rawls 1971, pp.195-201).  The constitution he 
imagines is undergirded by the two principles of justice.  Equal rights and basic liberties 
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guaranteed by these principles are thus enshrined in the constitution.  With this established, 
citizens have a duty to act in accord with the constitution, but do not have obligations 
beyond this.  If we imagine that science is considered within political liberalism – at all 
levels of enquiry, from the original position to political deliberation between citizens – 
though there would not be a revision of what are considered essentials of the constitution, 
it would be recognised that citizens have additional duties beyond obeying the rules of the 
constitution.  A deeper commitment is needed to the principles of justice, and citizens 
would need to ensure this commitment is established.   
 
For Rawls, the two principles of justice establish how the constitution should be arranged.  
That is, each person having a claim to the same rights and liberties as all others, and social 
and economic inequalities are arranged to the benefit of the least advantaged (Rawls 2005, 
pp.5-6).  Parties in the original position would recognise that these principles can only 
obtain if there are people motivated to uphold them.  If the truth of Rawls’ account of 
moral psychology is accepted, then it can be assumed that people will be naturally inclined 
to accept these principles.  However, for reasons I have argued throughout this thesis, we 
should not accept this truth.  Instead, we should assess the empirical evidence within 
psychology and neuroscience.  On considering this within the original position, parties 
would recognise that we cannot rely on a person accepting the principles of justice due to 
her innate moral psychology, or her capacity for free will.  If the principles of justice are to 
be accepted, society should be devised so as to foster the appropriate form of moral 
psychology.  This requires more than ensuring the just workings of institutions.  Even in a 
society with perfectly just institutions, a person may not be committed to the principles of 
justice if her moral psychology is not aligned with the Rawlsian sense of fairness.   
 
Acting against an adult to ensure her moral psychology cohered with this sense of fairness 
would undermine the liberty of conscience enshrined in the first principle of justice, 
meaning this would become self-defeating.  As Amy Guttman has argued (1980), 
paternalism against children can be justified on Rawlsian grounds; we should, then, be 
perfectionist and paternalistic towards children to avoid such acts of paternalism against 
adults.  Through such perfectionist measures, the development of moral psychology could 
be fostered through education.  The aim of such education is the development of fully 




When determining how the constitution should be arranged in accordance with the 
principles of justice, these implications should be considered.  If the stability of the 
constitution is to be realised, fully autonomous citizens need to uphold the principles of 
justice.  Under principles that guaranteed equal rights and liberties, and arranged social 
inequalities to the benefit of the least advantaged, it is still possible that a person would use 
these rights and liberties to the detriment of these principles.  Therefore, if a just and stable 
constitution is to be supported within the kind of well-ordered society imagined by Rawls, 
a commitment to the development of full autonomy must be established.  Through being 
perfectionist in regard to children, we avoid the need to be paternalistic against adults in 
the task of ensuring the development of full autonomy.  With this established, the stability 
of a liberal political order is better ensured.        
 
10.3 Is this Desirable?  
 
It may be thought that this is an illiberal approach, and therefore undesirable.   One might 
take into consideration the implications of neuroscience, but still maintain a commitment 
to the importance of freedom of choice.  Regardless of the level of control we hold over 
our thoughts, a person may believe that the protection of freedom of choice is sacrosanct.  
If a person chooses to endorse political libertarianism, as in the example of David in 
Chapter 9, this should be his choice to make, as the author of his own life.  This bears on 
what a person views as being the aim of liberalism.  One might view rational autonomy as 
being of greater importance than full autonomy.  If the aim of liberalism is to enable 
people to lead a life of their own choosing, and all the other ends of liberalism are 
subordinate to the protection of individual choice, then it is irreconcilable with this revision 
of political liberalism.  Instead, this revision prioritises the stability of a well-ordered 
society supported by a just constitution.  Within this, people will still be able to live lives 
of their own choosing, but choice will be subordinate to stability.  I argue that if the end of 
liberalism is to enable freedom of choice – as in the tradition of Mill’s approach to 
liberalism – then this revision of political liberalism will not be appealing.  However, I 
explain why this conception of liberalism should not necessarily be viewed as unattractive 
or illiberal.   
 
Jean Jacques Rousseau argued that if a person refused to obey the general will, he would 
be forced to do so (Rousseau 1762).  In this sense, Rousseau thought the person was being 
“forced to be free”.  By taking an approach to political liberalism that prioritises full 
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autonomy, I am not arguing that a person must be forced to be fully autonomous.  Instead, 
the formulation of society should be such that a person desires to become fully 
autonomous.  Rather than being forced to be autonomous, my argument is that people must 
be encouraged to consider the importance of fairness.  There is no argument here for the 
power of the state to be used to force people to act justly across their lives.  It is instead a 
matter of the culture of a society being such that a person is motivated to act as a fully 
autonomous citizen.  As argued in Chapter 9, perfectionist measures are taken in regard to 
children to avoid paternalism against adults.  Rather than interfering with the freedom of 
adults, we should encourage the appropriate dispositions in children so that, as adults, 
people are motivated to act justly.   
 
The liberal who views liberalism as promoting choice, enabling people to lead lives of 
their own choosing, may be troubled by the revision of political liberalism I have offered.  
Liberals in the tradition of John Stuart Mill (1859) may be particular troubled by this.  For 
instance, Joseph Raz, who views liberalism as founded on the promotion of individual 
liberty (Raz 1986, p.367), would presumably not desire a state that prioritised the 
promotion of a particular way of life over the protection of individual freedom.  If choice is 
central to what is important in our lives, and the state should protect our ability to make 
choices, it would seem contradictory for the state to impose a certain sense of morality on 
people through its education system.  As it is for people to develop their second moral 
power, a person’s moral commitments are for her to determine.  On this revision of 
political liberalism, however, I am not arguing that choice needs to be prevented.  Instead, 
we should ensure that people have the necessary dispositions to make good choices as 
adults.  It should not be assumed that people are born with such dispositions.  If a liberal 
society with a just constitution is to be sustainable, a citizenry with the appropriate moral 
psychology is necessary.  The development of such a moral psychology should be 
prioritised over the protection of individual free choice.  Once a person has reached 
adulthood, however, there is no argument for the use of state power in relation to her moral 
choices.  As argued in Chapter 9, perfectionism is utilised for children to avoid being 
paternalistic towards adults.   
 
However, this is not to assume that society will be perfectly just, or that all citizens will 
necessarily accept justice as fairness.  There is nothing to prevent citizens from choosing to 
endorse alternative doctrines.  If as an adult, a person chooses to endorse political 
libertarianism, this choice should be respected; the power of the state should not be used in 
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an attempt to prevent this choice, nor should the person be sanctioned  This person would 
pose little threat to stability in a society largely committed to justice as fairness.  No use of 
state power would be used to prevent people from endorsing the beliefs they wish to 
believe.  In a society committed to justice as fairness, the first principle of justice would 
protect freedom of conscience; if “each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic rights and liberties” (Rawls 2005, p.5), the state could not infringe 
one person’s right to freedom of conscience without imposing the same infringement on all 
others.  To do so would be self-defeating.  This approach to liberalism is premised on the 
need to develop a society which is committed to liberal ideals.  It cannot be assumed that 
people will necessarily come to endorse liberal ideals through their own capacity for free 
will, or an innate sense of morality.  This is why a perfectionist scheme of moral education 
is necessary.  If the appropriate moral sentiments that enable a person to become fully 
autonomous are developed in children, it is not necessary to act paternalistically against 
adults.  Once people have developed to be fully autonomous, there is no need for the use of 
state power in matters pertaining to individual morality; it can be assumed that most of the 
choices a person makes will be just if she has a commitment to the principles of justice.   
 
In this sense, individual choices can be respected with less concern regarding the 
consequences of these choices than would be the case in a society prioritising the 
protection of individual choice.  In the latter case, people may use the freedoms granted to 
them to choose to vote for policies which would end those same freedoms.  With no prior 
commitment to the importance of these freedoms on the part of citizens, there is little to 
prevent citizens from acting in this way, if they are persuaded to do so.  However, citizens 
with a prior commitment to the importance of full autonomy and acting justly are unlikely 
to be persuaded by unreasonable ideas.  Thus, through promoting the development of full 
autonomy, freedom of choice is better protected than under a scheme which primarily aims 
to protect freedom of choice.   
 
Hence, this revision of political liberalism should not necessarily be viewed as 
unattractively authoritarian or illiberal.  It is instead an argument to protect liberal values in 
light of the problems revealed through the empirical evidence.  Rather than assume people 
will act as citizens should in a liberal democracy providing the institutions are just, society 
should be structured as to ensure fully autonomous citizens who are motivated to act justly.  
The proponent of political liberalism who holds that constitutional stability is to be attained 
should take the implications of neural determinism seriously.  If the aim of liberalism is a 
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society of reasonable people upholding a just constitution, the development of moral 
psychology needs to be considered.  To reach a state in which the majority of citizens are 
reasonable and act in accord with the prescriptions of full autonomy, a scheme of moral 
education would be needed, the consequence of which would be a reduction in the 
diversity of beliefs within society.  Nevertheless, the liberal who, above all else, wishes to 
protect freedom of choice and this diversity of beliefs will no doubt not be persuaded by 
this formulation of liberalism.         
 
10.4 Beyond the Constitution  
 
Having explained why I view this revision of political liberalism as being more stable, I 
now turn to how it may help us respond to other political, social, and environmental issues.  
People viewing themselves as autonomous, but recognising the limits to their capacity to 
exercise free choice, would favour different political principles from those they would 
endorse on Rawls’ formulation of political liberalism.  As aforementioned, Rawls was 
primarily concerned with the basic structure of society.  Thus, his theory of justice aims to 
identify the type of constitution which will support a just society through just institutions.  
On this revision of political liberalism, citizens will favour a slightly altered constitution, 
but also recognise that the attainment of justice requires other citizens motivated to act 
justly.  In this section, I assess possible adjustments to the constitution, and how the 
political behaviour of citizens might be altered.   
 
Spinoza, explaining the ethical consequences that followed from his metaphysical doctrine 
– according to which, we are all part of the divine nature, and everything that exists does 
so out of necessity – argues that, on accepting this doctrine, we would change our social 
lives.  This doctrine, Spinoza says: 
 
Teaches us to hate no one, to disesteem no one, to mock no one, to be angry at 
no one, to envy no one (Spinoza 1677, p.68).   
 
Spinoza goes on to claim that, with our reason reflecting on this doctrine, we would be 
compelled to help each other.  Likewise, J.J.C. Smart, in an essay critiquing the libertarian 
position on free will (Smart 1961), argued that if determinism was accepted as true, we 
should be less inclined to judge and blame people for their failings.  I argue that the fully 
autonomous citizen, recognising the importance of acting justly, but also the vulnerability 
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of her own autonomy – that her autonomy is the result of the social environment in which 
she lives – would accept the propositions offered by Spinoza and Smart.  While the fully 
autonomous citizen is motivated to act justly, she does not castigate those who fail in their 
moral duties.  Instead, she recognises the need to structure society so as to increase the 
likelihood of people acting justly.    
 
Thus, on this approach to political liberalism, fully autonomous citizens would alter their 
political behaviour.  Fundamentally, on this approach, less emphasis is placed on the 
importance of free choice, and more on the need to act justly.  If we cannot rely on a 
person to develop the appropriate sense of justice through her own capacity for free will, 
this motivation must be encouraged in her from childhood.  I now offer brief explanations 
of how this approach may alter political and social behaviour.       
 
A different attitude may be taken towards the kind of inequalities existing within a society.  
As Cohen argued, the kinds of inequalities considered just on the difference principle 
would not obtain in a society in which there was an egalitarian ethos (Cohen 2008).  
Similarly, in a society of fully autonomous citizens, people would not act in ways that 
would undermine the ability of others to realise their own rational and full autonomy.  A 
successful entrepreneur would not seek to protect her wealth at the expense of the least 
advantaged.  Furthermore, as citizens recognise the limited capacity people have to 
consciously control their thought processes, less blame would be placed on people for 
economic failures.  If people can do little to prevent their thought processes being 
influenced by phenomena they encounter, then there may be little they can do to prevent 
bad economic choices as a result of these influences.  Thus, a different attitude toward 
welfare policies could be justified on this basis, one that is more egalitarian and less 
acquiescent towards inequalities.        
 
As in the example of Abdul in Chapter 9, fully autonomous citizens would not act in ways 
that would undermine the rational autonomy of other citizens.  An adult whose childhood 
addictions had stymied her ability to determine a rational plan of life could not be 
rationally autonomous.  Thus, a fully autonomous citizen would not engage in activities 
which could affect others in this way.  She would not consider it the duty of other citizens 
to exercise their capacity to choose freely in order to overcome such obstacles.  Instead, 
acting justly, she would not engage in such practices.  Thus, in a society of fully 
autonomous citizens, businesses would not desire to sell harmful products, journalists 
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would not deceive their readers, nor would gambling venues allow people to lose their life 
savings.  It would be recognised that such acts prevent others from developing their own 
autonomy.   
 
Finally, a fully autonomous citizen, considering the implications of neural determinism, 
would be less likely to desire a punitive justice system.  Being less inclined to blame and 
judge others for their failings, fully autonomous citizens would think instead about how the 
structure of society influences the choices a person makes.  Reducing the causes of crime 
and focusing on rehabilitation would be prioritised over retribution.  Fundamentally, the 
aim would be to instil in people the importance of acting justly that would reduce the 
likelihood of people acting against the rules of fair cooperation.  Thus, focusing on the 
development of full autonomy and the sense of morality it promotes would settle certain 
questions of law and order.          
 
That such changes to society would be made, along with the ways of life within society, 
gives us further reason to consider the implications of neuroscience.  On considering these 
implications, and realising the importance of full autonomy, citizens would alter their 
political preferences.  Instilling a sense of the importance of fairness in people is to prepare 
them for life in a cooperative society supported by a just constitution.  Citizens recognising 
the importance of fairness would be committed to upholding the ideals that maintain such a 
society and constitution.  However, this requires more than recognition and understanding 
of how the basic structure of society upholds just institutions.  It requires citizens to be 




Glossary   
 
Action Potential – The state of a neurone when its voltage is increased as it communicates 
with other neurones. 
Amygdala – Part of the limbic system concerned with emotion.  
Anterior – At the front.  
Basal Ganglia – A group of large nuclei that regulate both voluntary and involuntary 
movements.   
Cerebellum – A structure at the back of the brain that allows for conscious awareness of 
movement and the position of the body.  
Cerebral Cortex – The main section of the cerebrum, and the section responsible for a 
large part of our thought processes.  
Cingulate Cortex – Part of the cerebral cortex that regulates emotional responses in 
conjunction with the amygdala in the limbic system.  
Dorsal – At the back or top.  
Lateral – At the side.  
Limbic System – The name for a system including several parts of the brain – the 
amygdala, hippocampus, limbic cortex, and septal area – responsible for memory and 
emotion.   
Motor Cortex – The control centre for our bodily movements, including the primary 
motor cortex, pre-motor cortex, and the supplementary motor area.  
Nucleus (plural: nuclei) – A group of neurones.   
Neurone – The cells contained in the brain and nervous system that allow for the 
communication of information throughout the brain and body.  
Posterior – At the back.  
Posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus – Contained within Wernicke’s area, a part 
concerned with speech, along with interpreting the intentions of others.  
Prefrontal Cortex – Part of the cerebral cortex involved in the process of memory and 
learning.  
Pre-Motor Cortex – Part of the motor cortex responsible for modulating actions.  
Primary Motor Cortex – The main part of the motor cortex, and a part playing a large 
role in voluntary movements.  
Readiness Potential – Activity in the brain occurring before the body acts.  
Striatum – A nucleus that transmits dopamine found within the basal ganglia.  
Substantia Nigra – Part of the basal ganglia and transmits dopamine via the striatum.  
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Supplementary Motor Area – Part of the motor cortex that regulates body movement.  
Thalamus – A pair of structures that allow for the conveying of sensory information.  
Ventral – At the bottom.  
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